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2015] THE IRRELEVANT CONSTITUTION 609 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Edward Snowden became a household name m the 
summer of 2013, a majority of Americans still viewed dragnet-
style surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) as an 
acceptable means of combatting terrorism.' President George W. 
Bush publicly acknowledged in 2005 that the NSA had been 
conducting surveillance of ordinary Americans through the 
unprecedented collection of individual phone records and emails 
after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11).2 By 
January of 2014, however, public opinion had shifted." For the 
first time in history, Americans are grappling with the gravity of 
our emerging surveillance state. 
The American public has legitimate cause for alarm. Once the 
stuff of "paranoid fantasy,"· the era of ubiquitous government 
surveillance has arrived in large part due to the expansion of 
1 P EW Rt-:REARCH CTR., MAJORITY VIEWS NSA AS ACCEPTAHI.": ANTI-T .. :RROR TACTIC" 
PUBLIC SAYS INVESTIGATE TERRORISM, EVEN IF IT INTRUDES ON PRiVACY (2013). Gllailahic at 
http://www.people-prcss.orglfilesllegacy-pdfl06-10-13%20WP%20 SurveHl anceo 20Release.lldf. 
2 Devlin Barrett, U.S. Declassifies Some Details of Bush-Era S urueillance: Obumn 
Administration Still OpposPs Disclosure of Specifzcs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2013. http://olliin 
e.wsj.com/news/artlcl('s/SBl0001424052702303773704579272121175326400; .Jnml!s Risen 
& Eric Lichtblau, Blish Lets U.S. Sp:von Callers Without Courts, N.Y. T rMES, Dec. 15, 20U5, 
http://www.nytimes.com/20051121161politicsl16program.html. The program was reportedly 
discontinued in 2007. Dan Eggen, Omrl Will ()uerstP Wiretap Program, WASIl. POST, ,Jan. 
18, 2007, at ADl, auailable at http://www.w8shingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentiarticlel2007/ 
Ol/1 7/AR200701 1701256.html; I~etter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., tn 
Patrick Leahy, ChaIrman of the Comm. on the .Judiciary, and Arlen Specter, Ranking 
Minority Member of the Comm. of the Judiciary (Jan 17, 2007), available at http://hosted. 
ap.orgldynam ic/fi les/specials/in teractives/wdcJdocu mentS/fill alGonzaleh 07 0 117 . pdf?S IT JI>:A 
P&SECTION=HOME.www.people-press.org/fiIesllegacy-pdfl06-10-13%20WP%20Surveillnn 
ce%20Rl~lease.pdf. 
:1 See HUsan Page, Poll: Most Americans Now Oppose the NSA Program, USA TODAY 
(Jon. 20, 2014. 3:10 PM). http://www.usatoday.coml. tory/newsipoliticsl2014/01l201po!l-ns ... 
surveillance/46:J85511 (finding that most Americans polled now mdicate their disapproval or 
thn .6WCllping NSA survei1lance). 
I See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A Exammes SoclUi Networks of U.S. CitizPIIS, 
N.Y. TIMF.B, Sept. 29, 2013, at 22, auailable at http://www.nytimes.com/2013J09l29/uFJnsa-(.xn 
minesosocial-networks·f)f-us-citizens.html?src=twrhp& r=0 (describing the extremity of lhl! 
government intrusion); Dan FnlOkin, Top .Journalists and I.Alwyers: NSA Sllrllt'illa//c(~ 
Threatens Press Freedom alld Right 10 Council, T ilt: INTlmCI~I"I' (Julv 28. 2014, 9:a4 AM). 
hll}J:llfi rstlook.orgltheinteITeptJ~nI4/07/2H1nsa-survei llnncl!·threatens-pre~.{n'l,dmn-right''''1 
unsel-survey-f'indsl (describing the actual mtrusion as "previomliy ('on!Jidcred the stull' of 
paranoid fantasy"). 
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advanced technology and bulk data in private hands.5 Gone are the 
days in which cutting-edge clandestine surveillance was conducted 
through direct-yet relatively exceptional-methods like court-
ordered wiretaps. The government now carries out much of its 
surveillance by applying mathematical algorithms to huge sets of 
data that customers willingly turn over to third-party sources such 
as Verizon and Google.6 Privately-sourced phone, e-mail, and IP 
address information is then paired with so-called "enrichment data" 
from Facebook, credit card companies, airline manifests, voter 
registration rolls, GPS devices, aerial and closed-circuit camera 
photos,7 facial recognition systems," embedded microchips,9 and 
web-tracking technologies to create intimate personal dossiers of 
unsuspecting individuals who have broken no laws. 
[. See Obama's Speech on N.SA Surveillance, N.Y. T1MES, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.nytim 
es.com/2014/01l181uslpoliticslobamas-speech·on-nsa-phone-surveillanee.html (acknowledging 
tha t. technological advances, including those that facilitate bulk data gath(·ring by private 
corporations, invite abuse of Americans' civil liberties if left unrestrained), 
B See Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg Miller, Edward Snnwden Comes fhrward as 
Source of NSA Leaks, WASH. POb.,., June 9, 2013, http://wWW.w8shingtonpost.comJpolitics/ 
intelligence-Iearders· push-back -on·Jeakers-media/2013106109/flf80160·d 122·1 e2'8 73e-826d299 
ff459_st.ory.html (discussing the shocking revelation of Burveil1ancc program .. that collect. datn 
from third-party sources such as Verizon); Timothy B. Lee, Here's Everything We Know About 
PRISM to Da1.e, WASH. POST, June 12,2013. http://www.w8shingtonpost.comlblogslwonkblog/ 
wp/2013/061l2lheres-everything-we-know-nbou ~-prism-to-datel (discussing how the NSA'", 
PRISM program allows the NSA to coJlect data directly from the servers of Internet 
companies). 
7 See Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Eueryone in an Area lor 
Several Hours at a Time, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.comlbusinessl 
technology/new-surveillance-technology-can-track-everyone-in-an-area-for-several-hours-at-a-t 
imel2014/02/05lB2fl556e·B76f·lle3·a5bd·B44629433ba3_slory.html (discussing state use of 
aerial camera surveilJance). 
II See Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity. Faceprints. and the Constitution, 21 GEO. MAsON L. 
REV. 409,432-36 (2014) (describing facial recognition technology and its use); James Risen & 
Laura Poitras, N.SA Collecting Millions of Faces from Web Images, N.Y. TIMES, June I, 2014, 
at AI, aooilable at http://www.nytimes.oom/2014/06l01luslnsa-coUecting-millions-of-faces-
from-web-images.html (describing the NSA's expanding use of facial recognition technology for 
surveillance); Naomi Wolf, The New Totalitarianism 0/ Surveillance Technology, THE 
GUARDIAN. Aug. 15, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012Jaug/15/ncw-
totalitarianism-surveillance-technology (discussing the use of facial recognition technology in 
New York City); Natasha Singer, Never ForgeUing a Face, N.Y. TIMF.8, May 18, 2014, at BUl, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014J05/18/technology/never.forgettingaaface.html 
(describing a scientific pioneer's misgivings with the trajectory of facial recognition 
technology). 
II See generally KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIz McINTYRE, SPYCHIPS (plume 2006) (discussing 
the impact of microchip technology on privacy). 
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Such data insourcing1o for purposes of surveillance is of a piece 
with the government's widespread practice of outsourcing 
sovereign responsibilities to third parties through service contracts 
and other devices that effectively transfer public power to private 
hands. In both circumstances, existing law is not up to the task of 
ensuring that government officials remain accountable to the 
populace for sponsored activities. Statutory surveillance law and 
Fourth Amendment doctrine were crafted in the pre-digital age, 
when unconsented monitoring by the government was the greatest 
threat to privacy.11 Yet today, private industry parses and stores 
personal information on a scale that is exponentially greater than 
that which the government can aspire to on its own.12 The 
government capitalizes on such troves of private sector 
1o Insourcing is typically used to describe "the use of government personnel to perform 
functions that contractors have performed on behalf of federal agencies." KATE M. MANU!':!, & 
JACK MASKELl., CONG. R&SF.ARCH SERV., R41810, INSOURCING FUNCTIONS PERmRMEJ> IW 
FEDERAL CONTRAf'TONS: LEGAL ISSUES (2013), available at http:Jffas.orgfsgp/cra/misc/R418 
lO.pdf. It has been promoted by recent Congresses as well as the Obama Administration in 
response to concerns over outsourcing. /d. As used in this Article, "insourcing" refers to the 
government's use of private sector data and lack of constitutional limitations that govern it. It 
does not include information that private persons are required to provide the government by 
law or regulation. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text {summarizing routine data 
collection through tax returns and other incidents of citizenship). This Article does not discuss 
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (amended 2014), which is the primary legal authority 
addressing the government's use and sharing of records but does not bind private parties or 
restrict the government's ability to collect information from third parties. It provides that 
agencies shall "collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject 
individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's 
rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs." /d. § 552a(e)(2). The Privacy Act 
contains an exception for law enforcement activity. /d. § 552a(b){7). 
11 See Neil M. Richards, 1'he Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. Rb"V. 1934, 1940 
(2013) (observing that existing surveillance laws "focus(] on unconsented surveillance 
rather than on surveillance as part of (a] transaction"); Thomas Y. Davies, Recouering the 
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 620 (1999) C'(T]he historical sources 
show that the Framers worded the search and seizure provisions as they did to counter the 
possibility that legislators might authorize use of general warrants for customs searches of 
houses ... .'1. In referring to privacy, this Article focuses less on information nondisclosure 
and more on liberty or, as Anita Allen describes it, ~freedom from governmental or other 
outside interference with decisionmaking and conduct, especiaUy respecting appropriately 
private affairs." Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Priuacy, Private Choice, and Social 
Contract Theory, 56 U. CJN. L. R~;v. 461, 464-66 (1987). For a discussion of the dangers of 
ubiquitous surveillance, see Brown, supra note 8, at 434-36. 
12 See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Priuate-Public Intelligence Partnerships 
in the War on Terror, 96 CAJ.IF. L. REV. 901, 902 (2008) (discussing how the private sector 
has a "comparative advantage over the government in acquiring vast amounts of potentially 
useful data"). 
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information for its own surveillance. \:1 It also hires private parties 
for military combat operations, nuclear weapons management, 
municipal policing, prison administration, policy planning am! 
rulemaking, public benefits determinations, international 
relations work, and its own personnel management. I•1 
Because the Constitution only applies to state action,l. the 
government's use of private sources to conduct its work evades 
constitutional barriers that would otherwise operate to ensure 
accountability to the people. 16 Outsourcing and data insourcing 
occupy what amounts to a pocket of constitutional immunity as an 
accident of doctrinal shortsightedness." Numerous scholars have 
outlined legislative proposals for addressing private sector 
involvement in government practices. I" This Article seeks to 
13 PRul Ohm, The FOILrth Amendment in a Warld Without PrilJOCY, Al MJs.~. L.J. 1:l09. 
1311. 1321-22 (2012) (discussing the govornment's increasing reliance on private 
surveillanc~); Michaels, supra note 12, at 909 ("111f the government can convince private 
husinesRes tD share their data collections, it can make An end-run around the more 
I:l tringent restrictions limiting its ability to acceSB information directly,"), 
I I Dan Guttman, Governance by Cmttract: Constillliional Visions; Time for Reflection and 
Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321,323 (2004); see Michaels, supra note 12, at 902 (discussing 
the extent to which the government relies on the private sector). 
16 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) ("This court hnR ... constrlll'd 
!Fourth Amendment] protection as proscribing only governmental action."). 
III Sl'e Christopber Slobogjn, Gouernrnent Data Mining and the Fourth Amendllwtl/, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 317, 321 (2008) (observing that "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence appears to 
leave data mining completely unregulated" and proposing a framework for interpreting lht· 
doctrine to require limitations on government data mining); c{. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video 
Suruei.l/ance and the Constitution. of Public Space: Fitting llU! Fourth Amendment 10 a World 
'11101 Tracks Image and Identity. 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349. 1364-65 (2004) (arguin~ that . 
ius lcnd o( protecting individual expectations of privacy, courts shou1d identify nnd protect. 
lJublic SpacefO that allow privacy interests to exist). 
11 C(. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globali.wlion. Democracy. and Iht' Nt¥!d {nr a NPIf' 
Arlmitlislraliue I~w, 10 IND. J. GLOBAl. LEOAL S11)n. 125, 1:10 (20()3) (discutiNing huw 
privRtiUltion of outsourcing creates a "democracy deficit" hy reducing transparency undl.'r 
currl~nt policies). 
114 SCI'. ('.g., id. at 151-54 (advocating for amendment of lh(~ Administrative Procedure Act 
to l'nsurc proper accountability of government contractors Rnd private actors performing 
government functions)i Anthony LaPlaca, Settling the Itlherently GOllernmelllai Functions 
11·lmte OnCt' and for All: The Need {or CnmprchensiVt! l~g;slati(Jn of Private Security 
Contractors in Afghanistan, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 745, 764 (2012) ("Congress should explicitly 
preclude the Government from outsourcing certain functions by adopting binding legislation 
that gives teeth to restrictions on private security contracting."); David Thaw, The Efficacy 
uf Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. RF:v. 287, 370-71 (2014) (indicating that 
cyhersecurity regulatory reform should include n comhination of "Management. Based 
Hegulatory Delegation" and "directive regulation"); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & 
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establish that, in spite of the many shortfalls in prevailing 
doctrine, recognition of constitutional limits on the government's 
use of insourcing and outsourcing to perform sovereign functions 
is-or should be-inexorable. Such limits can be derived from the 
Constitution's structure, which assumes that the government 
remains ultimately accountable to the people for the exercise of its 
functions. With an eye towards creative litigation, this Article 
recasts state action, private delegation, and Fourth Amendment 
doctrine in ways that enable judicial review of whether the 
government has structured its outsourcing and data insourcing 
relationships in ways that preserve constitutional accountability. 
Part I describes the problem. Although governments have long 
relied on private parties to perform their core functions, 19 the 
practice in the United States today is so widespread that "[t]he 
fact that some of what government does can be done better and 
cheaper by the private sector has gained such momentum that the 
public sector is sometimes seen as redundant or irrelevant."20 The 
government conducts much of its surveillance using massive 
amounts of the private sector's data.2t Because private 
corporations operate extra constitutionally,22 the net effect of the 
(2011) (making cautionary recommendattons for legislatures developing privacy law 
reforms); rf Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What Dri!Jes It, 
How to /mproue It, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 0UTSOUIWING AND AMEHJCAN 
DEMOCRACY 192, 235-38 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (arguing for a greater 
focus on government employees and contract workers, as opposed to increased legislation, to 
improve government outsourcmg). 
18 Guttman, supra note 14, at 323; Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose a11d Priuale Seruice: 
The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the EuoliJin.g Law of Diffused 
So1Jere1gnty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 863-64 (2000) (describing the evolution of privatized 
government over the course of the twentieth century). 
2ll Paul R. Vcrkuil, Public Law Limitations on Prwatization of CloiX!rnml!nt Functions, H4 
N.C. L. REV. 397, 397 (2006). The primary rattonale supporting privatization-that private 
market11 are more efficient and apolitical than government-is itself subject to sharp 
debate. See, e.g., Matthew Tttolo, PriVatization and lhe Market Frame, 60 BUI-'F. L . REV. 
493, 494 (2012) (providing a cnhcal examination "of those assumptions and suggest[ing} 
that we abandon our baseline Vtew of privatization as efficient, neutral, and apolitical to 
adopt a default view of privati:&ation as fraught with normative implications"); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 432 (2003) (''When the 
government depends on private actors for regulatory functions, it has the cost of contracting 
with those actors and monitoring their performance. These costs can exceed any cost 
savings created by relying on private actors to perform regulatory functions.'). 
21 See Ohm, supra note 13, at 1322 (discussing the ~increasing reliance on technological 
advances and private surveillance" by the government). 
2~ See supra note 15. 
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government's insourcing of privately sourced data and its 
outsourcing of power to the private sector is a dilution of the 
relevancy of the Constitution when it comes to ensuring 
accountability to the public for the exercise of sovereign functions. 
Part III describes the current legislative frameworks that apply 
to federal outsourcing and data insourcing for government 
surveillance, and explains how both fail to meaningfully limit the 
government's ability to outsource public functions or adequately 
control its access to private data for surveillance.'" 
Part IV rev:iews the constitutional doctrine bearing on 
privatization, which developed without a coherent framework for 
testing alterations to the tripartite structure of government. As a 
consequence, ad hoc case law under the state action doctrine, the 
private delegation doctrine, and the Fourth Amendment has failed 
to account for the myriad ways in which the private sector 
infiltrates modern government, relying instead on the false 
assumption that the public and private spheres can be treated as 
distinct for purposes of constitutionallaw.24 
Part V argues that the merging of the public and private sectors 
should instead be analyzed against a presumption of adherence to 
constitutional structure that assumes-and thus requires as a 
matter of first principles-that government is accountable to the 
people."5 Recognizing that the law must evolve within existing 
doctrine to the extent possible, this Article goes on to make a case 
23 See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (summarizing the deficiencies of the 
current regulatory scheme), 
:u See infra notes ~98. 335-38, 3~75 and accompanying text... FOT a discussion or 
the First Amendment in the context of metadata surveillance, see Brown. supra note 8, at 
449-55. 
" See Akhil Reed Amar. Of Souereignty and Federalism, 96 YALe L.J. 1425, 1431-36 
(1987) (contrasting the eighteenth-century British belief thot sovereignty was unlimited 
and "resided in the [King)" with the American concept that "f{oyernment entities were 
sovereign only in B limited and derivative sense, exercising authority only within 
boundaries set by the sovereign Peoplej. But cf. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency. 549 
U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (suggesting that the Constitution is a compromise between the 
national government and the states, which ceded "sovereign prerogatives" to the former); 
Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Con.stitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46 
AM. J. COMPo L. 481, 482 (1998) (observing that some commentators view the Constitution 
"as a blueprint for decision making processes, rather than 8S a guarantee of substantive 
outcome" and emphasizing that "no clear consensus exists within the United States over 
what functions are either properly or exclusively the government's" (citing Ronald A Cass, 
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for recalibrating state action, private delegation, and Fourth 
Amendment doctrine as potential tools for rendering the 
government constitutionally accountable to the public when it 
outsources sovereign functions to the private sector or insources 
third-party data for use in its own surveillance activities,26 
II. OUTSOURCING, DATA INSOURCING, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Although privatization takes many forms,27 perhaps the most 
familiar is the traditional service contract, whereby a private third-
party agrees to perform some function that the government would 
otherwise perform for itself, such as routine building maintenance.'· 
Traditional service contracting becomes problematic when it 
implicates core government functions or individual civil liberties,29 
~1I Thifl Article does not advocate for stronger constitutional boundaries on outsourcing in aU 
circumsLances. The issue ho.s sharp political undertones that are beyond the scope of this 
Article. Whereas liberals might seek to limlt outsourcing and insourcing in order to enhance 
government accountability and preserve civil Hberties, for example, conservatives might 
promote the same methods with the objective of shrinking the size of government. C{. Douglas 
H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegatian and the Unitary Executiue, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. 
J.. 251, 272 (2010) ("If the Congress had to vote on the Code of Federal Regulations rule by 
rule, much if not most of it surely would fail. Yet those rules have the force of law without 
Congress having voted at al1."). See generally Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: 
Prioatizal;"n, Public·"at;"n, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 111, 113-17 
(2005) (chscussing the benefits and challenges of contracting out government work). 
27 See generally JANIN~ R. WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE: How THE WORLD'S NEW POWER 
BROKERS UNDERMIN" D EMOCRACY, GOVERNMENT, AND THE FREE MARKET 74-75 (2009) 
(chscussing ways in which lOa hoat of nongovernmental players do the government's work, 
often overshadowing government bureaucracy, which sometimes looks like Swiss cheese: 
full of hol.s"). 
:pt See Jack M. Beermann, Priuatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1607, 1522-25, 1529-53 (2001) (discussing numerous ways in which the government 
"contract[e) out"); Paul Seidenstat, The Mechanics of CAntracting Out, in CONTRACTING OUT 
GOVENNMENT SERVICF_' 233-47 (Paul Seidenstat ed.. 1999) (88me); Jon D . Michaels, 
Priuat1Zation's Progeny, 101 GloD. L.J . 1023, 1026-27 (2013) (discussing privatization in the 
form of the "marketization of bureaucracy" and "government by bounty''). 
29 See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, 
in GOVBRNMEN'r BY CONTRACT: OUTSOUHCING AND AMBRICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 18, at 
2 (noting how critk s of government outsourcing worry that its expansion in military, 
security. and intelhgence and policymaking functions further restricts the government's 
ability to ensure adherence to democratic norms); Verkuil, supra note 20, at 402, 420-32 
(argu ing that. some dIscretionary, policymaking funct ions of government should not be 
delegated to the private sector and suggestmg that the nondelegation doctrine can be used 
to determine what may and may not be delegated). 
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such as military operations on the battlefield,"o the drafting of 
regulations,"' or management of nuclear weapons sites."" Other 
forms of outsourcing include industry deregulation; the use of 
vouchers;"" the divestiture of government assets to private parties;"' 
and the infusion of market principles into the public sector by 
curtailing collective bargaining rights of government employees or 
converting civil service jobs to at-will positions.3s Outsourcing has 
received substantial scholarly attention because it challenges the 
basic structure of government and the presumption that the public 
and the private spheres are distinct.36 
Edward Snowden brought to the forefront of public 
consciousness an inconspicuous manifestation of privatization: the 
government's reliance on privately held personal data for 
intelligence and law enforcement surveillance.37 This practice-
which this Article calls "data insourcing"-is a form of outsourcing; 
the government relies on private parties to perform a function 
(intelligence· gathering) that it would otherwise provide 
independently. Because the private sector is not bound by the 
Constitution, it can collect private information with constitutional 
impunity.3s In bootstrapping that data as its own, the government 
30 See Denis Chamberland, Contractors on the Battlefield: Outsourcing of Military, NAT'I. 
n";f<', MAn., Mar. 2011, available at http://www.nationaldefenscmagazine.org/nrchive/20111 
MarchlPageslContractorsontheBattleCieldOutsourcingMilitaryServices.aspx (d iscussing the 
challenge of maintaining control over private contractofH for military services Rnd the 
methods in place to deal with this chalJenge). 
31 See Chris Sagers, The Myth 0/ "Privatization," 69 ADMIN. 1.... REV. :17. 45-46 (2007) 
(noting that privatization writers have expressed concern about the privatization of 
"seemingly inherent. government functions" like policymnking). 
:l2 See Gene AJoise. U,s. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OrneR, GAO-1O-11fi, NATIONAl, NUCU~R 
Sl-;CURITY AnMINIS'f'RA'I'ION NEEDS TO BEITER MANAGB RISKS AH.~n(,IATlm WITH 
MOIll';RNIr.A'I'ION (w ITS PI.ANTH 7 (Oct. 2009) (noting that outsourcing components of 11 nucl(!ar 
weapons plant may increase the risk that the components will he obtainpd by adversaries). 
33 Beermann, supra note 28, at 1519. 
:14 ld. 
ar. Michaels, .'wpra note 28, at 1026. 
an See Paul Htarr. 7'he Meaning of Privatizat.ion, 6 YAU; L. & p(JI,'v RI~V, 6, 7 (1988) C'In 
desperation some theorists announce that the distinction is outdated or so ideologically loaded 
that it ought to be discarded, or that it is a distinction without a difference,"); Sagers, supra 
note 31, at 56-57 (discussing the "line-drawing problem of the public·private distinction". For 
a discussion of the benefit..c; of well·structured collaborations between the public and private 
spheres, see generally JOHN D, DONAHUE & RICHARD J, ZECKHAUSER, COLLABORATIVE 
GOVERNANCE: PRIVA'fE ROLES FOR PuRI.JC GOALS IN TuRBULENT TIME...'; (2011), 
37 See supra note 6. 
aa See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text, 
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insources the extra-constitutional norms that governed the 
collection of that information in the first instance. As a result, the 
government becomes less accountable to the people for its 
surveillance practices and the Constitution is rendered largely 
peripheral. The same effect occurs when a government agent 
signs a contract transferring sovereign power to a private actor 
who functions outside the boundaries of the Constitution. 
Considered together, therefore, insourcing and outsourcing provide 
a platform for pondering a broader constitutional architecture for 
privatillation. 
A OUTHOURCING 1'0 'fHIo: PRIVATI!: SKCTOR 
The government has long relied on the private Sl.'Ctor to perform 
tasks rangmg from public infrastructure development to 
policymaking.a" But today, the government simply could not 
function without private contractors. This is a consequence of 
hiring caps on federal employees, a desire for flexibility, the need 
for Hhort-term "surge capacity," and a lack of in-house expertise:") 
From 2000-2014, the federal government paid over $6 trillion to 
private contractors." They formulate federal policy, interpret 
lawll, administer foreign aid, manage nuclear weapons sites, 
interrogate detainees, and control borders.42 The federal 
,. Sf'(' HumId Bruff. Puhllc ProRramll, Priuale Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration 
ill fi'eri('mJ ProgramN. 67 T fo;X . L. RIW. 441 . 460-61 (1 989) (describing longstanding cxumple~ of 
I)rivnte part ies making law such as ",alncient doctrines of property and contract Ithat) 
ulluw .. . n~slri r:L i Yl! covrnamts on land," government aut.horized colll'clivc burgaining, 
homeowners' nst:! tlclDtiOllK, nnd "the formation of specJal tnxing districts by petition of some 
r{~s iclt'nt s m a territory, ngamst the wishes of the others"), 
lei 8 1'(' A('(~UlH IT ION A nVISORY PANt;L, RF.PORT OF '1'lf f~ Ac:qurSl'l'UlN AnV1HORY PANEl. TO 
Tilt-: Ot'PU'fo: m' }o'fm.m.A l~ P RC)('UR I,<;M ENT POI,ICY ANn THI-~ UNITED S1'ATE ... '-l CONC;kl-':"")."i 393 
(2IK17) (listing thegc Cactors UK promptint( Cedl:'ral agencietl to increase the use l)rlVatu 
(:untrnl!Ling); :;('f.~ ulsu JOHN D. D()NAHUJo;, TUfo: PRI VATIZATION DIWIHION: PUl\l,I(~ ENUS, 
PHIVA1'1'; MI';ANS 4-1) (l9H9) (describing the rise of privatization in the 19AOI"I). 
11 Total Federal Spen ding , USASpending.gov, http://www.usaspenriing,govftrends?trendre 
pOl·t=d(!fnult&vit·wrl'JXlrt=yps&maLcontrnC'tmg..agency_t=&pop_state_t=&pop_cd_t:=&vendor 
_sla l<~_t.=&VI'ndnr._cd_t,:J& pHr._cnt_t;::&tah=r:: raph+VlcW&GO.x=Go 08St V1Hit.t~d Feb. ]4,201 :;). 
~:! Sfc4! IJlllra A DIckinson , Gouernmcl1' for Hire: Pri lKltizing Foreign. Affairs and the 
Prohlt'm of AC'C'Oulltab~lit.y Under Intemctionru Law, 47 WM. & MARy L, REV, 135, 138 (ZOOS) 
(dis(:IJ t>ni nK the privati~ation of fore ign nffairs); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance. 75 N.Y,U. L. REV, 543. 551-52 (2000) (discussing the pervasiveness of private 
actOn:l in "regulation. service provision, pobcy design, and implementation"). 
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government even hires private contractors to find and superVlse 
other private contractors." 
Private industry performs government intelligence functions on 
an eye· popping scale." Telecommunications companies have 
granted "the NSA c~mplete access to their powerful switching 
systems," built "classified communications networks for the NSA 
and the Pentagon," and provided sophisticated "information 
technology and analytical services to the NSA."45 Snowden's former 
employer, Booz Allen Hamilton", advises the government on 
operations coordination;47 border, cargo, and transportation 
security;'" as well as intelligence, counterintelligence, and 
counterterrorism,'9 with "more than 1,000 analysts working ... in 
research, analyses, case investigation, and operational activities."'" 
Academi-the company formerly known as Blackwater-has 
received over a billion dollars in government contracts5l for tasks 
ranging from tactics and weapons training for military, government, 
and law enforcement agencies;52 to high-risk protection of sensitive 
43 Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, National Security Inc., WASH. POST, July 20,2010, at 
AS (noting that the Department of Homeland Security uses nineteen private 8taffin~ 
companies to help it find other private contractors). 
44 See generally KATERI CARMOl..A, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOllS AND NEW WAR!->: 
RISK, LAW, AND ETHICS (2010) (describing the structure of private military and security 
companies, the assumptions that underlie their popularity. and how they might he 
regulated), 
~.j TIM SHORROCK, SPIES FOR HIRE: THE SECRET WORLD OF INTEWG}o;NCE OUTI-;OlJllCINCl 
305-08 (2008); see also D.vid A. Skl.nsky, The Priuatc Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165. 1177 
(1999) (discussing the private contracting of security), 
ott; John Bacon, Contractor Fire, Snowden (rom S122,OOO.a-ycar Job, USA TUllAY, June 
Ii, 2013, hUp:llwww.usstoday.com/sotry/newslnationl2O 13106111lbooz·aJlen -snowden· lired12 
4112311. 
41 Government Managemenl, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON. http://www.boozallen.com/consulta 
ntslcivilian.governmentlgovernment·management (18St visited Feb. 14,2015). 
48 Homeland Security, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, http://www.boozftlIen.com/consu)tantsiciv 
ilian.governmentlhomeland.security-consulting 088t visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
41 Law Enforcement, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, http://boozallen.comlconsultantslcivilian·go 
vcrnmenUlaw·enforcement·consulting (last visited Feb. 14, 2015). 
60 Jd. In 2012, "98% of the company's $5.9 billion in revenue came from U.S. government 
contracts," and "[t]hree-fourths of its 25,000 employees (heidi government security 
clearances." Bacon, supra note 46. For a detailed discussion of Booz Allen's deep influence 
on "every aspect of national security, from the military to the highest reaches of national 
intelligence," see SHORROCK, supra note 46, at 40, 38-71. 
&I Editorial, Blcckwate,'s Rich Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes. 
coml2007/10l03lopinionl03iht·edbl.ck.l.7733227.html. 
6J See James Dao, Attack Thrns Spotlight on Private Security Firms. REG.-GUARD, Apr. 2, 
2004. at A2 (noting that Navy SEALs and police units use Blackwater for training). See 
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installations abroad, including CIA offices.·a After the 2012 attack 
Oil the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, the budget for 
t:he Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
hallooned to $2.7 billion for security protection plus $1.3 billion for 
embassy security, constructioll, and maintenance.54 According to a 
report of the Congressional Research Service, of the 36,000 people 
employed by the Bureau, 90% are private contractors.55 In addition, 
DOS employs 32,000 local guards under personal service 
agreements or as subcontractors to ftrms under contract with the 
federal government,be; enabling "the Executive [to) direct broad 
swaths of intelligence policy without having to seek ex ante 
authorization or submit to meaningful oversight."·7 
Upwards of 480,000 federal contractors611 and nearly five million 
federal employees have top-secret security clearances, which 
private contractors are largely responsible for processing. 59 The 
company USIS conducted clearances for Edward Snowden'"' and 
Aaron Alexis, the Navy Yard shooter who obtained a secret·level 
security clearance for his job with a government contractor in 
generally Blackwater Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/toplnewslbus iness/ 
companietUhlockwnter_usa/indcx.html (last vililoited Feb. 14, 2015) (providing mdex of 
articles about Blackwater), 
53 See Mark Mazzetti, Blackwater Lases a .Job for the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11 ,2009, at 
AB, oooilah/t at http://www.nytimes.comJ20091121121usfpolitic.sl12blackwater.html?ref=b lac 
kwaterusa (difICuHSing a few examples of Blackwater's security contracts with the CIA). 
M Mark WaJk~T. PrWaJp Securir.Y COll tNU'lurs' Military RolE" Under Sail tin)" U·T SAN 
DIEGO, Aug. :iI, 201a, http://www.ut. . nndiego.com/newsl2013lAug/31/private·security-contr 
actors-military-role-under/3I?#article-copy, 
511 See id. (noting that nine out. of ten are private contractors). This is a function of cost. 
Outsourcing security at the U.S. Embas.!I.Y in Baghdad costa less than a tenth of what it would 
cost the government to staff it directly. See id. (comparing $858 million to $78 million). 
oM Jd. 
67 Michaels, supra note 12, at 904; see also id. at 924, 926-27, 934 (explaining that 
informally created intellh(ence relationships leave Congress unable to provide oversight). 
M Mark Hosenban, &elusive: NSA Contractor Hired Snowdm Despite Concerns About 
Re8ume Discrepancies, Rt;(f)'KHS (June 20, 2013, 8;52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/articlel 
20 13106l21Iu.·u •• ·security-.nowden·idUSBRE95K01J20130621. 
.... See Jia Lynn Yang & Matea Gold, Contractor that Vetted Snowden Says II Also Ran 
Background Check for Nauy Yard Shool", WASH. POST, Sept. 19,2013, http://articl ••. wa.hing 
tonpost.comJ2013·09-191businessl4221489J_Csecurity-c1earance·ulil is-background (noting that 
USIS hondles 45% of all background checks for the Office of Personnel Management). 
80 Dion Nissenbaum, Compan.y That Veiled Snowden Defends Work. WAlJ.. ST. J .. Aug. 28, 
2013, httpJlonlin •. w.j.cominewsiarticle.lSB10001424127887324324404579041360132655752. 
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2007.61 With 7,000 employees, USIS handles 45% of all 
background checks ordered by the United States Office of 
Personnel Management.62 In October of 2013, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) joined a whistle-blower lawsuit alleging that USIS 
violated the False Claims Act by automatically releasing 
incomplete background checks and billing the U.S. government for 
work it did not perform.6S 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, outsourcing has been critiqued as 
"paving the way for private contractors to abuse their discretion, 
evade oversight, and generate unanticipated cost overruns.""' Jon 
Michaels has argued that privatization strains the separation of 
powers by affording the executive branch "greater unilateral 
discretion-at the expense of the legislature, the judiciary, the 
people, and successor administrations."66 Of course, privatization 
is here to stay, regardless of its merits. And it is taking on new 
forms that are more difficult for the public to identify and 
question, let alone dismantle. 
B. INSOURCING THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR DATA ENHANC 'MENT 
Before the rise of the Internet and big data, government 
surveillance was conducted in real time by traditional methods 
that involved fewer partnerships with the private sector than exist 
today.66 With modern data mining, the latter form of intelligence 
I I Yang & Gold. supra note 59. Alexis was an information technology contractor for The 
Experts, Inc., a subcontractor to Hewlett-Packard, which was under contract with the Navy 
and Marine Corps to update and replace technology at numerous military installations. 
Carol D. Leonnig, Mates Gold & Tom Hamburger, Military's Background Check System 
Failed to Block Gunman with a History of Arrest. . WASH. POb'T. Sept. 17. 2013. http:// 
articles. w88hingtonpost.com/20 13-09-17/pohtice! 42132 771_1_sccuri t y -cloarance-mil i tary-cD 
ntractor-installations. 
62 Yang & Gold, supra note 59. 
63 Evan Perez, Justice Department Joins Lawsuit on Q:Jmpan.y~ Background Chf"Cks, 
CNN (Oct. 30, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/1O/30/usicontractor-hackground-ch 
ecks-Iawsuitl. 
a. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization's Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717. 718 (2010) (citing 
Freeman & Minow, supra note 29. in GOVERNMF.NT RV C ON1'RACT: OlfI'SOllR('1NG AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. supra note 18, at 1-6). 
" Id. at 719. 
(06 }o'~r R discuss ion of historical clandestine surveillance techniques, from " 'mobile 
surveillance,'" which is "conducted prima rily by foot. automobile, or airpJAnl''' to "track ( I a 
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gathering-third party sourcing-is eclipsing the former. Because 
constitutional jurisprudence and existing legislative accountability 
schemes evolved to address traditional methods, they are a poor fit 
for the privacy challenges posed by modern surveillance through 
big data mining.67 
1. Gouernment Surueillance Through the Twentieth Century. In 
early colonial history, little was done by way of government 
surveillance.6M Most communities relied on lay members to keep 
order.09 In the seventeenth century, the king or the governor 
appointed sheriffs for larger populations.70 Because they charged 
fees for their work, sheriffs focused on income-generating activities 
such as tax collection, serving subpoenas, and operating the jail, 
rather than on law enforcement.71 Their activities were primarily 
reactive-they addressed problems in response to complaints 
rather than preventing or investigating crime.72 
Government surveillance did not begin in earnest until the 
nineteenth century, when American cities faced increased crime 
from population growth, ethnic and racial tensions, and economic 
failures.7,. In 1861, Abraham Lincoln appointed the first secret 
service agent, a private detective who went on to institutionalize 
the practice of profiling criminals using posters and photographs 
during the Civil War.74 Although technology was limited at that 
time, the invention of the telegraph in 1844 and the telephone in 
century. see RORI:R'I' WAI.LACE & H. K~;ITH M £LTON. SPYCRAFT; THE SECRIlT HIsroRY OF 
THE CIA'~ SPYTECHS FROM CoMMUNISM TO AL·QAEDA 401-02. 416 (2008). 
If See Slobogin, supra note 16. at 321 ("Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
appears to leave dats mining completely unregulaLed ... ,It). 
611 See infra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that government aurvei1lance hegan 
in the nineteenth century), 
!IV See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMRNT IN AM"~RICAN Hn'''1'ORY 6H (1993) 
(''The creation of police forces was another landmark ... in the long, slow retl't'at of lay 
j U8ti~."). 
1'0 James GeiHtman, Sheriffs, in THI-: SociAl, HISTORY ell<' CRIMfo! ANn PUN1HHMt.:N'f 1N 
AMERICA: AN ENCYCJ.OPf:D1A 16S.~ (Wilhur R. Miller ed .• 2012). 
11 Id.; Craig n. Uchldn, Hi..<;tory of Aml'ru'on PolirinR. In 1 Tm: gNC:YI:1.0PlmJA OF P()I.IN~ 
SCllm",,; ($17 (.Jack R. Greene ed., 3d ,·d. 2007). 
7t UchidA, Hupra nole 71. 
73 CHRISTIAN PARlmTI. TIm SOl..,. GAm;: RUHVEI I.LANC Jo; IN AM";R II~A FROM SI..AVgRY TO 
'fHJo; WI\R ON 1'~:RROH :1fi-86 (200:l); Uch irla, sl/pra note 7 1, Rt fH7- 1R (des(!rihing t he 
development of' the first Aml'ricnn po1it'l' dt-'PIU·t.IIU.mtH in rt!S pclllHe to dvil di):lorder ill 
ninetf't'nth century cities). 
14 J .K. PIITlmS~:N. HANlllKJOK ()to' HUIlVJm.l.AN('K 'rl~(·IINOI.C)( lH~~ :lIt (:ld 1'41. 2(12). 
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1876 made surveillance easier.75 Investigators used simple 
telescopes or bribed telephone and telegraph operators to 
eavesdrop.7s With the advent of the hand-held camera in 1884, 
photography became a more accessible surveillance tool. 77 The use 
of mug shots, body measurements, and police files for 
identification purposes-a method called "Bertillonage" after its 
French inventor, Alphonse Bertillon-evolved and spread.7s 
By the early 1900s, the federal government used secret 
operatives, including private organizations, to conduct 
investigations.7• Federal and state law enforcement authorities 
began compiling fingerprint repositories.BO The Bureau of 
Investigations-now the FBI-became an official part of the 
Department of Justice."! The federal government began collecting 
personal financial information and other data on tax returns.82 
During World War I, surveillance technologies such as code-
breakers, magnifying devices, and submarines equipped with 
airship detection equipment were deployed to protect national 
interests.83 Mter the war, law enforcement began to rely heavily 
on wiretapping to monitor social unrest.84 
711 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARc ROTENHEIUJ & PAUL M. SGJ-IWAU'f'Z, PIUVAGY, INFORMATION. 
AND TECHNOLOGY 64 (2006). 
16 PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 30. 
n See Susan W. Brenner, TIu! Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 
MISS. L.J. I, 32-33 (2005) (noting how the hand· held camera made eavesdroppin~ Himple 
and popular); PARENTI, supra note 73, at 3~38 (discussing law enforcement's use of 
photographs in the nineteenth century). 
111 PARENTI, supra note 73, at 43-45. 
79 PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 30; JENNIFER FRONC, NEW YORK UNll&KCOVER: PRIVATI<! 
SURVElLlANCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 146 (2009) ("During the war, 88 8 consequence of 
and in response to the weakness of federal police mechanisms. private organizations were 
either deputized by agencies of the government or deputized themselves to flU the gaps in 
the policing system ... [by) conduct{ing) undercover investigations of prostitutes, 
immigrants. 'slackers' who failed to register for the draft, and radicals."). 
8J PARENTI, supra note 73, at 51-53; PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 30. 
81 Pf:l'ERSEN. supra note 74, at 30. 
It2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shaH have power to lay and collect taxes 
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment. among the several 
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."); see also I.R.C. § 601 (1970) 
(repealed 1976) (giving tax deductions to bank affiliates). Law enforcement access to tax 
record. i. limited. See I.R.C. § 6103(d)(I) (2012) (anowing disclosure to enforce tax laws); 
id. § 6103(h)(4)(D). (i)(I)(A) (authorizing disclosure by court order). 
II.l PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 30-31. 
~ SOLOVE, RoTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 75, at 64; see Erin Murphy, The Politics 
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During the 1930s and the 1940s, the government expanded 
routine collection of data on American citizens.8s The first social 
security number was issued through the U.S. Postal Service in 
1936,"" and became linked to property ownership, residence 
histories, medical records, and other public transactions that the 
government could use to profile individuals.87 During World War 
II, Western Union forwarded all international cables to United 
States intelligence personnel.1I8 The National Security Council and 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were created to handle 
national security and intelligence matters.89 The FBI's jurisdiction 
was extended to include background checks offederal employees.!IO 
In the 1950s, television, radio, and telephone technology 
improved substantially."1 State and local government agents 
routinely eavesdropped on unsuspecting subjects-often in 
cooperation with local phone companies." Physicists and 
astronomers developed knowledge that was later applied to 
orbiting satellite technology.93 Under President Truman, national 
responsibility for communications intelligence shifted to the NSA, 
and surveillance policies were revised to address the Cold War 
threat of communist expansion."' The CIA, at the direction of 
President Eisenhower, contracted with Lockheed Corporation, 
Wid Statulury l .. ulV Bn{orctlUent Exemptions, III MICH. J~ REV. 485, 503 n.72 (2013) (noting 
LhH.llhl! "law uuLlawing wiretapping" expired at. the end of World War J). For a discussion 
of wiretnp legislation, see infra Part In and SOLOVE, ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 
75, at 83-91. 
"" See infra notes K6-90 nnd llct.'ompanying text. 
",I Social Security Numbers, SOCIAL SECURITY, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssnlfirstcard. 
html (Ial!t visited ~'eb, 15, 2015). 
117 Set' PARKNTt, supra note 73, at 84-87 (explaining the development of the social security 
sysLcm nnel how linking persunal information to social security numbers quietly reduced 
Americans' privacy); William H. Minor, Identity Cards and Dalabases in Health Care: The 
Net!d fv, F.d.rat Prioory Praterlions, 28 COWM • • 1.1. & Soc. PROS.". 253. 26(}.$ (1995) 
(discussing the development of the social security system and the privacy concerns it creates). 
l1li Michaels, supra note 12, at 914. See generally THOMAS F. TROY, DONOVAN AND THK 
CIA: A HI!l'l'ORY llF 'I'H>: ES'l'ARI.I!lHM':N1' OF THE CENTRAl. INTE!,I.IGENCE AGENCY (1981) 
(detailing the history of the CIA through the post-World War II years). 
1111 PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 36. 
110 Id. 
III Id. at 39. 
91 Susan Freiwald, Online Sur~iIIanC'e: Remembering the Lessol1S of the Wiretap Act, 56 
AIoA. L. R.;v. 9. 12 (2004) (citing SAMUEl. DASH F.T AI.., THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959». 
as Ph"1'KK.."iEN, supra note 74, at 37. 
" Id. at 38. 
, 
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General Electric, Eastman Kodak, and other companies to build 
spy planes and other technologies with unprecedented surveillance 
capabilities "that could see behind the Iron Curtain to measure the 
strength of Soviet military forces and detect preparations for a 
surprise attack."9& 
In the 1960s, civil rights turbulence, increased use of 
recreational drugs, and fear of nuclear proliferation fueled public 
demand for enhanced foreign and domestic surveillance.9s Night 
vision devices enabled long-range military surveillance,97 aerial 
mapping cameras allowed for preClSIOn topographical 
photography,98 and infrared sensors evolved.99 The CIA developed 
the capacity to build 3D models of foreign terrain, buildings, and 
weapons using surveillance photos and intelligence data. 1011 Bar 
codes were in regular use by 1967.101 
In the 1970s, the Watergate scandal made illegal investigative 
surveillance and wiretapping a headline issue.1U2 The Director of 
the NSA admitted to Congress in 1975 that the agency 
"systematically intercepts international communications, both 
voice and cable," and acknowledged that domestic conversations 
were captured incidentally, as well. lOa Documents disclosed in 
2013 by Edward Snowden reveal that global communications 
providers began voluntarily handing over customer data to the 
" PHlUP TAUBMAN. SECRET EMpIRE: EISENHOWER. THE CIA, ANn THF. HnJIIEN STORY OF 
AMERICA'S SPACE EsPIONAGE, at ,a (2003); Bee auo SHORROCK, supra note 45, at 74 (noting the 
Eisenhower Administration's contracts a8 historical examples of outsourcing intelligenr.e) . 
.. &e LoUIS FISHER. THE CONSTITUTION AND 9111: RECURRING THREATS TO AMERICA'~ 
FREEDOMS 286-87 (2008) (noting the national security response to domestic And foreign 
threats in the 1960s and early 19708); PETERSEN, supra note 74, at 39 (discussing how the 
socia). political, and intemabonal climate of the 19609 influenced public opinion tnwards 
national security). 
97 Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation. of the Value and MeaTUJ Moo~ls (Jf the Fourlh 
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced SurlJeillance. ~9 SYRACU"F. L. REV. 647. 
678 & n.162 (1988). 
011 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 242 & 0.4 (l9R6) (dL'f\r.rihing 
sophisticated eqUJpment used by the Environmental Protection Agenr:y (EPA) to aerially 
photograph Dow Chemical's facility). 
., See PETEHSEN. su.pra note 74, at 438. 
100 Id. at 39. 
Inl PARENTI • . <;upra note 73, at 99. 
11t~ Ph."TBRSEN, supra note 74, at 42-43. 
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government in the 1970s, often for hefty fees.!" The first 
commercially viable personal computer was introduced in 1975.10' 
Computer hackers emerged with the expertise to overtly break 
into others' computers, including government systems. illS 
Magnetic strip technology became readily available for credit card 
use, and by 1972 ua fully operational network of interconnected 
computer databanks" was under development in order to "facilitate 
almost instant credit and background checks."l07 Marketers 
discovered that data from white and yellow pages, driver's license 
records, and voter registration cards could be compiled, bought, 
and sold. 1OB 
The Internet evolved in the 1980s as a medium for military 
communications amongst a finite group of government, academic, 
and computer professionals. 109 Mter a suicide bomb attack in 1983 
left 241 Marines dead in Beirut, the Reagan Administration coined 
a new phrase, "war against terrorism."1I1l The Internet's rapid 
circulation of information enabled unprecedented opportunities for 
collaboration amongst law enforcement entities and increased 
public scr utiny of government surveillance activities, which 
expanded through the 1990s. l11 
By the mid-1990s, private organizations such as museums, 
service stations, department stores, grocery stores, and schools 
routinely installed motion detectors and visual surveillance 
systems. 112 Digital camcorders and global positioning systems 
came on the commercial market.1l3 Government began to rely 
101 Craig Timbt!rg & Barton Gellman, NSA Paying U.S. Companies for Acre5.'l to 
Comrnunirotw ns Networks. WASH. PoST, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wur 
Jdlnational'8ecurity/nsa·payin~·us·companie8· for·access·to-communications-net,worksl2Ul:i1UH! 
291564 la4bS-1Oc2.1Ie3.bdf6·e4fc677d94al_story.html. 
1M PETERSEN, supm nou! 74, ut 43. 
106 Id. at 44. 
1117 PARI':NTI, supra note 7:1, at 96. 
1M Sec ,JUI.I/o; ANClWIN, DRAn NJo:r NATION: A QU Jo;"'?T' fo'OR PRIVAf'Y, SJo:C'UlUTY, ANI) }<'RJo:r-:IK)M 
IN A WOKI.n OP RJo:U:NTI ... :SS SURVJo.:II.I..ANC F. 30 (2014) (discussing how th(~ rise or modl'rn 
computing facili tated th(! buying and Nelling of personal data). 
1U!t P,,:rJo:H:SF.N, xupra note 7.1, at r){J, 50-52. 
1111 SHANK HAltft lS, TIn: WATCHJo:R."I: 1'H Jo: RISE 01" AMJo:lUCA'H HunVJo:ILI.AN(,Jo~ HTATJo: :i, 30,:32 
(2010). 
III Irl, III flO. 
liZ Id. at 53. 
1I:l rd. at 56. 
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tnl ' I'CII HinJ{J,Y un technological developments from the commercial 
sect.ol' lor its own surveillance.1I4 
2. Twenty-First Century Surveillance and the Private Sector. 
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw additional growth 
in computerized communication, with a shift towards a global 
economy based on the collection, sharing, and analysis of infinite 
amounts of information.1I5 The transition from analog to digital 
technology in 2009116 meant that telephone communications were 
no longer conducted on dedicated paths between two parties. 
Multiple communications could instead occur on a single line by 
breaking them down into pieces-or "packets"-and reassembling 
them at the destination.1I7 These "digital trail[sJ"lIK of activity 
could be stored relatively cheaply.1I9 As a consequence, 
government monitoring became "less about analog surveillance 
and more a matter of 'data mining.' " 120 
Today, the amount of globally available data is staggering. 
Phone companies, social networking and dating sites, online 
retailers, Internet service providers, publicly available satellite 
systems, financial institutions, and credit agencies collectively 
possess "trillions if not quadrillions-plus bits of information," much 
of it voluntarily disclosed by individuals as a condition to using a 
product or service. 121 A CNN reporter bluntly described the data 
trail created by logging onto the Internet each day: 
114 Richards. supra note 11, at 1958 ("One of the most significant changes that the aliCe of 
surveillance has brought about is the increasing difficulty of separating surveillance by 
governments from that by commercial entities."), 
l1ri Sec ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE FUTURE (W 
PEOPJ.E, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 4 (2013) \In the first decade of the twenty·first century the 
number of people connected to the Internet worldwide increased from 350 million to more 
than 2 bi1lion. In the same period, the number at mobile·pbone subscribers rose from 750 
million to well over 6 billion (it is now over 6 billion)."). 
116 See Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109·171, 
§§ 3001-3009. 120 Stat. 4, 21-27 (2006) (terminating all licenses and requiring the 
cessation ofbroadc8sting by full·power stations in the anaJog television service8). 
m PATRICIA MOLONEY F1GlJOLA. RESEARCH SERVo RL30677, DIGITAL SURVElJ.J.ANCE: THE 
CoMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT ACT 2 (2008). 
1111 wm Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the DigiJ.al Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
283, 292 (2003). 
1111 Orin S. Kerr. The Nert Generation Communications Privacy Act. 162 U. PA. L. REV. 
373,37:;"'76 (2014). 
no DeVries. supra note 118, at 292. 
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Google has every e-mail you ever sent or received on 
Gmail. It has every search you ever made, the 
contents of every chat you ever had over Google Talk. 
It holds a record of every telephone conversation you 
had using Google Voice, it knows every Google Alert 
you've set up. It has your Google Calendar with all 
content going back as far as you've used it, including 
everything you've done every day since then. It knows 
your contact list with all the information you may have 
included about yourself and the people you know. It 
has your Picasa pictures, your news page 
configuration, indicating what topics you're most 
interested in. And so on. 
lf you ever used Google while logged in to your 
account to search for a person, a symptom, a medical 
side effect, a political idea; if you ever gossiped using 
one of Google's services, all of this is on Google's 
servers. And thanks to the magic of Google's 
algorithms, it is easy to sift through the information 
because Google search works like a charm. Google can 
even track searches on your computer when you're not 
logged in for up to six months. '22 
627 
The government has tapped into private corporations' 
gargantuan storehouses of data for years.'23 Under a secret 
executive order issued by President George W. Bush after 9/11, 
In Id.; see also DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE SToRY OF THE 
CoMPANY THAT Is CONNECTING THE WORLD 323-28 (2010) (comparing Google with Facebook, 
which it describes as having a "vision of providing a universal identity system for everyone on 
the Internet'). See generally STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS WORKS AND 
SHAPV..8 OUR LIVES 315-67 (2011) (discuaaing Google's influence on America~ politi~ and 
government); SIVA VAlDHYANATHAN, THE GoociLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE 
SHOULD WORRY) 3-4 (2011) (discussmg Goagle's gJobal impact and negative effects on Mthe 
pursuit of global civic responsibility and the public good'1-
12.1 See DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: How OUR SEARCH FOR SAF~"I'Y 
INVADES OUR LIBERTIES 247 (2011) ("Most personal electronic information is in private 
hands, and savvy entrepreneurs manage it for profit by selling the data to retailers of all 
stripes. The government can buy 1t, too, and since 9/11 various proposals for using it have 
generated 8 blizzard of collection programs."); Ohm, supra note 13. at 1324-25 (observing 
that data minmg has muted traditional surveillance methods like court-ordcred wiretaps 
and physically tailing suspects); Richards, supra note II, at 1940-41 (discussing the 
complex entanglement between government surveillance and private business). 
628 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
telecommunications companies such as AT&T, Verizon, and 
BellSouth granted senior NSA officials' oral requests for 
warrantless access to switches carrying domestic telephone calls, 
which led to the creation of a massive database of information 
regarding individual calling habits. 124 Much of the government's 
data now comes from large-scale commercial data brokers such as 
Thompson Reuters' CLEAR125 and LexisNexis' Accurintl26 that 
collect information from private sources for government 
purchase. '27 A 2008 report by the United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) stated that the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), DOJ, DOS, and the Social Security 
Administration "used personal information obtained from [suchl 
resellers for ... criminal investigations, locating witnesses and 
fugitives, researching assets held by individuals of interest, and 
detecting prescription drug fraud" at a cost of approximately $30 
million that year. 128 The purchased information included "birth 
l!H Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 2; ~81ie Caull!Y, NHA flus Massive /Jatabase of 
Americons' PhOM Calls, USA TODAY (Mny 11. 2006. 10::lR AM), http://m~ntodlly30.tlAAlU 
day.com/newslw8shingtonl2006.05-10-ns8_x.htm. 
125 CLEAR, https:Jlc1ear.thomsonreuwrs.comicleuf_homclgovcrllJlIcnl.htm# (hlHt visitl'd Jo'(!h. 
15.2015). 
I'ltl LF.XIS NEXIS, hUp:llwww.lexislluxiH.cnm/guwrnmtmth.olulinnFiinvcstig:ntiVl'/ol'Curinl.(U,l'x 
(lust visited Feb. 15,2015). 
1:!1 Michaels, supra note 12, at 9Ui; see also Duvid Gray, Unuiell{' K('(lb; Citron & Liz 
('lark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime Afur United StateN v. Jont>,S. 103 J. CIUM. I .. & 
('KIMINOIA)(W 745. 7R5 (2013) rrSJocial networking siLes. merrhnnts, and data hn,hrR 
l'l!(:ord and analyze our digital footprints 0 , ,fur immediate commercial gain 0 , , • Som{~ 
packuttt· the information into 'digital dossiers,' which they sell tu J,tuvcl'nmcnl nnd prJvnte 
clients. Law enforcement and other government officials routinely contrm:t with theSl" dntn 
bruk(!l'R or directly request or Bubpoena information about our oolino uctivltje~ rrom ISP,.. ('-
muil JlruvidcrH, nnd search engines." (citing DANIEL J. SOLOVF.. 'rlIg Dlw'rAI. P";lt,';()N: 
'l'F.CUNOr.OflV ANlJ PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION ACtio! 2 (2004))): Rrllcc &h,wi(·r. Do You 
Wont the Govemmenl nflying Your Data from Corporatwns? TH"; A'rI.AN'J'H' (Apr. ao, 2013, 
1 : 25 PM), ht.t p:/lwww.theat1antic.com/technololO./archi vel2D 1 a/04/du-ynu. Wit nt • the ·gownlln 
(mt-h\lying-your·dftta·from-corporationsl2754~lJ ("Sometimros [guv(>Mlment ngen('ies] similly 
purcha:\C 'privately·hl~ld data] , just a8 any other company might."). 
1:!:It U.s. Gov'" A(,C()UN'I'AfUI.ITY OFFICE, GAO-OB·543T. PRIVACY; GOVf.;uNMio~N'1· USI': f))o' 
DATA FROM INFORMATION RESEl.LERS COULD INCLUDE BE'rrER PR(m:CTloNS (21108), 
ollGilahi, at http://www.gao.gov/Rssctsl120/11929R.pdf. The term "r(·Rl·ll('rs" rl'rer~ to 
"businesses that vary in many ways but have in common collecting nnd aggregating 
personal inrormation from mUltiple Rources and makmg it avadahlc to tht·ir cu"tomprs." Id. 
at 5. The National Counterterrorism Center-which is part of the Office or the Dire('tor of 
National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, OFFICfo; OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
NATIO!llAL I~'TEl.LlGENCE, http://www.dni.govlindex.phplaboutlorganizationlnational-rount.e 
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and death records, property records, motor vehicle and voter 
rCb>istrations, criminal records, and civil case fIles, , , telephone 
directories, business directories, classified ads or magazines, 
Internet sites, and other sources accessible by the general public" 
but not readily available, as well as "[n]onpublic information 
derived from proprietary or nonpublic sources, such as credit 
header data, product warranty registrations, and other application 
information provided to private businesses directly by 
consumers."'29 The government also accesses a network of over 
sixty "fusion centers" developed after the 9/11 attacks, which share 
intelligence information amongst local, state, and federal law 
enforcement as well as private contractors, '30 
Until recently, the NSA's surveillance programs collected two 
types of privately-sourced data, which the agency then mines for 
patterns and trends,m The first is metadata, which "includes 
highly revealing information about the times, places, devices and 
participants in electronic communication, but not its contents,"'3. 
The FOI'eign Intelligence Surveillance Court's '3.1 Verizon order, 
made public in June of 2013, covered this kind of data-the so-
called "envelope" of a customer phone call, including the date and 
l'lm'roriMm-('(>nl.er-who-we·are ()ORt visited Feb. 15, 2015)-uses such data for surveillance, 
as well. Cray. Citron & Rinehart, supra note 127, at 786. 
1:tV U.S. Gov'" AeC()UNTAlm~I'l'Y O}o'Jo'fCJo;. GAO.OB.543T, supra note 134, ut 6 (footnote 
omitted) . 
lau Statt! and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, U .S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
~~;GURITY. hUp:Jlwww,dhs.gov/atat.e-and-ffiajor-urban-area-fusion-centers (last visited Feb. 
15, 21ll 5). A 2012 repnrt by a congressional subcommittee assailed them 8S "'pools of 
Ineptitude. waste and civil hberties intrusions," according to one journalist. Robert 
O'Harrow, Jy .. J)HS "/<'usion Cenler,," Porlrayed as Pools of ineptitude and Civil Liberties 
Intrusions, WASH. Po~, Oct. 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigationsldhs-fu 
Kiun-(~enttH'purll'ayed-us-poolj,j-of-i Ileptilude-and-civil-li hertiutl-in trusionsJ20 12/1 010211 00 144 
40·()cbl·lle2·hdla·h868e65d57eb_story.html. 
1:11 See Burton Gellman. U.s. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Reuealing 
Internet, Phone Meladala, WASH. Posr. June 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.comiinvest 
igntionshls-surveillam:e-arthitecturc-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-phone-metadatD.1 
201 :J/Oflll rwcHhfO04n-d51 1- 1 le2-b05f-3ea3COe7bb6a_story.html (describing two collection 
programK fOT metadata and two collection programs for content). 
1J2 [d. See generall.y PATRICIA MOWNEY FIGIOLA, RESEARCH SERVo RL30677, DJGITAl. 
SURV,m,I.ANe>:: TH>: COMMUN'CATIONS A .... 'STANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT 1-2 (2008) 
(explaining that modern technology hos blurred the traditional distinction between the 
interception of communication content and the acquisition oC identification information). 
13.1 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is established by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885 (2012); see id. § 1803 (establishing the 
court). 
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time of a call, its duration, the telephone numbers involved, and 
location of the participants.,a4 
The second type of NSA data collection involves the content of 
communications. '3• Also in June of 2013, the press revealed that 
the government through the PRISM program was "tapping directly 
into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies, 
extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e·mails, 
documents, and connection logs that enable analysts to track" a 
person's movements and contacts over time."6 It was later 
reported that the NSA has also collected "upstream" Internet 
data,'37 which is traffic sent from a computer or network-such as 
uploaded files or muItiplayer game data in real time-as distinct 
from "downstream" data received by a computer or network. I:IIC 
l,l.l Glenn GreenwaJd, NSA Collecting Ph.one Rf'rords of Millions of Verw m Cll~tom('rs 
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/woridlinteraci 
ive/2013/junl06/verizon.telephone-data-court.order. 
1311 See supra. note 131 and accompanying text. 
las Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Milling IJata {rom Nint U .• "", 
ln1crnet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. Po • .,.,.. June 7, 2013, at At , A12, oooilable 
at ht.tp:l/www.w8shingtonposLcomiinvestigationsJu8·intelligence-mining-data-from·nine-us·in 
t.emet-comparues.in.braod.secret-program-2013l06l06l3aOcOda8.cebf.l1e2.8845·d970C(:h04497 
_story.html; Glen Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to lTsC'r lJnta of 
Apple, GooNle and Others. THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 3:23 PM). http://www.theRUardian. 
rom/worldJ20131junlO6lus-tech-giants.nsa-data. 
137 Laura K. Donohue, SectUm. 702 and the CoUection of Internalwllal Teiephonf> omllnlernf!1 
Q,ntent, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL"\' 117. 120 (2014) (CIting Jnmes Ball. N.'iA:, Prism 
Surveillance Program: How It Works and What It Can. Do, THE GUARDIAN (Junu 8, 2013, 1:56 
PM), http;l/www.theguardian.com/worldl2013JjunJ08lnsa-prism-scrver-collection-racebook-goo 
g)e); FISC Ct .• Mem. Op. & Order, at 30 (Oct. 3. 2011). available at https:/Iwww.ncill.urg/fllesl 
assetsifisc_opinion_lO.3.2011.pdf. The Obama Administration publicly confirmed the 
existence or both programs. See Press Release, Shawn Turner, Dlr. or Pub. Affairs. Office or 
the Dir. or Nat1 Intelligence, ON! Declassifies Intelligence Community Tlocuments Regarding 
CoHectlon Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligenc£" SurvClUanrR Act (FISA) (Aug. 21, 
2013), aooilable at http://www.dni.gov/index.phplnewsroomlpress-releasesl191-pre88-releases-
20131915-dni-decJsssifies-intelligence-community-documents-regarding-coUectlon-under-sectl 
on-702-of-the-roreign-intelligenceosurveillance-act-fisa C'President Ohama requested that til(' 
[NSA] declassify and make public as much inrormation a8 possible about certain sensitive 
NSA programs .. .. "J. 
1311 DoUGI.AR DOWNING, MlrHAEI. COVINGTON & MIo:J.oOY MAULDIN COVINGTON, 
DICTIONARY OF CoMPUTER /.NU INTERN~'T TERMS 154. 535 (9th ed. 2006). Orin Kerr draw. 
the distinction between prospective surveillance-the "capture [of] future communicatIOn!" 
that have not yet been sent over the network," such as wiretapping-and retrospective 
surveillance. where the govemment looks for past communications that are stored in a 
network. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surueillance Law After the USA Patriot AcL' The Hil: 
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 616 (2003). He aJso characterizes this distmction 
as direct versus indirect surveillance. Id. at 621. 
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The NSA amassed more than 13,25 million upstream transactions 
in the first six months of 2011,'"9 In exchange for the data. it paid 
U.S. companies a total of $394 million dollars that fiscal year. l4O 
According to one telecommunications executive. these "voluntary 
agreements simplify the government's access to surveillance."I.1 
The NSA's computers analyze the information it collects for 
suspicious patterns and so-called "communities of interest"-
people in contact with persons of interest overseas,l.2 Although 
traditional database systems required analysts to build and 
rebuild statistical models after pouring over search results for 
hours. modern "machine learning" or "cognitive analytics"'4a 
methods apply algorithms to find patterns and meaning based on 
context; the algorithms then fine-tune themselves in an iterative 
process that proceeds without "any significant human 
intervention.'· .. • As a result. the government's intelligence 
capability is cheaper, faster, more powerful-and more elusive-
than ever before. I• 6 By making correlations amongst infinite bits 
l3i Donohue, supra note 137, at 121. 
140 Timberg & Gellman, supra note 104. Several companies that have provided 
information to the NSA under PRISM reported to tho Washington Post that they do not 
accept money for doing so. Id. 
HI Id.; see also Robert Lenzner, A7T, Verizon. Sprint Are Paid Casl, by NSA for Your 
Privale Communications, FORBES, Sept. 23, 2013, hup:Jlwww.Corbes.comJsitesirobertlenzn 
er/20 13109/231 a tt verizonsprin t·are-paid-cash ·by-nss -for -your-pri vate-comm unica tions! ("The 
[NSA) paya AT&T, Verizon. and Sprint Beveral hundred million dollars a year for access to 
81% of all international phone calls into the US, according to (the Snowden disclosures}:,. 
Many of these agreements are authorized by the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012). See generally infra note. 197, 241-44 and 
accompanying text. 
l oti Steve Chenevey, PRISM' Barach Obama Says 'Nobody Is Listening ro Your 7'elephone 
Calls,' AssOClATED PRESS, June 7, 2013. http://www.wjla.comJarticlesl2013106Jprism.barac 
k-obama-says.nobody-is-listening-to.your-telephone-caUs.-89818.html. 
143 See Rajeev Ronanki & David Steier, Cognitiue Analystics, in TECH TRENDS 2014: 
INSPIRING DISRUPrlON 19,2 1 (2014). auai/able at http://d2mtr37y39tpbu.cloudfront.netlwp-con 
tentJuploadal2014/02ITech.Trend • • 2014]INAL-ELECTRONlC_.ingle.2.24.pdf (classifying 
machine learning 8 S one of three kinds of cognitive analytics). . 
144 Steven M. Bellovin, Renee M. Hutchins, Tony Jebars & Sebastian Zimmeck, When 
Enough I, Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Leamine, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& LIBERTY 556, 590-91 (2014) (providing a scientific explanation of machine learning). 
14 ,\ See Michael Hickins, U.S. News: How the NSA Could Get So Smart &1 Fast--Modcrn 
Computing Is Helping Companies and Governments Accurately Parse Vast Amounts of Data 
in a Matter of Minutes, WAU. ST. J., June 12, 2013, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com 
InewaiarticlealSB10001424127887324049504578541271 020665666 (explaining how the NSA 
can now efficiently parse quantities of data that were unimaginable five years ago); 
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID SURVEIl.IANCE: A CONVERSATION 5-6 (2013) 
G32 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
or data that are enriched by new technologies such as biometrics, 
high-resolution cameras, aerial vehicles, and DNA sampling, I"; the 
government can now track virtually anyone, anywhere, at any 
time. An internal presentation dated April 2013 for senior NSA 
analysts described PRISM as "the most prolific contributor to the 
President's Daily Brief, which cited PRISM data in 1,477 itP.ms 
[the prior] year.""7 
Scholars have identified a litany of harms that flow from 
unfettered government watching, including "self-censorship and 
inhibition,""" decreased civility in social relationships,I." 
restricted freedom to associate with others,I50 and reduced 
accountability for those doing the monitoring. lnl When 
surveillance is automated, "the camera itself is not selective in 
whom it watches; and it provides a searchable record which 
trumps human memory in longevity, authority and accuracy."IS2 
Manual surveillance, by contrast, requires that the watcher 
identify a subject in advance and maintain Borne degree of 
proximity to him.' When a machine collects the data, there are 
fewer opportunities for human interaction that would enable the 
subject to thwart the surveillance by hiding. Automation prevent/; 
(describing the mutability of so-called "liquid surveillance," whereby "[sJurveillnnct· poWl'r. 
us exercised hy government depArtments, police agencim. and privatI! rurpurnti(ms .. . IIUW 
nppear[s) ... in databases that may not even be 'in' the country in queRtion"). 
1>11' Pl!.'TlmHJ~N, supra nute 74, at 72-75, 743. 
1·17 Ge1lman & Poitras, sf,pra note 136. 
w, ANITA L. ALLEN. UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 172 (2(Jl1); Sef! n/tm 
SHII'l.lo!R., supra note 123, At 240-43 (discussing how the sensation of beinK wntched afTt:>Cts 
behnvior). This phcnomenon was identifiP:d. in an 1897 study in which the prt.'scnce of ot.ht'r 
rider~ cAlised cyclists to pedal faster. Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian l.ooplwle: 711(' 
Present Constitutionality of Big Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure. 5 
FIRS1' AM .. :NII. L. REV. 234, 271 & n.136 (2007) (citing Norman Triplett. Tlu' IlYIWIIW/:t'II;C 
Factors in Pacemaking and C.cmpetition. 9 AM. J. PsYCHO).. 507, 533 (1898). 
'" See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 536-:17 (20116) 
(describing how exposure may impede a person's ability to participate in society). 
1&0 See ANGWIN, supra note 108, At 5]-64 (asserting that government surveillance 
restricts freedom tn 8860Ciate through the internalization of censorship). 
1~1 Sre Solove, supra note 149, at 508-09, 523 (explaining how data aggregation unRettlcR 
people's expectations and how excluding people from participation in their personal data 
reduces government accountability). See generally THE SURVE1Ll.ANCF. STUDIES READER 
(Sean P. Hier & Joshua Greenberg ede., 2007) (collecting essays on topics such as how 
surveillance operates as a modern mechanism of social control and structures individuRI 
behavior and everyday life). 
1&2 Kevin Mocnish, Unblinking Eyes: The Ethics of Automating Surveillance, 14 ETHICS 
INFO. TECH. 151, 152 (2012). 
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the watcher from assessing "the realities on the ground," making 
"the possibility of negotiation, subtlety and discretion" less 
likely.'"" The subject of the surveillance becomes disempowered.' ''' 
Studies have also shown that the selection criteria programmed 
into aut.omated systems is "overwhelmingly determined by age, 
ethnicity and sex."1 1;S For example, "people from different cultures, 
sexes and ages will behave differently in crowds."'56 If distinctive 
behaviorH are built into an automated surveillance system, an 
innocent individual "could register as deviating from the norm" 
simply because she has a different cultural approach to personal 
space and tolerance for crowds than expected. I•7 As a 
consequence, "[s]urveillance fosters suspicion in those who wield 
it." liill The programmer's prejudices become "frozen into the code, 
effectively institutionalizing those values,"'fi9 
Since the Snowden scandal broke, the dangers of ubiquitous 
government monitoring have become a frontline public issue. In 
announcing plans to amend NSA practices, President Obama 
aclm owledged that the government's use of priva tely held data to 
track Americans is unprecedented and poses novel constitutional 
questions, "0' Google has urged customers to push for legislative 
reform, "" The debate over technology's impact on personal 
privacy has thus moved beyond identification of the problem; the 
only salient question is what to do about it, 
I.'" fd. at 164. 
I ~ '. fd. 
• .\0\ Sef' ld. at 152, 15A (explaining how the prejudice that "overwhelms" manual 
~uryeillam:tt iN often programmed into automated 8urvei11 ance sY.8tema). 
Holi Id. a t. 159. 
1&1 [d. 
I Klrstip Ball, Elizabeth Daniel, Sally Dibb & Maureen Meadows, Democracy, 
.\)JJn l('llianre anrl "Knowing What's Good for You ':' The PrilKlte Sector Origins of Profiling 
and the Birth of "CLtizen Relationship Management," in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 
III , 113 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas eds., 2010). 
1&9 Mncniah, supra note 152, at 158. 
UI) Obama's Speech on N.SA. Plume Surveillance. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,2014, http://www.ny 
timcR.coml2014l01l18/uslpJliticsiobamss-speech-on-nsa·phone·8urveillance.html?_r-O. 
!til C'lOOgle Talle Aclion: Demand &al Surveillance Reform, GooGLE, https:lltakeaction.with 
gongle.comipageJsJusa-freedom-act?utm_medium=80cial&utm_80uree=twitter (last visited Feb. 
17,2015). 
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III. OUTSOURCING, DATA INSOURCING, AND LEGISLATIVE REGIMES 
When private coniractors and corporations perform public 
functions, they confront far fewer statutory and regulatory 
restrictions than do government actors engaged in identical 
activities. ' 62 Contractors exercising outsourced pUblic powers are 
not governed by the procedural restrictions that bind identical 
government conduct. Likewise, federal law leaves largely 
unregulated the private sector's collection of personal 
information.163 As a result, the government and the private sector 
are able to collaborate on intelligence gathering in ways that 
"evade oversight and, at t imes, . .. defy the law.""" In this regard, 
outsourcing and data insourcing are of a piece. '66 The executive 
161 See Michaels, supra note 64, at 7l~19 (calling government contracts or contract 
provisions that enable an outsourcing agency to achleve goals that would be difficult or 
impossible in the course of ordinary pubhc admmist.ration "workaroundsj. Enhanced 
regulation is one way of addressing the need (or accountabihtyo but it creates incentiveB to 
maximize informality in outsourcing relationships. See Michaels, supra note 12. at 94::1 
("[PJlacing more legal requirements between the Executive and its intelligence aims will 
likely intensify the Executive's thirst for mformality."). 
1M Danielle Keals Cltron. Reserooirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Prioot(' Law at 
Ihe Dawn O(IM In(ormaJwnAge, 80 S. CAL. 1. REV. 241, 255 (2007). As a service to the public. 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation has published a chart summarizmg the voluntary policies 
of 1.nternet service providers, e-mail providers, mobile communications tools, 
telecommunications companies.. cloud storage provide1'8, location-based services, blogging 
platforms, and soClal networking sites" regarding cooperation with the government and public 
transparency. including whether a company requires a warrant before turning over the 
content of communications and whether it worms customers of the existence of government 
requests for information. NATE CARDOZO ET AL .• WHO HAS YOUR BACK? PROTECTING YOUR 
DATA FROM GOVERNMENT REQUESrS: THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FoUNDATIO>/'S FOURTH 
ANNUAL REPORT ON ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS' PRIVACY AND TRANSPARENCY PRACTICES 
REGARDING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO USER DATA 4, 18 (2014), available al https:llwww.elT. 
org/fiIesl2014/0511Slwho-h .. ·your·back·2014·govt·data·requests.pc!f. 
1M Michaels. supra note 12, at 90l. See generally James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, 
Commercial Data and National Security. 72 GFJJ. WASH. L. REV. 1459 (2004). Many of the 
voluntary agreements under which communications companies work with the NSA are 
reportedly 80 sensitive that "only a handful of people in a company know of them. and they 
are sometimes brokered directly between chief executive officers and the heads of the U.S.'a 
major spy agencies., .. which have reportedly traded access to classified intelligence for 
cooperation. See Michael Riley. U.S. AgencLes Said to Swap Data WIth Thousands of Firm.~, 
BLOOMBERG Bus. (June 14, 2013, 12:01 AM). http://www.bJoomberg.com/newsl2013·0S·14/u· 
s.agenciesosaid.to-swap.data-with-thousands.of·firms. 
1M See MIchaels. supra note 12. at 904 (observing that the use of private data for 
surveillance 8 form of " 'privatIzation' 10 the guise of informal intelligence agreements with 
corporations"). 
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branch can both outsource its functions and bootstrap private data 
for surveillance without with relative impunity_ 
A. OUTSOURCING-RELATED STATUTES 
Within the administrative hierarchy, a wide range of standards 
apply to federal agencies by Congress, the President, and the 
courts for purposes of limiting the discretion exercised on behalf of 
the constitutional branches and for imposing transparency and 
modes of public participation. The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)'66 is the primary statutory source for public disclosure, 
public involvement in rule making, and judicial review of 
government decisionmaking. 167 Its Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) provisions mandate public disclosure of government 
activities_ISS The Federal Advisory Committee Act restricts and 
makes public the advice that federal advisory committees provide 
agencies_ 169 The Government in the Sunshine Act makes 
statutorily defined agency meetings public_ 170 The Federal 
Register Act requires publication of regulatory documents for 
public inspection,171 and the Information Quality Act (also known 
as the Data Quality Act) directs OMB to issue government-wide 
guidance regarding the quality of information "disseminated by 
Federal agencies_"172 Executive Order 12,866 also requires OMB 
'" Administrstive Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 796·404, 60 St.t. 237 (1946) (codified .s 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U .S.C.). 
lIST See infra notes 168-70 (describing the APA's parts and protections); see also Gillian E. 
Metzger, Priuatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1434 (2003) (noting that, 
whereas the APA applies only to agencies, regulations governing contractors focus on 
preventing fraud versus providing a way to challenge contractors' actions). 
1M Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). However, the Supreme Court has 
held that the government can withhold from public disclosure databases composed entirely of 
publicly available data, because there is a "di8tinction, in terms of personal privacy, between 
scattered disclosure of the bits of information ... and revelation of the (information) as a 
whole." U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989). 
16& Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2012). 
'" Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). 
'" Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C_ §§ 1601-1511 (2012). 
\7'1 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. C, § 515, 114 Stat. 
2763A-153 to -164 (2000); see Agency Information Quality Guidelines, OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMfo~N1' AND BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblinCoreLagency_info_Quality_ 
link'" (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (noting § 515's popular name); Data Quality Act, CENTER 
FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, http://www.foreffectivegov.orglnodel3479 088t visited Fed. 
15, 2015) (referring to § 515 .s the Data Quality Act). 
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oversight of the regulatory process through its Office of 
Informat.ion lind Hegulatory Affairs.173 
None of the foregoing statutory constraints on government 
conduct. lIppfy to private contractors exercising identical public 
functions, however. The APA, the FOIA, and other disclosure 
stat.utes do not cover private actors.174 Nor are contractors subject 
to the same "pay caps, limits on political activity, and labor rules" 
that apply to government employees.175 OMB Circular A·76 
forbids the outsourcing of "inherently govemmentar' functions,'7. 
but agencies routinely overlook it'77 and lack the personnel to 
properly administer its requirements. 178 Although the Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) of 1998 codifies Circular A· 
76's definition of "inherently governmental function,"J7· it contain6 
no method for challenging the decision to outsource itself.18o 
113 Exec. Order No. 12.866, 58 Fed. Reg. 61.735 (Sept. 30, 1993), reprint~d as a.mended in 
6 U.S.C. § 601 note (2012); .ee alBo Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U .S.C. §§ ~60 1 -3521 
(2012) (establishing the Office of Information and Regulatory affairs within the Office or 
Management and Budget); 2 JACOB A STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL J. MEZIN F.~ . 
AoMINISTRA'rIVE LAw § 7.09 (2014) (des<:ribing the Paperwork Reduction Act, which cre.ted 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs) . 
• 14 See 6 U .S.C. § 651(1) (2012) (defining "agency" for the purposes of tho APA lind its 
subparts). 
115 Guttman, supra note 14. at 338. 
17. OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A·76 REVISED I, A2 (2003) (stat ing thi. policy 
Bnd criteria for determining what a re ''inherently governmental activltie,,"). Cir(:ulnr A·7() 
predated tho Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998. which codified A· 7(l'g 
definition of "inherently governmental function," 31 U.S.C. § 501 note Wederal Activitietl 
Inventory Reform) (2012) ('T he term 'inherently governmental function' mearu; R funct ion 
that 18 60 intimately related to the public interest B8 to require performancn by Federal 
Government employees,"). The statute then lists examples of the types of "CunctionM 
included" Id. 
m See Freeman & Minow, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that government I'I:gpncieA IIfw n llU'k 
the capacity to enforce contractual terms); see also Correction of LonK·Standing ErnJrs in 
Agencies' Unsustainable Procurements Act of 2009, S. 924, 11 lth Cong. § ~i (2009) (findin~ 
that inherently governmental functions "have been wrongly outsourceci"); Concurrent 
Resolution on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 2010. S. Con. Ref!. 13, l11th Cont(. 
§ 502(5) (2009) (requiring the Department of Defense to "review the role thot contract on.; 
plAY in its operations, including the degree to which contractors ar€' pP.rfo rminK inhJ!rently 
governmenta l functions .. . " (emphasis added». 
178 PAUl. R. V ERKUJL, OUTSOURCING S OVEREIGNTY: WHY P RIVATI7.ATION OF GOVERNMRN'J' 
F UNL"I'IONS THREATI<NS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABoUT IT 12H (2007) ("Th" 
agency's designation of what is 'jnherently government' is not ImbjL'ft to administrativt! 
review."). 
1UI See supra note 176. 
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Accordingly, there are no external checks on government 
outsourcing in the form of private rights of action to challenge 
outsourcing decisions or contractor compliance. 'MI The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)182 governs the process by which the 
government purchases goods and services, but only disappointed 
bidders can challenge contract awards for noncompliance. '83 The 
FAR's conflict of interest provisions do take into consideration 
whether a contractor's aims are "at odds with the 'public interest," 
and existing rules can be waived for contracts deemed essentiaJ.184 
Although private tort and contract law might apply to abuses by 
government contractors, immunity defenses stymie lawsuits. 18s 
Only the government can sue private contractors under the 
Contract Disputes Act,l86 Moreover, it can contract out of 
normative protections in the negotiating processl"7 and often lacks 
1M! See infra noles 176-90 and accompanying text. 
1112 The FAR is codified in Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations nnd is promulgated 
by the General Services Administration, the Department of Defense. and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration under the authority of the Office uf Federal 
Procurement Policy Act of 1974. See Exec. Order No. 12,979, 60 Fed. Reg. 55, 171 (Oct. 25, 
1995), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 3701 note (2012). 
'" See 31 U.S.C. § 3551(1)-(2) (2012) (giving "interested part[ies!" the right to file protests 
und defining the term). Bidders can either challenge the agency's failure to comply with 
Cireular A·76 under the APA or file bid protests with the GAO under 31 U.S.C. § 3551 
(2012). Robert H. Shriver III, No Seat at the Table: Flawed Contracting Out Process 
Unfairly Limits Front-Line Federal Employee Participation, 30 PuB. CONT. L.J. 613, 627 
(2001) (citing CC Distribs. V. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding no 
constitutional standing to sue»; see also VerkuiJ, Bupra note 20, at 453 (,"rhis leaves 
contractors themselves the most likely candidates to achieve judicial review and makes 
such review dependent upon the government denying rather than granting a request to 
privatize a government function."); cf id. at 454 (suggesting that the Subdelegation Act 
might provide an avenue for judicial review of delegations to private parties). 
II\.( Guttman. supra note 19, at 898 (citing Organizational Conflicts of lntet·e~t. 4K C.F.R. 
pt. 2009.5 (1999». 
18ft See. e.g., Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550. 567 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying immunity to 
private foster care contractor in action under federal disability Jaws); Pani v. Empire Blue 
Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying immunity to a private insurance 
company in a Medicare dispute); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only 
Problem, 76 Gfm. WMH1. L. REV. 1216, 1228-29 (2008) (flrguing thnt privnte contractors 
should not be immunized for government work performed). 
, .. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2012). 
1"7 See Freeman, supra note 42, at 591 (noting that t!ven if "lprivllLe lawl provided a hasis 
for extending common law norma into contract law, p~uti~8 could presumahly minimize or 
avoid their new obligations by explicitly contracting out of them"). Rut rl. Jody Freeman, 
&tending Public I~aw Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. RfW. 1285, 1296 (2003) 
(arguing that contracts should reflect public law values through a process of 
"publiciutionj; Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Tlwory and the Failurts of Public·PrilJOle 
638 GEORGIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
the resources or motivation to pursue common law remedies. 1B11 
The False Claims Act (FCA)189 enables qui tam suits to recover 
penalties from private contractors for fraud only so long as its 
formidable requirements are satisfied. loo .r 
In sum, the administrative law norms that exist within a 
government bureaucracy and constitutional democracy do not 
apply to private contractors.191 Nor has Congress creat,ed private 
rights of action to constrain ultra vires outsourcing decisions or to 
enforce contract terms that do not involve false claim submissions 
within the meaning of the FCA. As a result, the government is 
largely left to self-regulate its outsourcing programs through use 
and sharing agreements that it may not decide to enforce. l92 
B. DATA INSOURCING-RELATED STATUTES 
Federal surveillance laws bearing upon data insourcing-like the 
laws applicable to outsourcing-leave substantial gaps in both 
government and private sector accountability, The statutory 
landscape relating to surveillance data shifted substantially in 
response to global terrorism. Pre-9/ll, Congress enacted the 1968 
Wiretap Act,19a the FISA of 1978,194 the Electronic Communications 
ContractilJg. 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2254. 2256 (2013) (afl{lling a mandatory duty to act 
in furtherance of the public interest should be implied in all government outsourcing 
contracts and that "members of the public for whose benefit the service WaR being 
provided-and who are harmed when service provision is poor-should be permitted to sue 
8S third·party beneficiarles for breach of the public interest duty"). 
1118 See Jody Freeman. Extending Public Accountability Through Privatization.: Fram 
Public Law to PublicizaJ.ion, in PUBUC ACCOUNTABJU1Y: DESJGNs., DJLF.MMA..~ ANU 
EXPEHIENCr..8 83, 97-98 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (explaining how both the executive 
and legislative branches may lack the motivation to hold private actors accountable). 
'''' 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012). 
110 Laura A Dickinson, Public ValueslPriuate Conl.ract, in G{)Vl~RNMt;NT fly CONTUAGT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 18, at 335, 356. 
Ull See Kimberly N. Brown, "We the People," Constitutional Accountability. and Outsourcing 
Government. 88 IND. L.J. 1347. 1361-64 (2013) (comparing accountability measUreR 
constraining government actors and the lack thereof regarding private contractors). 
192 See supra note 177 (explaining the current inadequacy of legislative, regulatory, nnd 
constitutional methods of oversight); see also Brown, supra note 191. at 1364-69. 
'" 18 U.S.C. §§ 251~252O (2012). The Wiretap Act waa enacted as T>tle III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pub. L. No. !JO.351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 
scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S. C.). See SOLOVE. ROTENBERG & SCHWARTZ, 8upra note 76, at 
84-85 (noting 'Wiretap Act" as the name of the statute). 
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Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986'95 (which contains the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA»,196 and the Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994.'97 These laws largely 
authorized the interception and storage of wire, oral, and electronic 
communications under circumstances that mayor may not require 
probable cause and a warrant, The FISA stands apart from the 
others because it applies to foreign-versus domestic-intelligence 
and is triggered by a relatively lesser showing on the government's 
part.'"" 
Post-9/ll, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,'99 
the Protect America Act (PAA) of 2007,200 and the FISA 
Amendments Act (FAA) of 2008.'''" These statutes amended the 
}<'ISA to provide the government with expanded authority that 
gave rise to the controversial Verizon order and the NSA's PRISM 
program, both of which effectively enabled the collection of 
Americans' communications data without probable cause and a 
warrant}"2 
1. Before 9111. Pre-9/ll surveillance legislation restricted the 
government's ability to collect voice and electronic 
communications, both in-transit and from storage repositories, It 
also imposed civil and criminal liability for unilateral violations by 
II'~ ~~Iectronic Communications Privacy Act or 1986, Pub. L. No. 99·508, 100 Stat. 184ti 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
... 1M U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2012). 
"n 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-\01IJ (2012). 
1l1li See infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text . 
1I~..1 Uniting nnd Strengthening America by ProVlChng Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107·56, 115 Stat. 272 
(codified a8 amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, 50 U.S.C,). Notably, 
Congres." aUowed § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, a section that allOW3 for bulkcoUection of U.S. 
citizens' ceUphone data, to sunset in Jun~ of2015. Jeremy Diamond, Patriot Act Provisions Have 
Expired: What Happens Now?, CNN PoLlTIC,q (June 1, 2015), httpJlwww.cnn.coml2015l05l:Wpo 
liticslwhat-happens·if·the-patriot-act-provislons-expirel (explaining that the Senate allowed key 
provisions orthe law to lapse, incJuding the NSA's bulk data collection program). 
"'" Protect America Act of 2007, 50 U.S .C. §§ 1805a-1805c (2012) . 
:lilt !<'ISA Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified os 
amended in scattered Hections or50 U.S. C.). 
.., See BRENNAN CENTER ~'OR JUS'rICE, ARE THEY ALLOWED TO Do THAT? A BREAKDOWN 01' 
St:LKL"'~:D GOVEKNM ";NT SURVlm ,LANCE P ROGRAMS (2013), aooilabl~ at http://www.brennance 
nter.urg/situ£/dllfuultlJilus/analysis/Government%20Survei11ance%20FAch heet.pdf (providing a 
breakdown of the new government surveillance programs and explaining their statutory 
justmcatio118).,.. 
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the private sector, while immunizing third parties for cooperating 
with government investigations. 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 ("the Wiretap Act")203 made it illegal for anyone to intercept 
or disclose wire or oral communications,204 which it defines as 
utterances "by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
justifying such expectation."206 The statute expressly covers the 
"contents" of communications, i.e., "any information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication."206 It 
permits law enforcement to apply for a judicial wiretap order only 
upon a showing of probable cause that the target is involved in 
serious crimes that are enumerated in the statute.207 The 
government must provide notice to the target and minimize 
collection of unrelated communications.208 The statute also 
imposes civil and criminal liability for violations,209 
The ECPA of 1986 expanded the Wiretap Act's protections for 
voice communications to ban the intentional interception, use, or 
disclosure of "electronic communications,"210 which is defined in 
such a way as to cover e-mail and Internet activity.2lI The ECPA 
thus makes it unlawful for a third party to intercept someone 
203 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
2£l,I 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012). This formulation reflects the seminal decision in Katz IJ, 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which preceded the Wiretap Act by Olle yo". .<We 
Freiwald, supra note 92, at 21- 22. In Katz, the Supreme Court expressly declined to 
address whether a warrant 18 required in cases involving national Be<:urity. 389 U.R Itt:JfiH 
n.23; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511. 532 (1985) ("In the aftermath of Katz. 
Executive authority to order warrantless national security wiretaps remained uncertAin."). 
'" 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2012). 
"" Id. § 2510(8). 
'" Id. §§ 2518(3), 2516(1); see also Freiwald, supra note 92, ot 23-25. 
"" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(5), 2518(8)(d). 
•• Id . §§ 2511 . 2520. 
210 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. H9·5()8, 100 Stat l H4H 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S. C.); see aL<;(J 18 U.H.C. § 2511 (20 12) 
(making it unlawful to intentionally intercept any "wire, ornl , or electronic cnmmunicntion"). 
:! ll See United Stutes v. Councilman. 418 F.3d 67. 79 (18t Cir. 2(05) ("'Wit· cnnrlulh· that tl K-
temporarily stored e·mail messages at issue here constitute electronic communications within 
the scope of the Wiretap Act . .. .'1j Kerr, supra note 138, at 630 (st.Rting thnt ConJ(n.'HH 
expanded the Wiretap Act to the lnternet in 1986 when It enacted t.he ECPA). The Jo~CPA 
defines an "electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, imagc8, 
ROunds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire. radio. 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptica] system that affects lnterstate or foreign 
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). 
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else's e-mail without hiB or her consent."l" The ECPA contains the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA),"" which protects stored 
communications such as those maintained by an individual's 
Internet service provider (ISP), and imposes criminal fines or 
imprisonment on anyone who intentionally accesses or discloses 
such communications without authorization."l' It also contains 
the Pen Register Act;'5 which requires a court order before 
installation of a device for recording telephone numbers dialed (a 
"pen register") or telephone numbers from which incoming calls 
originate (a "trap and trace device").21" 
The ECPA and the SCA contain exceptions that make it possible 
for private parties to lawfully capture and store electronic 
communications and share them with the government. The ECPA 
contains a business use exception, whereby employees of electronic 
communications service providers may "intercept, disclose, or use" 
electronic communications in the normal course of employment for 
"mechanical or service quality control checks.'''l7 It also authorizes 
the government to obtain warrants requiring that providers 
"furnish ... all information, facilities, and technical assistancp 
necessary to accomplish .. . interception[s) unobtrusively."2I" 
Additionally, the ECPA authorizes third-party service providers to 
hand over information to the government pursuant to a FISA order 
or a certification by the Attorney General or a designee that no such 
order is required.2 !U A similar provision in the Pen Register Act 
", See IH U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)-(5). 2520 (2012) (imposing criminal ond civil liubility fnr 
vioJa.tioOlI). 
'" Id. §§ 2701-2711. 
'" Id. § 2701(a)-(b). 
:llll Jd. §§ 3 12 1- :3127. The Pen Regislp.t Act governg the U~ of devices thai lrtll_~ whut hm. 
been termed "envelope information" (including "addressing" and ''routing'' information for e· 
mail), id. § :l127(:!), while the Wiretap Act and the SeA govern "content information," :;t'(! itl 
§ 2511}( 1), (4), (R), (12) (defining "intercept" under the Wiretap Act to mean "the uurnl m' 
other II:cquhntmn of the contents of Rny wire, t>Jcctronic, or oral communication throu.::h lhl' 
ufle of nny ek'Ctronic, mechanical, or other device," and providing definitions fOl' "witl' 
communication," "contents," and "electronic communication"), 
l lU Jd, § 3121(8); sc>e also id. § :U27(3)-(4) (defining "pen register" and "trap Rnd h'Rl'!' 
rlevic:c"). 
m /d. § 2[111(2)(a){i); :.·~e .Jarrod .J. White, C'..ommentary. B·mail@WorkCom: Rmplu,l'l>1' 
N,'onitoring of b'mployee E·mail, 48 AlA L. REV. 1079. 1086 (1997) (stating that 18 D.H-C. 
§ 2511(2)(o)(i) (201:l) i~ a souret! ror the "business U!:l~ exemption," wh ich an emplDYI~r mn)' 
n~scrt. to moni tor an employcc'~ ('·muB in the abRcncc or express 01' implit!d (.'UI1b1:IIl). 
' " 18 U.S.C. § 2518. 
' 1' Id. § 2511(2)(0)(ii). 
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lI iloWfl Ii ... (Ox Plllt" ortlers requiring that service providers install 
"11I'veiillllw(' equipment at the government's behest."u 
Fnr il.H plll·t, the SCA empowers the government to obtain the 
eOlllplll.s of wire or electronic communications with a warrant or by 
Huhpoena with prior notice to the subscriber.221 Non·content 
information may be obtained pursuant to a warrant or a court 
order that does not require probable cause.222 The SCA exempts 
service providers from civil or criminal liability regardless of the 
purpose of the interception;22-1 in this way, it differs from the 
Wiretap Act's narrower exemption for "activit[ies] which [are] a 
necessary incident to the rendition of his service."224 
Law enforcement routinely makes use of ECPA and SCA 
exceptions to collect electronic data regarding private citizens. An 
internal DOJ "Electronic Surveillance Manual" indicates that the 
SCA is commonly used to obtain cell tower dump records,225 which 
it can use to determine a cell phone's approximate location within 
a few hundred yards.226 Recently, the government invoked the 
"" Id. § 3123. 
211 Id. § 2703(s)-(b)(1). There is a question as to whother the ECPA's requirements bind 
just the service provider or whether the government is precluded from making a request for 
information without complying with the ECPA first. In McVeigh u. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 
215,218-19 (D.D.C. 1998), the Navy discharged an officer for homosexual conduct it derived 
from information it informally obtained from AOL. The Navy took the position-rejected by 
the court-that the ECPA contains no prohibitions relating to government conduct. Id. at 
220. A service provider could arguably lurn over information to other private parties 
without. n warrant, subpoena, or a court order under the ECPA, RS well. 
:lX.l Sce 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring "reasonable grounds 10 believe that the ... records or 
other information f'Ought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation" 
(emphasis added». Recently, in an appeal ofa criminal conviction bAsed in part on location 
records obtained from cell phone service providers under the SCA, the Eleventh Circuit 
found the statute unconstitutional to the extent that it allowfl the government to obtain 
slich information without a warrant. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210-18 (11th 
Cir. 2014). uaca",d en bane, 573 F. App'x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (mem.). 
,., 18 U.8.C. §§ 2701(c)(I), 2703(.). 
". Id. § 2511(2)(.)(i). 
m See U.S. DEP'T OF JmrnCr:, EI.ECTRONIC SURV}o;II.f.ANGfo: MANUAl .. at ii, 162 (rev. 2005), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminallfoieJdocslelec-sur-manua1.pdf (setting forth 
pl"OCCdures "to obtain authorirattion to oonduct electronic surveillance" and including a fonn 
application for a ("(lUrt order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which includes "cell site information" 
within the types of information the applicant can apply for disclosure 00. 
:m; Hon. Brian I.. Owsley, Tile Fourth Amendment Implications of the Oouernment's Use of 
Cell Tower Dump. in Its Electronic SurveiUance. 16 U. PA. J. CoNST. L. " 5 (2013). When. 
cell phone is turned on, the phone sends out a "signal testing" to the nearest ceU site in 
order to initiate contact with the network. [d. When a call is placed, "it triggers a series of 
relays along the cell·site network." ld. at 4. Providers routinely collect information 
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SCA to obtain records from the Twitter accounts of individuals 
associated with the WikiLeaks organization.227 
The SCA also allows law enforcement agencies to use National 
Security Letters (NSLs)221l to obtain information from ISPs and 
telephone companies without a court order if the government 
certifies that the records it seeks are "relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities."22' Google has reportedly 
received thousands of NSLs issued over the last few years, 
implicating tens of thousands of users and accounts.230 
Congress passed the FISA in 1978, after Watergate raised 
public awareness of the executive branch's long history of 
warrantless surveillance for national security and political 
purposes.231 Whereas the Wiretap Act, the ECPA, and the SCA 
are criminal statutes implicating domestic intelligence, the FISA 
was enacted to enhance the government's capacity to obtain 
"foreign intelligence information" by eavesdropping on people 
suspected of working with foreign governments on United States 
soiJ.232 It thus has a "lower threshold for conducting surveillance 
regarding the proximity of a particular phone to a particular cell tower, the position of the 
tower in relation to the phone, and the signal strength of the phone for billing and other 
purposes. Id. at 5. 
:!21 Scott Shane & John F. Burns, U.S. Subpoenas Twitter Over WikiLeoks Supporters, 
N.Y. TIM"", Jan. 9. 2011, at AI, auailable at http://www.nytime • . coml2011IDlI09/worldl09 
wiki.html; Glenn Greenwald, DOJ Subpoenas 7\vitter Records of Seuerol WtkiLeaks 
Volunteers, SALON (Jan. 7, 2011, 11:08 PM). http://www.ltalon.coml2011101l08ltwitter_21 . 
22Il For background on NSLs, see SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING L IBERTIES: THE WAR ON 
TERROR AND THE EROSION 0" AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150--64 (2011). 
;1211 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b). The statute states that "[a] wire or electronic communication 
tiervice provider shall comply with a request for subscriber information and ton billing 
records information, or electronic communication transactional records in its custody or 
possession made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under subsection (b) 
of this section." Jd. § 2709(a) (emphasis added). In In. re National Security Letter, 930 F. 
Supp. 2d 1064, 1075-77 (N.D. Cal. 2013), a federal district judge held the statute's provision 
prohibiting a recipient from disclosing the existence of an NSL, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c), violated 
the First Amendment. and that the narrow and deferentia} provision for judicial review, id. 
§ 3511(b), violated the }I'irst Amendment and the separation of powers. 
:l.'lI1 Traftsparellcy Report: Requests For User Illformation, GOOGLE, https:llwww.google. 
oom/tranHparencyrt~portJ\\serdatarequestslUSI (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
~L See Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 
2008 and Ideas for Puture Surueillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. I NT. L.J. 269. 275 (2009) 
(describing pre·FISA history of governmental abu~s). 
,,, See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(e)-(0. 1802 (2012). The FISA make. numerous distinction. 
based on whether the surveillance target is foreign or a U.S. national and whether the 
644 GEORGIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
[t,hat] reflects the inherent differences between obtaining 
Hurveillnnce for intelligence (e.g. prevention) purposes, as opposed 
to obtaining evidence to be used to convict an individual in II court 
of law."":! 
The FISA does not require that the government demonstrate 
probable cause that a search will reveal evidence of a crimp so as 
to justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate judge."'I' It 
instead allows the government to apply to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC}-a special panel of eleven federal 
district court judges2:I!;-for an ex parte order authorizing 
electronic surveillance of Americans for up to ninety days.2:16 The 
government must show, inter alia, that "the target of the electronic 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power" and 
that "a significant purpose" of the investigation is to obtain foreign 
intelligence.237 Although no indication of criminal wrongdoing is 
required for foreign subjects, in order to obtain a warrant 
regarding a "United States person" the government must 
demonstrate probable cause to believe that the person is 
"knowingly" engaged in activities that "involve or may involve a 
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States:'23~ The 
statute also mandates that the government craft "minimization 
procedures" to limit its collection, storage, and dissemination of 
Ilc'quil'litinn ill; by fihrr optic cRbh.· or by wir(!ll's~ l;oJ1lmtlni('ntion. slwh us rHelin, IImnt1jC nthf'r 
fl1dnrfi. leI.: ~('(~ a/so Rlum, supra note 2...1 1. Ht 279 (lIot.ing Ihnt ",.,IHA Nt'l'ms IU makc! 
arhitrury du..tindions, hAsed on technology, thAt nn~ riivuJ'('('{1 fmm Itny priVRt·y 01' 
1'( 'ngonnhh'Ol' sH (:onccrnfi of t.he Fourt.h Amcndm~nt"). 
:!.1., Rlum. ,'wpm note 231. at 276. 
:!:II Set' Rcncrall,v William C. Banks. Programmatic S'lrl'l'illan('t' cmd FISA: Of Nlwllr:; ill 
H ttJ'stUl:/(:;, AA Tfo:x , L. HfW. 163:1 (2010) (describing the "hllsic icil'H" (If the· Jt'lRA IIH uJ)uwing 
"'g}Clvcmment (to) conduct. intruflive electronic fturvcillanCl! uf Anwricnn!< ... wilhuut 
traditinnni prohab le C8Uf>e ••• if it could demonstrate •.. renNeln 10 hdicvl' that tnr~cls of 
Hurvpillnnre IwerrJ acting on behalf of fo reign powers" (citing 5n V.RC. § 1 ROSCn) (201 2»). 
~:Io\ flO U.RC. § 1803(a); SOInv F.. RO'n:NnERG & RCHWART'I., SlIpNl nllte 75. nl 104. A 
~eparate court of review "hn(sJ jurisdiction to revit>w the denial flf IIny alJpJicat ion marie 
under (FISAI." 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b). 
'" 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805. 1824(d)(l)-(2). 
'" [d. §§ 1804(. )(J)(A), (.)(6)(B), 1805(. ). 
2St! Jd. § 1B01(b)(l), (h)(2) (defining "agent of a fore iKJ\ power" 38 requiring at least thiR 
showing if the target is 8 "United States person"); SOLOVg. ROTENRfo;H( : & SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 75, at 104. 
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non-foreign-intelligence information."39 In certain circumstances, 
the FISA authorizes surveillance without a court order.240 
In 1994, Congress passed the CALEA and President Bill 
Clinton signcd it into law."" The CALEA was enacted in response 
to FBI complaints that advancing digital technologies were 
mRking it difficult to perform surveillance over telephone 
networks."" The statute requires telecommunications carriers to 
develop and modify their equipment, facilities, and services to 
ensure that they can comply with the FBI's electronic surveillance 
requirements.· '" Any interceptions conducted on the premises of a 
communications provider must be done pursuant to a court 
order."'" 
2. Afler 9/11. In the wake of 9/11, Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act. of 2001,2'5 which amended the FISA in a number of 
important ways. For example, prior to the 2001 amendments, the 
government had to persuade the FISA court that "the purpose" of 
"" fill U.S.C. §§ IMIlI(h), 1805(0)(3). 
"" ,.,.", id. §§ IHIY!(u), 11\05(0, 1809(a)(I), 1811; SOI.OVl:, ROT>:N8l:RCl & SCHWAR'I"t, supra 
nute 75, Ilt 104. ~'ourth Amendment challenges to the FISA and its amendments have been 
UIl~lI('Ct'Ssrul. SI!r!, e.g., United States v. Abu·Jihaed, 630 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(denying dcfemlnnt's constitutional challenges to FISA after admission of evidence that 
dllfcncinnl CIImmunicated nation!!l defense information and provided materials to 
terroris.ts): United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 984 (D. Minn. 2008) (finding 
thul pndmhll' CRU~l tmd particularity requirements of FISA satisfied reasonableness 
requirement of io'ourth Amendment where defendant was charged with conspiracy and with 
providing matenal support and resources to terrorists). 
llli Cnmmuniration~ A. ..... -listance of Law Enforcement Act. Pub. L. No. 103-414, lOS Stat. 
~279 (1994) (codified a. omended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012». 
2.12 FUH.IOI.A., supra note 117, at 1 (noting that complaints by the FBI of increased 
difficulty nc(·tlssing public telephone networks contributed to the enactment of CALEA). 
'" 47 U.RC. §§ H102, 1005 (2012) . 
... , Id. § 1004. 
\lU Uniting nnd Htrengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
§ 208(a). 110 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, 
50 u.s. C.). The USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3.161, which possed the house in May 2014, would 
,'xtenrl'he USA Patriot Act to 2017. USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 701(0) 
(2014); see also H.R. 3361 (113Ih): USA FREEDOM Act, GOVTRACK.US, https:/Iwww.govtra 
ck.ul:llbmgressibiIl6l113IhnS:i61 (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (noting that the bill passed the 
HotllU' hut died in the Renate). Although it was designed to curtail the NSA's bulk 
collection of meta data, partly by shifting the retention of metadata to private firms, privacy 
advocates Ilssailed the bill. Andrea Peterson, NSA Reform Bill Passes House, Despite Loss 
of Sup}}f)rt from Pril1tlCy AdVOC'aWJ, WASil. POST, May 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/the-switchlwp/2014/05l22/nsa.reform.bill.passes.house.despite.loss-of.support.fro 
m.privary.udvocatesl. 
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its surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.2•m 
Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act narrowed the government's 
burden to demonstrating that foreign intelligence is "a significant" 
purpose of the FISA surveillance."'7 It also expanded the 
government's ability to obtain ex parte orders authorizing physical 
searches,2' H pen registers, and trap and trace devices;'''' expanded 
the length of the FISA's surveillance periods;"'" and increased 
access to emergency surveillance.'51 
In addition, § 215 of the statute-which expired on May 31, 
2015"''---significantly enhanced the government's ability to obtain 
business records such as customer book lists, library patron 
records, and medical records from third-party telephone and ISP 
companies.253 Although grand juries routinely issue subpoenas for 
business records in criminal investigations, no showing of probable 
cause was required under § 215."" Rather, the application only 
needed to include "a statement of facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are 
relevant to an authorized investigation."""'· Moreover, companies 
served with § 215 orders were prohibited from disclosing that fact 
to anyone, including the subjects of the surveillance.256 The FISA 
court's controversial order to Verizon in April of 2013, made public 
with the [lIst of the Snowden leaks, was issued pursuant to 
§ 215.'57 It broadly required Verizon to provide the NSA with 
,·m 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B). 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000) (amended 2001) (emph.siR addcd). 
'" USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107·56. § 218. liS Rtnt. 272, 291 (2001). 
." [d. §§ 206, 207, liS Stat. at 282. 
•• [d. § 214, lI5 Sta~ at 286-87 (a mending the FISA). 
' ;0 [d. § 207(0), 115 Stat. at 282. 
'" [d. § 212(1), 115 Stat. at 284. 
~ See Diamond, supra note 199. 
" " [d. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (codified at 60 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012» (uuthurizing 
production of j'any tangible things" related to "an investigatIOn" regarding (orcign 
intelligence not concerning United States persons or "to prowct tlgainliit international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities", ; see Donohue, BI/pm notc 1:17, /1(, IZH n. :12 
(citing § 215 68 increasing govemment access to certain business TL"Cords). 
2M See 50 U.S.C. § 1861. The Executive must "fully inform" Cungrl!HH 1\ 1'1 to the 
implementation of § 215 on an annual basis. Id. § 1862(8). 
"" [d. § 1861(b)(2)(a). 
... [d. § 186I(d)(I). 
:!ttl In re Appiicolion. of F.B.I. for an. Order Requiring the l'rodurt um of 7unRibie 77lings 
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telephone call metadata for the approximately 101.2 million 
wireless accounts in its systems for a three-month period?5B 
Although the FISA limited the government's ability to engage 
in warrantless spying on U.S. nationals,259 after 9/11 President 
George W. Bush issued an executive order unilaterally authorizing 
the NSA to eavesdrop on Americans' e-mail and telephone 
communications if a person was believed to have terrorist links.2GO 
Under the Bush Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program, 
the NSA conducted "vacuum cleaner surveillance" in conjunction 
with private telecommunications companies for purposes of 
identifying potential terrorist threats, and only then utilized the 
FISA procedures to further investigate.26t In 2007, the FISA court 
condoned the program, "g[iving] the government access to nearly 
all of the international telecom traffic entering and leaving the 
United States.''262 The PAA was also enacted in 2007 to provide 
legislative backing for programmatic surveillance beyond the case-
specific confines of the FISA. 263 
Upon the PAA's expiration in 2008, Congress passed the FAA."" 
Whereas the FISA tolerates interceptions of communications 
266 Id.; see also Verizon Posts Double·Digit Earnings Growth and Continued Strong 
Operating Performance in 3Q: 3Q 2013 Highlights, VERIZON.COM, http://www.verizonwireleM. 
comlnewslartic1e12013110/93-2013-earnings,html Oast visited Feb. 21. 2015) (noting Verizon's 
101.2 million retail connections in 2013). The FISA court on February 26, 2015 approved an 
extension of a modified telephony metadata collection program until June I, 2015. the date on 
which § 215 is set to expire. Statement by the White House Press Secretary, TH e: WHITE HOUSE 
OFF.CI; OF THE PRESS SECR~"TARY (Feb. 27. 2015), auai/able at https:/Iwww.wh.tehouse.gov/ 
the·press-ofI'icel2015102l27/statement-pres8·secretary·reauthorization<oUection.bulk.telephon 
y-meta (commenting on the reauthorization of the Collection of Bulk Telephony Metadata 
Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act). 
261' JAMES G. MCADAMS, FED. LAw ENFORCEMENT TRAINING FACn.rrIES. FoREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA): AN OVERVIEW 1-2 (2007). auailable at http" l/www. 
fletc.gov/sitesldefaultlflleslimported.JilesltraininglprogramalJegal·divisionldownloads·articles· 
and.faqslresearch-bY·8ubjectJmisce1l8neouslForeignlntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdC. 
2to Blum. supra note 231, at 283; Banks, supra note 234, at 1641. 
211\ Banks, supra note 234, at 1641-42. 
262 Id. at 1643. 
263 Id. at 1644; Blum, supra nate 231, at 296-97. 
Z64 Gene Healy, Our Continuing Cull of the Presidency, m. THE PRESIDENCY IN TH& 
Tw':N1'Y·FIII.'"T C~NTURY 145, 153 (Charles W. Dunn cd., 2011). Section 702 of the FAA 
amended the FISA at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. L 10· 
261, § 702. 122 Stat. 2436, 2438. The FAA was reautho rized in 20 12. H.R. Res. 5949, 112th 
Cong. (2012) (enacted). Sec /lell.rally EUWARD C. L.U, CONGo RESEARCH S ERV .• R42725. 
REAtrrHORIZATION Ol-~THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT (201 3) (dlSCussing the reauthorizatIOn of 
the FAA). 
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involving perRons on U.S. soil, the FAA only allows for the targeting 
of non-U.S. persons outside the United States.""" However, it docs 
not require an individualized determination by the FISC as a 
precondition to surveillance of a specific target.266 The FAA instead 
empowers the U.S. Attorney General (AG) and the Director of 
National Intelligence (ON!) to obtain a so-called "certification order" 
from the FISC empowering them to jointly authorize, for up to one 
year, the surveillance of non-U.S. citizens outside of the United 
States for foreign intelligence purposes.267 Rather than requiring-
as the FISA does-that a target be an agent of a foreign power,26" 
the FAA provides that the FISC "shall"26" issue a certification order 
upon a showing, inter alia, that "a significant purpose of the 
acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information .... 7o The 
court must approve "targeting" and "minimization" procedures in its 
certification order to ensure that only people "reasonably believed to 
be outside the United States" are targeted and to minimize any 
privacy impact. 27 J 
After the FISC issues a certification order, the AG and DNI can 
direct that electronic communications providers assist in 
surveillance in exchange for retroactive immunity,272 An 
immunity provision is triggered if the AG certifies to one or more 
of five conditions.27" In such cases, no civil action may be 
maintained "against any person for providing assistance to an 
element of the intelligence community."27' Only companies served 
with FAA orders can challenge related requests for information 
before the PISC. "7:, 
'" fiO U.S.C. § IHHln(b) (20 121. 
2fiIi NSA n IH. OF CIVil , L unm'l'It:''-: ANIJ PRIVACY Ofo'I·'IGfo:, NHA's I MPU·;Ml-:N'rATION (W 
FOREIGN IN1'RfJ.IC:fo:NCR SURVEII.IANel,! ACT Hfo;rTJON 7<r2, at 2 (2014), ouai/abi!' at http:// 
WWW.fI1H.C Irgli rp/ntUlJcl po .. 702. pelf. 
'" 50 U.s.C. § IMln(o). 
'" Id. §§ 18()4(n)(~)(A). IH04(0)((;)(II). 
'" [d. § 18Hl o(i)(~)(A). 
"" 'd. § 18!l1n(g)(2)(A)(v). 
'" [d. § IRRl n(g)(2)(A). 
:01"12 [d. §§ 188Ia(a), 1885a(0); 8f'e LHura K. Donohue, The Shadow of Slale Secrets. 109 U. 
PA. L. REV. 77, 157 (2010) (dl.!lCussinK the arrangements). 
273 60 U.S.C. 1885.(0). 
'" [d. § 1886. (0). 
:'16 Id. § IBR l a(h)(4){A) rAn t'il.actnmic communication service provider receivinC a directive 













N,sA with COl 





Section 702 al 
and dat.a repe 
government's; 
end-run aroun 
thfl Ji'fII, . i~1 IlIh!llif.{ 
1)('htinn.l_ 
~11\ .Jnnll'4" .Jnm'r l 
Jo'ISA AlItlwI"IUrs. J4 
~~ r flO U.8.C'. ~ ISH 
mn\' uulhoriZ(· jilin 
nuthnrizntiol1, the to 
HllItt'H In m·quirC' fOl 
nrcr'nwnld & I.<:wen 
UlUJ OIlier." Til l-: Gu 
1 :lIju n/lUill UI-h.'fh. gi II 
that Ihl' }O~ISA Ampnl 
!m l J)IINAII(JI~. /tuJm 
n'j C1('lImnn & Pllit 
Ht·ndqutll'll'l's- Brite 
mtr·lhgpncp from the 
(hr' formallegRI prOCf 
:Jill! NSA DIR. OP e,v 
:!lIl ld. 
~'f1.2 Jel. at 6, 
~~I SrI' Dunohl1t .. /I . 
lAnguage of § 702 has 
(Vol. 4H:(i07 
r the targeting 
lwever, it does 
~e FISC as a 
Ie FAA instead 
he Director of 
ification order" 
l, for up to one 




lurpose of the 
,ation."-7o The 
rocedures in its 
ably believed to 
I minimize any 
.G and DNI can 
ers assist in 
,unity.272 An 
to one or more 
action may be 




il, aumJabl£' nt http:// 
I Statl! Seen!js, 1 ~9 U. 
ler receiving a directive 
side such dIrective with 
2015) THE mRELEVANT CONSTITUTION 649 
Commentators have criticized the FAA as "permitting the mass 
Ilequisition, without individualized judicial oversight or 
supervision, of Americans' international communications."'76 
Rection 702 of the FAA is the stated legal authority for the 
I(overnment's PRISM program,277 under which the NSA "tap[ped) 
directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet 
compllnieA," and extracted "photographs, e-mails, documents, and 
, connection logs," along with audio and video data.278 Those 
companies included Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, 
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple."?" The NSA describes the 
PRISM program as "compel [ling)" service providers "to provide 
NSA with communications to or from" individuals identified as 
likely to communicate foreign intelligence information.280 It also 
"eompel[s)" service providers "to assist ... in the lawful 
interception of electronic communications to, from, or about tasked 
Heledors" under § 702.261 
Onc(' intercepted, "[c)ommunications provided to NSA under 
Section 702 are processed and retained in multiple NSA systems 
anrI data repositories.''2On There are no legal restrictions on the 
government's ability to search such data, which can operate as an 
end·run around the FAA's ban on surveillance of U.S. nationals.2B3 
lin' F'm,.ign Il1t~lI ig(!lll'(' Sllntt~illuncu Court. which "hall have jurisdiction to review such 
pptition."). 
2111 .Jaml·~I.J u rrer & Laura W. Murphy, Oversight Hearing on the Administration's Use 0/ 
FJ8A tllltiUJrilics, l ~ ";NnAO fo~: J. F EOERAI.IST SOC'y PRAC. GROUPS 76, 78 (2013). 
:m 50 U.R(, . § lAAla(a) ("lTJhc Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
mny authorize joint ly, for a period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the 
nuthoriznt ion, the targe ting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
~lntl-'N tu acquire fOl'eign intelligence information.j; DoNAHUE, 8upra note 40, at 2; Glenn 
Oreenwuld & g wen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple Google 
unrl Ot/II·rs. 1'm: GUAIU)fAN (.June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), http~/www.theguardian.com/warldJ20 
131junlO6Iuli·tech·giants·nsa-da ta; see Gellman & Poit ras, supra note 136, at Al (stating 
that thf~ f"fSA Amendments gAve rise to the PRISM project). 
21>1 lloNAtUlt-:, Iwpm nau> 40, at 1 (quoting Gellman & Poitras, srtpra note 136, at AI). 
:./;79 Ut-llmon & Poitrafll , Sllp ra note 136. Interest ingly. the Government Communications 
Headquartprs-Britain's equivalent of the NSA-had a lso been secretly gathering the same 
inlclhKel1l't· flTlm tht~ !,jj' nine companies through a n operation set up by the NSA. bypassing 
the formnl h~gal proceSR required under their own laws. [d. 
1ItO NHA Om. IlP CIVIL LI BERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE, 61lpra note 266, at 5. 
2H1 ld. 
282 [d. at H. 
:tlI3 &e l)nnohu(', Rupra note 137. at 160. 192 (noting how the "to, from, and about" 
languat:w of § 7IJ2 has been misused). 
650 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [VoL 49:607 
Laura Donohue has identified numerous violations of the FAA 
resulting from the lack of FISC oversight over specific searches of 
the NSA's metadata databases.284 Moreover, before the Snowden 
disclosures gave rise to the lower court decisions in Klayman v. 
Obama285 and ACLU v. Clapper,286 lawsuits brought by individuals 
challenging these surveillance schemes have failed because the 
secretive nature of the programs makes it difficult for plaintiffs to 
establish the requisite injury."87 Commentators have thus assailed 
the FISA and the FAA as providing insufficient safeguards for 
individual privacy rights protected by the Constitution.288 
IV. THE REACH OF POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL FIXES 
Despite its inadequacies, the prospect of new legislation 
remains the primary means of establishing limits on data 
insourcing and outsourcing.289 The relevant constitutional law is 
ad hoc, with no coherent framework for minding constitutional 
tolerance of modern alterations to the structure of government. 
Moreover, no doctrine is particularly robust for purposes of 
confining the privatization of government, as all are premised on a 
flawed assumption that the public and private sectors are 
severable for purposes of constitutional law. 
284 DONAHUE, supra note 40, at 40-54 (discussing three important waYt> the NSA hOR Rid!!, 
stepped statutory requirements). 
2M 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2013). See infra notes 373-74 and accompanying text. 
'" No. 14·42·CV, 2015 WL 2097814 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2015). See i,,(ra not~'375 and 
accompanying text. 
"" See Clapper v. Amnesty InCl. USA. 13:J S. Ct. 113H. 1155 (201 3) (holding thnl 
plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate present or impending injury barred standing to chal1en~ 
the constitutionality of FISA); Am. Civil Liberties Union Y. Nnt'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 
687 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing). 
2811 E.g., Donohue, supra note 137, at 174-90, 202-06, 243-65 (arguing that the NSA's 
metadata mining programs violate the FISA and the Constitution); Banks, .<fupra note 234. 
at 1656 ("(DIne inevitable problem with the relaxed standard (of the FAA) is that ... more 
warrantless surveiUance of persons inside the United States will occur."); Alan Butler, 
Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 
48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 63-67 (2013) (indicating that the main problem with the FISA is 
"inadequate transparency and public accountablllty"). 
:lM1I Butler, supra note 288, at 82-91; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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A. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
In theory, the state action doctrine extends the Constitution to 
limit or remedy the negative effects of private behavior that is 
attributable to the government.290 In practice, it converts private 
actors into state ones for purposes of suppressing evidence in 
criminal trials or attaching liability for violations of individual 
constitutional rights.29 ' In Shelley v. Kraemer, Chief Justice 
Vinson famously stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects 
no shield against mt:rely private conduct, however discriminatory 
or wrongful .. 292.....-unless. the Court later explained, "to some 
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been 
found to have become involved in [the conductj."293 
The traditional aims of the state action doctrine are twofold: 
first, to "preserve[) an area of individual freedom by limiting the 
reach of federal law and federal judicial power"'·' and, second, to 
"avoid[ j the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it 
could not control."" ;' The doctrine thus simultaneously seeks to 
maintain private parties' autonomy and freedom on the one hand, 
and to ensure that the government is responsible for matters that 
lie within its sphere of authority on the other. By necessity, it 
assumes that a meaningful dividing line exists between the public 
and private. 
Legal commentators have critiqued the doctrine's task as 
impossible.296 The Supreme Court itself has quipped that "[w)hat is 
:!1I11 See infra note 292 and accompanying text (explaining that private actors may be 
subject to the Constitution if the government is sufficiently involved in their conduct). 
211 Private parties may be subject to money damages for constitutional violations under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 only if they are found to be acting under "color of law." Flagg Bros. v. Brooks. 
436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). The Court has stated that "the state action and the under color· 
of·s tate·law requirements are obviously related." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co .• 457 U.S. 
922. 928 (1982); Bee also Verkuil, supra note 20, at 431 (observing that the state action 
doctrine M 'constitutionalizes' after· the fact delegations that amount to the exercise of public 
authority" rather than limiting them in the first instance). 
'" 334 U.S. 1. 13 (1948). 
' " Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth .• 365 U.S. 715. 722 (1961). 
m Lu.gar, 457 U.S. at 936. 
2t6 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (l988); see also 
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary 8ch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 306 (200l) (Thomas. 
J., dissenting) (describing these two aima of the state action doctrine as set forth in LUNar 
and Tarkanian). 
298 See, e.g., Paul Brest. SIaU! Action and Liberal Theory; A Casenole on Flagg Brothcl"M v. 
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 13~O (1982) (arguing that the state action doctrinl! i~ 
652 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
'private' action and what is 'state' action is not always easy to 
determine."29? Yet the Court is entrenched in a formalistic 
approach to state action that is devoid of broader constitutional 
principles for steering the sorting process when it happens that the 
public and private roles blur. Instead, it has deemed courts' role as 
one of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" in individual 
cases,2gB leaving a dizzying array of outcomes with few common 
threads. As a consequence, the doctrine mostly fails as such. 
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court erected a two-part 
analysis for implementing the dual purposes of the state action 
doctrine,2g9 although it has only intermittently employed both 
parts in subsequent cases.300 The first prong-whether "the 
[challenged] deprivation [was] caused by the exercise of some right. 
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by 
the State or by a person for whom the State is rcsponsible"ool-is 
satisfied if the private actor, in effectuating a constitutional 
deprivation, acted "with the knowledge of and pursuant to" a law, 
person, or entity for which the state is responsible."o2 This fnctor 
thus requires that the private actor's conduct be in conformity 
with the rules of the state."03 
The second part of the Lugar formulation does more doctrinul 
work than the first. It asks whether "the party charged with the 
deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said tu be a state 
intellectually inconsistent); John Dorsett Niles, Lauren g, Trihhle & .Iennirer M. Wims il il 
Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. Rt:v. H8S, MR9 (2U1 1) ("l l) l l' V(·II'pil1~ a 
comprehensive state action approach is impossible becRu~ the ~t nt(· Acliull ln11UJry c'fln 
arise in limitJess factual situations and therefore defies definition.i. 
291 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); see also Louis Michael Hmdmnn, 711(' Stalf' 
Action Paradox, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 391 (1993) ("No Rrps of ('onRllturul1Iul Inw i ~ 
lUore oonfusing and contradiCtory than state action."). 
298 Burton., 365 U.S. 8.t 722. 
"" 457 U.s. nt 9~7. 
:100 See generally Bf'('nlwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 306 (Thoma .. , .J ., diswnf.ing) (l1ulinR fhnt 
the Court has "used many different tests to IdentIfy :.t8te Rebon"). 
30 L Lugar, 457 U.s. at 937. 
.~ Am. Mfl'S. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (H)9H) (qUill ing Flngg HnH~ .• ft1l= v. 
Bronks. 436 U.S. 149. 156 (I 97R». 
:1113 In Lugar, a curporate defendant was sued for obtaining nnd (',,('cul in!.! 11 WI'if Ill' 
attachment of the plaintiffs property pre·judgment. I.ugar, 457 U.s. at 9201 - 21l. 'I'hl' ('IlUrt 
found slale action for purposes of the plaintiffs due process clalln, but not for fI dP11Il 
pl"Cm iaed on "unlawful acts" for which "respondents were R('ting conlrary I II till' l'df!Van l 
policy articulated by the State," as they lacked "the authority of Htnl e nflk inlt-l to put I hi' 
weight of the Slate behind thelr private decision." ld. at 940, 
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actor."""4 For this step, the Court begins by identifying "the 
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains."""5 Whether such 
conduct should be held to constitutional standards is then 
analyzed under two primary tests: (1) the "exclusive government 
function" or "public function" test which, the Sixth Circuit has 
explained, looks to whether "the private entity exercises powers 
which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state, such as 
holding elections or eminent domain";'"6 and (2) the 
"entanglement" test, which looks to whether the government 
compelled, encouraged, authorized, facilitated, or participated in 
private conduct.307 Neither test relies on principles of the 
structural Constitution-such as the separation of powers or 
achieving government accountability-at any stage in the 
analysis. As a result, neither operates in a way that could 
conceivably capture the broader constitutional implications of 
government outsourcing or the insourcing of data for surveillance. 
The highly formalistic public function test has heen largely 
confined to holding elections,308 empanelling juries,'''''' running 
.10 14 Id. at 937. 
... Sul/iuan. 526 U.S. at 51 (quoting Blum v. Yareleky. 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). 
'" Wololeky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing ~'logg Bro •. Inc. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149. 149 (1978); Jackeon v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U$ 345, 352 (1974»; 
see also Flagg Bros., Inc., 436 U.S. at 157-62 (discussing the public function lest); Nixon v. 
Condon. 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932) (recognil.ing that the test is satisfied whtm parties are 
acting in matters "intimately connected with the capacity of government"), 
301 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PR INCIPI~ES ANII PCH.IClF..H 529 (4th ed. 
2011 ) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary S.,h. ABe'n. 531 U.S. 288 (2001)). 
PmfeMsor Chemerinsky characterizes public function and entanglement 811 Mexceptions" to 
th" ban on holding private actors constitutionally accountablt!. ld. He aJsa identifies R 
possible third exception-"entwinement," whIch ie entanglement without government 
em:uuragemcnt and ~prings from the Court's decision in Brentwood Academy. Id. Other 
scholars have d~ye)oped taxonDmies of state action that divide the entanglement test into 
multiple Hcporate tests. See, e.g., Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State 
Action Doctrine, 73 Mo. L. REV. 561, 564-67 (2008) (identifying seven tests for fltate action, 
including the "state agency," the "joint participation," the "&tate compUlsion," and the 
h~ymhiClI ic: n!IRtionship" tesls). Jody Freeman divides ~ntnngJentent into "joint 
pllrtic:ipat.ion" nnd "ncxtlfl," with the latter governing circumstances in which the privRtt' 
actor is heavily regulated. Freeman, supra note 42, at 577. 
"" See 'ferry V. Adorn., 345 U.S. 461, 46S-70 (1953) (Black. ,J.. plurality) (applying tho 
public fUl1ctinn tl!l'It Lo ,·II-ctions in which public OffiCU1)S ure seit!<:ted). 
:109 See gdmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (holding that th~ 
exercisp of peremptory challenges in civil cases is utnte actiun), 
654 GEORGIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
municipalities,31D and (possibly) operating prisons.311 Technically, 
it is limited to circumstances in which the government delegates 
"an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign" to a private entity,312 a 
standard that the Court has not clarified except to hold that the 
provision of education does not qualify.313 In Rendell-Baker v. 
Kahn, the Court found that a private, nonprofit school was not a 
state actor because the state legislature had given the executive 
branch the option of providing educational services publicly; 
education was thus not an "exclusive" function of the state.3 14 
For its part, the "entanglement test" is not a true test, but an 
amalgamation of considerations-some factual, some subjective."'5 
They include (1) whether the government regulated or licensed the 
private party, (2) whether the state exercised coercive power over 
the private party, (3) whether the state encouraged or participated 
in the private activity in question or otherwise had a "symbiotic 
relationship" with the private party, and (4) whether the functions 
and motivations of the private actor were at odds with those of the 
government.3lS In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, the 
Court explained that this "nexus" inquiry "necessarily turns on the 
degree of the Government's participation in the private party's 
activities, a question that can only be resolved 'in light of all the 
circumstances.' "317 
:110 See Marsh v, AJabama. 326 U.S. 501. 505-06 (1946) (hoJdin~ that town that was 
wholly-owned by a corporation was a state actor). 
:m See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (holding that privately employed 
prison guards were notentlUed to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but reserving 
the question of whether they acted under color of state law in the first instance). 
312: FJagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks. 436 U.S. 149, 160 (1978) (holding that warehousemen's 
proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for soorage was nol a state action). 
'" See Renden·Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (holding that .ducation of 
maladjusted high school students is not the exclusive provmce of the state). 
314 ld. Michele Gilman has thus observed that if the legislature allows functions Lo be 
outsourced, "it is hard to see how a privatized service can ever satiafy this interpretation of 
the public function test." Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountabtlity in an Era 0/ 
Priuatized Welfare. 89 CAUF. L. REV. 569, 614 (2001). 
'I' A1though scholars have subdtvided the entanglement approach into numeroUIJ distinct 
tests for state action, see supra note 307, the Supreme Court has not formulated it thAt WAy. 
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary 8ch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) ("Our 
cases have identUied a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution."). 
31t See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 307, at 539-51 (explainmg these and other 
considerations to determine the "degree of government involvement" in the action). 
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The "totality-of-the-circumstances" nature of the entanglement 
test has produced inconsistent results. The Court found no state 
action in Rendell-Baker,'"" for example. in which employees sued a 
nonprofit school after being terminated for engaging in political 
speech,:Il" Even though the school received most of its funding 
from the state, the Court reasoned. the rationale behind the firings 
did not pertain to the educational purpose of the public function.320 
In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Ass'n, in 
contrast, the Court declared a private regulator of public high 
school athletics a state actor by virtue of school officials' 
"entwinement ... in the structure of the association," which was 
comprised of public school officials and employees eligible for 
membership in the state retirement system.32l In dissent, Justice 
Thomas criticized the majority's finding of state action because the 
association performed no public function; it was neither created, 
controlled, or coerced by the state; and it fulfilled no government 
objective.32'2 
The entanglement test incentivizes the government to hand off 
immense discretion to private parties.323 The less the government 
coerces or substantially involves itself in a private activity, the less 
likely there will be state action and constitutional liability for 
either party under the test, Indeed, the Supreme Court in Blum v. 
Yaretsky pointed to the absence of coercion to justify rejecting a 
state action argument in the face of other indicia of government 
influence.:l24 Blum involved a class of Medicaid recipients seeking 
'" 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982). 
rllil Id. at 831-35. 
:I:!II Id. at 840-42. 
'" 531 U.S. 288, 291, 300 (2001). 
:L%1 ld. at 309-1 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
:J'L' S('(! Metzger, supra note 167, at 1424-26. In her exhaustive analysis of government 
outsourcing under the state action doctrine. Gillian Metzger condudes that the test's 
el:l~ntiul foculi on "close government involvement" fails to acoount for private parties acting 
"as independent decision makers" under the auspices of government authority. [d. at 1424. 
When government contractually delegates its powers to private parties and fails to retain 
l"IufficiL'nt oversight or control, it "evisceratlesl the fundamental requirement of 
com;titutionni nccountahility." [d. at 1422. ProfeAAor Metzger has therefore urged that the 
focuR of state actlOn analysis "shift! I to assessing t he powers wielded by private entities and 
"way from identify ing surreptitious government action," an intriguing approach that is not 
OlU.i1y supportable by case law. [d. at 1424. 
31~ 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (explaining that the government is "responsible fur :1 
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or haR provided such signirkHlI1 
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notice and an opportunity for II hCIIl"ing before a private nursing 
home could transfer them 1.0 another facility.32' Although the state 
subsidized the cost of the home. liclJnsed and extensively regulated 
its operations, and paid for most patients' medical expenses, the 
physicians and nursing home administrators ultimately made the 
transfer decisions.!I?j; 'The decisions were not "require[d)" by the 
state, so there was no stat.e action.s2? 
The decision in Bu.rdeau v. McDowell328 similarly supports the 
notion that the government can employ private parties to do what 
it cannot constitutionally do unilaterally, so long as it distances 
itself from the act in question. In Burdeau, the Supreme Court 
rejected II criminal defendant's attempt to constitutionally 
challenge prosecutors' use of books and papers received from a 
private party who had stolen them.329 Because "no official of the 
Federal Government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure 
of the petitioner's property, or any knowledge thereof until several 
months after the property had been taken from him," the seizure 
was not attributable to the government.330 Burdeau thus treats 
the private and the public spheres as distinct: because a private 
party-not the government-unlawfully took the defendant's 
property, the Constitution does not apply to the government's use 
of that material in a criminal prosecution. It also validates the 
government's use of the private sector's extra-constitutional status 
to achieve objectives it could not achieve on its own absent 
constitutional scrutiny. 
B. THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
The private delegation doctrine offers another approneh to 
limiting the government's ability to partner with the privatu Huctor 
for purposes of engaging in government functions. including 
encouragement. either overt or covert, that the choice must in low be dl~'I1I. ·11 tu IN! IhJlL or 
the State"}. 
:t.u. ld. at 993, 
:rJI! Id. at 994-96. 
'" [d. at 1005. 1008-10. 
"'" 256 U.S. 465 (192 1). 
~J'II Id. at 475-76. 
~ ld. at 475. The theory behind Burdeau coalesces with till' Ii'utt r lJl A IIII 1It11l 1l : 1lt'~ Ih ird-
party doctrine to essentially insulate the government from cnn~1.1 1 III 11111 111 " Ol! It I l ints 10 the 
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surveillance. In theory, it insists that the powers vested by the 
Constitution in Congress must be exercised by that branch of 
government and cannot be transferred elsewhere.a: .. Such a claim 
featured prominently in post-New Deal litigation around the 
propriety of the burgeoning administrative state.""l In Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court struck down a provision of thl' 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA):m that empowered the 
President to manage a prohibition on interstate shipment of 
petroleum on the grounds that Congress had set "no criterion to 
govern the President's course."a.,· The Supreme Court has since 
declined to apply the doctrine on the theory that Congress has 
broad delegation authority so long as its enabling legislation 
includes an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of 
discretion.:"~· The Court's landmark decision in Chevron U.S.A, 
Inc. v. Natural Reso!!rces Defense Counril. Inc. :l.16-which requires 
courts to defer to agency constructions of ambiguous statutory 
text'!37- effectively shores up Congress's authority to hand off 
legislative power with vague directives to agencies charged with 
administering a statute."'!" 
Two cases challenging congressional attempts to delegate 
legislative powers to private parties reached the Supreme Court 
around the same time as Panama Refining, with similar results. 
In A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. u. United States,:t19 the Court 
held unconstitutional NIRA's authorization of private trade and 
:~11 .~t! Mistretta v. Uniwcl States, 4KH U.s. :UH, 371-72 (19M9) ("The nonc1e legotilln doct.rinH 
is rooted in the principle uf !-IepRration rtf powers that underlies our tripartite system (If 
Guvcl'Ilnlt'nl. ... Congre!S8 gem·rally tnnnut. c.lelegute iL .. )eg1Klntive puwer to IIllotlmr BI·Rm:h." 
(citlllg FI!'lcl v. Clnrk, 14:3 U.s. (i49. 1i92 (l~92»)). 
.1.11 gil .. A.L.A. Schechter Puult.ry Curp. v. Unitf'd Htalt~8, 295 U.s. 495, 5:17-:19. fi4~ 
(l9:Hj); Pun. Rt·f. Co. v. Ryan. :,m:i U.s. 3HH. ·'20-21, 44:!5-4:!H, 4:iO (19:ifi): Metzgt!r, tlllpru 
null..> 167. Ilt 1437-45 (discussing nondclegat ion casel' in the Supreme Court folluwin.c thl ~ 
N('w Il,·nl) . 
.. , 15 U.K.!'. § 7U:I (2006). 
:"\.'f.I PUll. Rl'{. Co .. 293 U.s. at 415. 
i\.VJ Mu:lrelta, 4RH U.H. At 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, .Jr., & Cn. v. Unitttd Htatm., 276 U.H. 
:m·t, ·HU) (I !J2H)). 
rill 1G7 LJ .H. ~:J7, H4:J (HJH·I) . 
.,1 Id . 
,. Sf'€' HlChard J. Piert't~ . • 11'., Cfwvnm and Its Aftf'rmath: .Judiriul Rcuif'U' of Ag,.""y 
Illh'rpl'f'tutiIJlIS uf Stalutory PNJllisiollS, 41 VA~j). L. H,(o;v. aOI, aos (19HH) (calling the isslie of 
CongresR dplc'gating with nmblgllOliH directives the "more controverRial point" in Chevron). 
:lat 295 U.S. at 495. 
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industrial groups to draft codes of fair competition-subject to the 
President's approval-for the sale of chickens."40 The legislation 
violated the separation of powers because it enabled businesses 
"[to] roam at will and the President [to] approve or disapprove 
their proposal as he may see fit."341 Congress, the Court explained, 
"is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential 
legislative functions with which it is thus vested."342 
In Carter Ii. Carter Coal Co.,"43 the Court again applied the 
private delegation doctrine to strike down the Bituminous 
Conservation Coal Act, which authorized coal miners and 
producers to establish wages and maximum labor hours for mine 
workers."" The statute required no governmental imprimatur 
before the provisions took effect."'~ "This is legislative delegation 
in its most obnoxious form," the Court wrote, "for it is not even 
delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively 
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and 
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same 
business."346 Grasping for a public-private dividing line, the Court 
reasoned that "[t]he difference between producing coal and 
regulating its production is, of course, fundamental. The former is 
a private activity; the latter is necessarily a governmental 
function .... "3'7 
Since the New Deal cases, the Supreme Court has consistently 
upheld delegations to agencies and private parties alike.34" Thus, 
am Id. at 521- 23 & n.4. 542. 
all Id. at 5.18. 
:~12 Id. at 529. 
,., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
'" Id. at 278, 31G-II. 
:W~ Id. at 310. 
:~I(\ Id. at. 311 . The Court further suggested that the delegation viola ted due process by 
allowing private part ies to regulate competltors. [d , This argument is problematiC to the 
extent that it applies procedura l due process protections to a ICgJslative versus adjudicative 
decision. Bee Bt·Metallic Inv. Co. v. Stnte Ed. of EqualIzation. 239 U.s. 441, 445-46 (1915) 
(holding that "8 genera l determination" affecting R IRrge number of people in unexceptional 
waYI:I lS not bound by due process). 
'" Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311. 
3-IK See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assocs ., 531 U.S. 457, 472-74 (2001) (holding that 
the phrase, "requisite to protect the pubhc health," was sufficiently deter minate til guide 
the EPA's establishment of nabonal ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air 
Act); Cumn v. Wallace, 306 U.S. I, 15-16 (1939) (upholding statute requiring two·thirds of 
regulated industry to approve regulations before they could take effect); Sunshine 
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as Jody Freeman has observed, "[r]esurrecting the nondelegation 
doctrine to invalidate private delegations on the theory that some 
'public' functions are nondelegable would ... require heavy 
conceptual lifting."3.9 Yet she and others have called private 
delegations more troubling "than the broadest delegations to 
public agencies."350 If private delegations were not especially 
noxious, Carter Coal would call into question the propriety of 
legislative delegations to administrative agencies-and thus the 
viability of the federal regulatory state itself. In its present form, 
the private delegation doctrine does not answer the threshold 
question of whether the Constitution can be read to ban the 
outsourcing of legislative power to private parties, however 
defined, while preserving the rule making function of modern 
executive branch agencies. 
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
In litigation pending across the country, the primary doctrinal 
battleground for challenging the NSA's use of third-party data for 
surveillance has been the Fourth Amendment, rather than the 
state action or private delegation doctrines.361 This stands to 
reason. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he overriding 
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy 
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."3' 2 In 
Mapp u. Ohio, the Court went so far as to characterize it as 
establishing a "right to privacy, no less important than any other 
right carefully and particularly reserved to the people."3s3 The 
Fourth Amendment grew out of the Framers' concern "that 
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the 
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 388, 393 (1940) (upholding s tatute that 
allowed coal indus try members to fix prices in accordance with statutory standards), 
:wg Freeman. supra note 42, at 584, 
:Il1O Jd. at 583-84 (citing Harold J. Krent. Pragmerlling the Unitary ExecutilJe: 
Congressional Delegations o{ Admi"istraliue Authority Outside the Federal Gouernment, 85 
Nw. U. L. R~N. 62, 69 n.17 (1990); David M. Lawrence, The Priuate Exercise 0/ Gouernmenlai 
POWl!r, 61 INn. L.J. 647, 649-50 (1986». 
:\Ii I See NSA Surueillonre Lawsllit Tracher, PnoPUBLICA, http://projects.propllblica.orWgl·lIl' 
hicslsurveillance·suitS#Jn%20ro%20N ational%2OSecurity%20Letter%202011 (last visit(td "\ -1. 
22, 20 15) (listing pending cases). As noted preVlously, this Article does not anuly;/,I' Ihu 
statutory, First Amendment or due process challenges to NSA surveillance programR. 
"" Schmerber v. California, 394 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
'" 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (emph •• i. added). 
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lIuthority of 'general warrants' were .. . immediate evils" t.o he 
avoided by, first, "protecting the basic right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures" and, second, "requiring that 
warrants be particular and supported by probable cause."3M 
Originally construed as the physical invasion of a person or 
property, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
occurs "when the government violates a Bubjective expectation of 
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."3" The reasonable 
expectation of privacy trigger is a tricky means of confining the 
government's collection and use of third party data for 
surveillance, however. The reason for this mirrors the problem 
plaguing the state action and private delegation doctrines: the 
illusion that the public and private spheres are severable for 
purposes of constitutional law. In essence, prevailing Fourth 
Amendment doctrine treats the existence of a third party 
intermediary as a waiver of constitutional protections, in two 
ways. First, the Court has long declared that "[wJhat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.""'· Thus, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned property, like 
garbage left out for collection,357 or in the movements of an 
automobile on public thoroughfares,"" because it is available for 
members of the public to view."'" 
Second, the Court has repeatedly held that "the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government 
x'"' Yuytnn v. Nt!w York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-64 (1980). The FOUl1h Anwndlllt'nl PI'UVUil!H thut 
ftJhe right of the people to he secure in their pt!THOI1H, hnuscH, papers. lind 
dfecttl, ugomsl um'casonable searches and seizureH, sha ll not be vinlated, 
nnd no WarmntR shall issue, but upon probabJp CIIUSt', I-Iullponed hy ORlh 
IJI' nffirmntion. and particularly descnbing the plnre t.o ho Resl'Cht'rl, and thl' 
Jl<'rlmns nr thingA to he Aei7.ed. 
U.H. {'(}Nh'1', amend. IV. 
:It,i. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 (200l). A H,,-a rch nIHil o(:<:urM If then' is 
phYflical trespass. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.R 438, 4fi6 ( IH2.R), OIN'rru/c'd III 
1"'" by Katz v. United States, 389 U.s. 347 (1967); Sergor v. Npw York. aRR U.s. 4\ (HI67). 
'"' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S .• 147, 351 (1967). 
,L'oI California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
"" United Sta ••• v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1911:1). 
:t6'J ld . at 281-82. 
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authorities.","m 'rhe Court has thus found no Fourth Amendment 
ban on the use of information obtained through government 
informants.'"H Most notably, it found in Smith v. Maryland that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers 
dialed""' because callers "voluntarily convey numerical information 
to thn phone company and 'expose[]' that information ... in the 
ordinary course of business."363 Providing tax documents to an 
accountant similarly relinquishes Fourth Amendment 
protections.a64 The Court has held that bank customers have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in records "contain[ing] only 
information voluntarily conveyed ... and exposed to [bank] 
employens in the ordinary course of business."365 Nor is the Fourth 
Amendment violated if a physician provides the state with copies 
of medical information.36G 
With the advent of the Internet, some lower courts have applied 
tho third party doctrine to authorize warrantless government 
acceRS to shared computer files, information sent or received 
through the Internet and stored on a third party server,367 and 
,IW Ullitl.d ~tales v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 
U.s. 745. 752 (1971); Hoffa v. Untted States. 385 U.S. 293. 302 (1966); Lopez v. United 
Sla tt'H. :17:3 U.s. 427, 437-39 (1963», The Supreme Court has also held that "8 party 
il1<Timinntmi by ('vidence produced by a th ird party sustains no violation of his own Fifth 
AUH'ndmcnt rights," CuI. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (citing Johnson v. 
Ull il ed SLules . 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913); Couch v. United States. 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973». 
Hence. the Fifth Amendment does not protect against subpoenas for a person's records and 
pa pHrs heM by third parties. COZlch, 409 U.S. at 328, 333-35. 
;1(11 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1971); see also Hoffa v. United States, 
:!H5 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (no }4'ourth Amendment protection for conversations with a 
culleague who turns out to be a government agent); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 
:l I 1 ( l Ho£)) (same regarding interactions with secret agent sent by the government to 
pUl'chase narcotics from defendant); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437-39 (same regarding agent's use 
nf t!iect.ronic rm~ordmg pquipment). 
'" Smith v. Maryland. 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979). 
:11;:1 [d. at 744 . 
:1111 Cmu'h, .to9 U.H. at 335-36. 
:11~ Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 728-32 (1980) 
(holding that a criminal defendant had no standing to suppress documents mega11y seized 
frllm a' bridi.'8se (Jf an officer of a Bahamian bank because he had no privacy interest in 
till' llI); Gal, Ba1/kers Ass'n, 416 U.s. at 54 (holding that regulatory mandates that banks 
keep customer records for government scrutmy did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
"'" Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589. 604 n.32 (1977). 
:161 .JUl1khi P. Semitsu, Frain Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth of Social Networking 
PrilJac,Y RiRhts RevolulLOnized Onlme Government Surueillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 338 & 
nn.li 1>l-l'i5 (201 1) (citing cases). 
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individual subscriber information from an ISP.!lGH In the words of 
the Ninth Circuit, the rationale is that "computer surveillance 
techniques that reveal the toIfrom addresses of e-mail messages, 
the IP addresses of websites visited and the total amount of data 
transmitted to or from an account ... are constitutionally 
indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that the Court 
approved in Smith."3." 
Lower courts are also split on the question of whether the third 
party doctrine enables the government to capture electronic 
information about an individual's location at a specific time-such 
as cell phone tower data-without a warrant. Following the Third 
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Davis held that 
the Fourth Amendment applies to cell phone location information 
because" 'a cell phone customer has not "voluntarily" shared his 
location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful 
way'" and is likely "'(unJaware that . .. cell phone providers 
collect and store historical location information.' "370 The court 
rejected the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit,371 which had previously 
applied Smith to find no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell 
phone records on the rationale that "(cJell phone 
users ... understand that their service providers record their 
location information when they use their phones at least to the 
!'It~ See, c.g. , United States v. Perrine. 618 F.3d 1196. 1204 (lOth Cir. 2008) (noting also that 
"[eJvery federal court to address thleJ issue has held that subscnber information ... (from an 
ISP] is not protected by the Fourth Amendmentl ) . . ,"); !We also Semitsu, supra note 367, at 
3.18 n.l86 (20 11) (citing cases). 
)00 United States Y. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007). The Sixth Circuit in 
Wars/iak 1I. Uruted Stales reached the opposite cnncluslon, although the decision was 
vacated on other grounds. 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a sender of 
electron ic mall has a reasonable expectatlon of prIVacy in messages residing WJth an ISP). 
II(l('al"..d in. part, 532 F.3d 521 , 525-26 (6th Clr. 2008) (en bane) (finding that the question 
whether government should be enjoyed from searchmg crimmal suspect's e·mails without a 
warrant was not ripe). 
". 754 f '.3d 1205. 1217 (11th Cir. 2014). reh 'g /lranled. 573 Fed. App'x 925 (2014) (quoting 
III re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elee. Comm'n Servo to Disclose 
Recs. to Gov'e. 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Clr. 2010» ; sec also In. re Application of U.S. for an 
Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell·Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1 VJ, 119-20 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that a law enforcement request for ce1l SIte information raises 
even greater privacy concerns than inst&Hation of a GPS device on n w lm:11' hecause "ceJl· 
site· location records ... enable 'mass' or 'wholesale' electronic sllrvl~i llnnct '" of the "vast 
majority of Americans"). 
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same extent landline users in Smith understood that the phone 
company recorded the numbers they dialed,"372 
Another open question is whether Smith bars Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny of the NSA's data surveillance programs. In 
Klayman u. Obama,"73 the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia concluded that "the relationship between the NSA and 
telecom companies [has] become so thoroughly unlike those 
considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years ago that a 
precedent like Smith simply does not apply:'374 In contrast, in an 
opinion that was vacated on other grounds, the Southern District 
of New York construed Smith as strictly holding "that individuals 
have 'no legitimate expectation of privacy' regarding the telephone 
numbers they dial because they knowingly give that information to 
telephone companies."37. 
Together with the state action doctrine and the private 
delegation doctrine, the Fourth Amendment's third party doctrine 
leaves open the question whether the Constitution can be 
meaningfully invoked when the government outsources its 
responsibilities to the private sector-either overtly or by 
capturing private sector surveillance for its own use. The next 
Part maps out a method for constitutionalizing how the 
government structures its reliance on the private sector for its own 
functions.376 
v. TOWARDS A RELEVANT CONSTITUTION IN AN ERA OF 
OUTSOURCING AND DATA INSOURCING 
Scholars have recognized that prevailing constitutional doctrine 
has left technology-related privacy protections largely in the hands 
:rn In re Application oe u .s. for Historical Cell Site Data. 724 F.ad 600, 613 (5th Cir. :wl;n 
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Un it ed States v. MadISOn, No. 1I·602H'>.CII. 
20 12 WL 3095357, a t "8 (S.D. F l •. July 30, 2012». 
'" 957 ~'. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 201 3). 
;11·1 Id. at :U. 
.m ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), oomtl'd fl il d r. ~ lII ulIC/(H/. 
No. 14-42, 2015 WL 2097814 (2d Cir. May 7, 2015). 
:171; 'ro be sure, there are policy reasons fo r confimng constitutionnl dlll ' l rill!! 10 It. 4~ur",'" 
boundaries; th is ArtIcle sets the doctrinal groundwork for the d.·lm"· Wll holll fu lly t;lu .... h\4 
the normatIvo implica tions. 
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of legislators and regulators.377 But legislative responses to the 
government's increasing reliance on the private sector should not 
evolve in a constitutional vacuum. Viable arguments exist for 
reworking existing constitutional doctrine to require that the 
government structure its outsourcing and data insourcing 
programs so as to preserve its own accountability to the people?7" 
A. PRESUMPTIONS AND THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTION 
Commentators briskly debate the need for and proper approach 
to legislative reform of surveillance laws,379 and strong arguments 
exist for leaving privacy protections to Congress. Judges lack the 
technological expertise to understand the full implications of a 
Fourth Amendment case within a vast array of rapidly evolving 
technologies and, in understanding them further, are constrained 
by the arguments and evidence presented to them by lawyers.3BO 
Courts are also confined to operate within outdated doctrinal 
rules. Legislatures and regulators, by contrast, can seek input 
from experts on a macro level, unrestrained by the facts and issues 
in a particular case.""! They are more procedurally flexible than 
courts, and thus capable of responding to technological change 
more swiftly and adeptly.oR2 
Without a constitutional anchor to drive further reforms, 
however, legislative solutions to the problems associated with 
outsourcing and data insourcing remain dependent on the 
377 See Kerr. supra note 138, at 630 ("Congress haR responded to this constitutional vacuum 
with a series of laws that offer relatively strong (although hardly perfect) legislative privacy 
protections."), 
:1711 In the aftermath of the Snowden flCsndal, outraged politicians, thp. ACLU, 
telecommunications companies, and concerned citIzens have invoked the courts to obtain 
constitutional redress for perceived overreaching by the NSA despite the statutory hackdrop 
to its odium •. NSA Surveillance Lawsuit Tracker, silpra note a51. 
379 See, e.g., Kerr, .<;upra note 13B, at 638-42 (arguing that criticisms of the USA PA'rRIOT 
Act's pen register amendments Rre misplaced). 
AAO See RilE'Y v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497-98 (2014) (Alita, J., concurring) 
("Legislatures, cledcd by the people, are in a better position than we are to assess and 
respond to the changes t.hat have already occurred Rnd those that almost certainly will take 
place in the future ."): Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitlltion.al Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 807 (2004) (arguing 
that Congress-and not the courts interpreting the Constitution-is a better responder to 
the privacy threats of emerging technologies). 
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providence of political coalitions and congressional will. The 
Constitution is not so fickle. Its importance as a backstop for 
legislative protections of important rights like privacy derives from 
the structure of the national government. AIl Judge J . Harvie 
Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit has observed, "[i)f the courts 
are to function as interpreters of constitutional rights, they must 
necessarily function as arbiters of constitutional structure."~83 
James Madison understood this, explaining in The Federalist No. 
10 tha t the "proper structure of the Union" operates to protect 
minorities from dangerous factions.~4 The Supreme Court has 
relied on the Constitution's structure-as distinct from its 
enumerated government functions and provisions enshrining 
individual rights-to uphold states' immunity from suit,385 the 
President's appointment power,385 limits on federal control of state 
law enforcement officers,'B1 and Congress's powers under the 
Commerce Clause,388 to name only a few examples.3BY 
One such principle of constitutional structure is the 
foundational assumption that the government is accountable to 
the people.S'" Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 49 that "the 
people are the only legitimate fountain of power."391 In The 
Federalist No. 78, he argued that legislative acts "contrary to the 
Constitution" are invalid because "[t)o deny this, would be to 
affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the 
servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people 
are superior to the people themselves."392 The Supreme Court has 
consistently reinforced the notion that government exercises only 
delegated powers channeled from the people through the 
;\11.1 J. Harvie Wilkinson Ill, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690-
91 (2004). 
:1Il1 Tm: Fl':UF.RAJ.IST No. 10, at 4'7- 53 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2(09). 
"'.; Alden Y. Maine, 527 U.S. 706. 713 (1999) . 
... ~'r"yt.~ Y. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 870, 878 (1991) . 
'" Prin tz Y. United States, 521 U.S. 898. 935 (1997). 
:U!M Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth ., 469 U.S. 528, 555- 56 (1985). 
:1II!l ,'Jet! J!cll t!rally Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constituti<')fl, 99 VA. L. R~:v . 
1435, 144:1-48 (2013) (describing structural const itutional 1itigation in federal court). 
:lWIJ Sef~ ~nerally Brown. supra note 8, at 456-57 (proposing a constitutional accountabili ty 
ciuC'l ri nc that would t.e t.her the exercise of Cederal power to the people). 
~9 1 'riff': }o'Em mAI.lST No. 49, supra note 384, at 256 (James Madison). 
,'V,r~ '['m : FJ.:m :M I.lfoo'1' NO, 78, supra note 384, at 393 (James Madison). 
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Constitution.3!)'1 Accountability and the idea of government by the 
people are inextricable: because the people retain the ultimate 
power of government, those who hold public power must be 
accountable to the populace. Likewise, in order for there to be 
accountability under our Constitution, the source of federal 
power-the people---must have some say in its exercise. 
Under outsourcing regimes, the relational hierarchies that exist 
within a government bureaucracy and constitutional democracy 
are replaced by the happenstance of contractual terms. Private 
contractors are consequently less accountable to the voting public 
than government actors functioning within the umbrella of the 
executive branch and under an ongoing threat of judicial review.394 
Blind spots in applicable laws keep the scope of the government's 
access to private sector surveillance data beyond public view, 
compromising voters' ability to hold legislators and the executive 
branch accountable.395 The viability of a political solution also 
depends on a functioning Congress, the relative priority of other 
"... See McCulloch v. Maryland, 11 U.S. 316. 403 (1819) ("rho government proceed. 
directly (rom the people: is 'ordained and established' in the nalll(! of the people .... "); 
Downes v. Bidwell. 182 U.S. 244. 359 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("[NJo utterance of 
this court has intimated a doubt that in its operation on the people, by whom and for whom 
it was established, the national government i8 a government of ,mumera ted powers, the 
exercise of which is restricted to the use of means approprill t.c: nn cl plainly adapted to 
constitutional ends. and which are 'not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of 
the Constit ... non:" (quoting McC"lloch, 17 U.S. aL 421»; Hnwkl! v. Rmith, 253 U.S. 221, 
226-27 (1920) ("[tJhc Constitution of the United States waH ordnirmd hy the people," who 
"grant" authority to Congress, and "Ji1t is not the function of t:nurl.H or legislative bodies, 
national or state. to a lter the method which the Constitution hn~ tilCl'fI"); U.S. Term Limits, 
lnc. v. Thorton. 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) ("mhe Framers, in perh" ll!"! Uwir most important 
contribution, conceived of a Federal Government dirt.'cliy n !HIIUnHihk· to the people, 
possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen diredly, nol hy S tn tes. but by the 
people."); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (HIS:!) ("WIIl ~ 1I a ny Brunch ncts, it is 
presumptively exercising the power the Constitution hlni ddt'J,.:nh,d In il .. "): Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (.Jm~hlll1 • • 1 •• 1'(IIll'lIITj n~) ("rrlhe 
Federal Government as a whole, possessea only delcgntl!Cl IHIWI ~ rtl. 'I'lIt! JlurlKIAC of the 
Constitution waf not only to grant power, but to kecl' il. rnllH ~diillg nut fir hnnd."; 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (relying on thc (:l!ItYMhll rJ.: AcldrcHS fnrmu lation 
of "government of the people, by the people, for t he people" til cUlIHI.il.utiull ully require 
roughly equal representation of voters in state legislative riist.rids); II"tlmr Y. VII . Hf.nte Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (observing that in Ue.1'lIulds I hi' COUl'1 nolt!tI that the 
Equal Protection Clause "is an essential part of the con('t!lIl. nr n ~nV~'I'I1I1H'11 1. III' Inws li nd not 
men" and "is at the beart of Lincoln's vision of 'govcrnn14!111. (If I II~' 11j ~ I)lh · . lIy IIII' Jll'Ople, 
rand] for the people' · (quoting Reynolds, 371 U.S .• t 56R)). 
3tl-4 See Brown, supra note 191, at 1351-52. 
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issues competing for political attention, and the power of 
interested lobbying groups to influence the legislative process.396 
Such factors have little bearing on the legitimacy of the privacy 
concerns created by the expansion of data-related surveillance and 
as a consequence the concerns are left unaddressed. 
Importantly, privacy rights are not grounded in Congress's 
discretionary exercise of its constitutional powers-but in the 
Constitution itself. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
the Bill of Rights reflects the Framers' concern for protecting 
specific aspects of physical privacy,:m such as privacy of speech 
and assembly (First Amendment);398 privacy of the home against 
demands that it be used to house soldiers (Third Amendment);399 
privacy of the person and possessions against unreasonable 
searches (Fourth Amendment);'OO and informational privacy (Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).-ol 
Under prevailing doctrine, however, the private nature of the 
government's data source dictates whether constitutional privacy 
guarantees apply to surveillance conducted using that data. 402 
The government can effectively hide behind the private sector's 
extra-constitutional status and evade accountability for an 
unprecedented level of prying. The same phenomenon holds true 
19fj See Matthew A. Cahn. Tile Players: Institutional and Nonirutitutwnal Actors in the 
Policy Process, in PUBJ.IC PoLICY: THE EssENTIAL READINGS 201-11 (SleUa Z. TheodouJou & 
Matthew A. Cahn eds., 1995) (indicating that the political process is much more complicated 
than it appears, involves a number of actors, and that "(t]he role each actor plays, in 
combination with the relationship between actors in both policy bureaucracies, is what 
ultimately determines policy outcomes;. 
3$17 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing a right to decisional 
privacy on the theory that "the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from t.hose guarantees that help give them life and substance," and 
that some of those guarantees "create zones of privacy'1; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 
n.25 (1977) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, in a Fourth Amendment context); Cal. 
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Financial 
transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. At some 
point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of 
privacy."). In subsequent decisions, the privacy right has come to encompass matters such 
as child rearing, procreation, and termination of medical treatment as a matter of due 
proceSH. & e Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (listing the cases that hn\lj ~ 
protected activities on the grounds of privacy). 
:m U.S. CON~"'. amend. I. 
:19& Id. amend. III. 
<tOO [d. amend. TV. 
4111 [d. amend. V . 
... 02 See supra notes 1~18 and accompanying text. 
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for government outsourcing. Decisions to outsource are mnde 
without constitutional restraint, and once a function is outsourced, 
the Constitution does not apply to confine how private parties 
carry it out. Constitutional accountability should instead operate 
as a structural principle that limits how government outsourcing 
and data insourcing occurs, shifting courts away from the public· 
versus-private focus that has stagnated evolution of the law to 
date. Such a functional principle of constitutional accountability is 
already at play in state action, private delegation, and Fourth 
Amendment doctrine. 
B. STATE ACTION AS A DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
State action doctrine is ostensibly a means of holding private 
actors accountable for constitutional violations.'oa It is a quasi-
jurisdictional doctrine that helps define the breadth of the 
Constitution's reach when it comes to government actions taken in 
tandem with the private sector.'O' The substantive obligations 
enforced via the state action doctrine come from the substance of 
the Constitution itself.,o5 As currently applied, the state action 
doctrine is an "all-or-nothing approach."·o6 A private actor is a 
state actor under the doctrine for all purposes, including financial 
liability for damages to individual constitutional rights.407 If the 
state action doctrine were softened to recognize that public-private 
relationships operate on a continuum,'os with no clear line dividing 
the public and the private sectors, it could be recalibrated to 
prompt a narrower remedy in appropriate cases, i.e., an order 
.os See Metzger, supra note 167. at 1410 ("State action doctrine remaim; thp. primary tunl 
courts use to ensure that private actors do not wield government power outMitit, 1)[ 
ccmstitutionnl constraints."). 
40( See id. at 1501 (noting that the current doctdne targets government involv('lnpnt or 
persuasive entwinement with private actors). 
406 See Kimberly N. Brown. Governmpnt b.Y Contract and the Strltcturol (oll.';t jllltirm, H7 
NOTRJo: DAM .. ; L. REV. 49] , 504 (2011) (noting that the doctri nt' asks when "privati· purlil'lt 
8hould he treated as government actors" ond "susceptible to liability fol' violutiol1'4 flf 
individual consti tullonal rights"). 
·ICle Metzger, supra note 167, at 1431 & n.223. 
~07 See id. ("If state action is found, constitutional requirements directly apply in full ftln'c' 
to the private entity."). 
·10" See Brown, supra note 405, at 607-12 (arguing that pubhc'priVHtt! n!lnl ionshiru; fnll un 
" constitutional continuum). 
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directing that the government structure outsourcing relationships 
in ways that ensure government accountability. 
In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil CO.,40. the Court described the state 
action doctrine's twin aims as preserving private autonomy and 
freedom and relieving the state of responsibility for conduct that 
the state cannot control.410 The Court identified the first question 
in a state action analysis as whether "the deprivation [was] caused 
by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by 
a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the 
State is responsible."4Il The second factor-whether "the party 
charged with the deprivation ... may fairly be said to be a state 
actor"-exists because, "[w]ithout a limit such as this, private 
parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to 
rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the 
community surrounding them."412 
The Lugar formulation accordingly hinges on a determination 
that unconstitutional conduct is , in the first instance, t he product 
of some activity for which the state is responsible. Ultra vires 
action by a private party is not state action. By the same token, 
the test "avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, 
responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be 
blamed."4l3 
In Lugar, a private party used a prejudgment attachment 
procedure to secure property in satisfaction of a debt.414 The 
procedure required only an ex parte petition that the creditor 
bel ieved that the owner might dispose of the property to defeat his 
creditors.416 The debtor sued the creditor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging that it had acted jointly with the state to deprive him of 
due process.4'6 The Court dismissed the count of the complaint 
challenging the creditor's "malicious" and "wanton" acts because 
... 457 U.s . 922 (1 982). 
IUJ [d. at 936 (advocating "careful ndherencp" to t.he doctriOl' to nchipve these aims). 
au ld. at m17. 
l l ~ [d. 
~ 1 3 Id. at 93ft 
-II t fd. at 924. 
m fd. (describing the prejudgment attachment procedure requirement). 
H I; fd. at 925. The Court held that the state action mquiry 18 idenucnllu IIii' ··ulld. !' t, I! lIr 
ur !ll ute la w" mquiry for purposes o f § 1983. [d. at 935. 
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they were not attributable to the state.·!? As for the claim that the 
prejudgment attachment procedures themselves were insufficient, 
however, the creditor was a state actor.·!" The Court explained: 
"While private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct 
that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created 
by the statute obviously is the product of state action ... ·!" Thus, it 
concluded, "Petitioner did present a valid cause of action under 
§ 1983 insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the 
Virginia statute ... •20 By contrast, in Moose Lodge No. 107 u. 
Iruis,42! a private club's refusal to serve an Mrican-American was 
not attributable to the state by virtue of a regulatory scheme 
enforced by the state liquor board because "there [wa)s no 
suggestion ... that the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations 
governing the sale of liquor [we]re intended either overtly or 
covertly to encourage discrimination."'" 
In the traditional public service contract scenario, the 
government has levers of control over private contractors that it 
can employ if it so chooses. It can require stiffer contract terms to 
derme and restrict a contractor's responsibilities or outline 
meaningful consequences in the event of a breach.423 Or it can 
impose additional regulatory requirements on the contracting 
process, such as APA-type procedures and FOIA transparency.'2' 
If the remedies available under the state action doctrine were 
recalibrated to require that the gouernment structure its 
relationships with the private sector in ways that protect the 
public interest, there could be pressure on government-through 
the courts-to remedy problems with compliance and 
accountability in creative ways. 
.U7 Id. at 940 . 
411' ld. at 940-42. 
4 '&1 Id. at 941. 
420 ld. at 942. 
'" '07 U.S. 163 (1972). 
422 [d. at 164-65, 173; see also Lugar. 457 U.S. at 937-38 (distinguishing Moose Lodge 
based on the disconnect between state Jaw and the defendant'fj dIscriminatory po1icies in 
that case). 
423 See Metzger. supra note 167, at 1372-73 & n. lO (noting scholars who have proposed 
greater contractual controls on private entities to increase accountability) . 
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The opInIOn in SlIinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n·25 
demonstrates how the state action doctrine might operate to 
prompt injunctions requiring that the government structure 
outsourcing relationships to establish lines of constitutional 
accountability. In SlIinner, labor groups brought suit to enjoin 
regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) that authorized railroads to conduct drug and alcohol 
testing on employees.42" The FRA argued that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply because private railroads were 
responsible for implementing the regulatory provisions on testing, 
which were not mandatory.427 The Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding that "[a] railroad that complies with the ... regulations 
does so by compulsion of sovereign authority, and the lawfulness of 
its acts is controlled by the Fourth Amendment ... •28 Thus, the 
Court found state action even though the tests were not 
compulsory:'2!) Although it found no Fourth Amendment violation 
on the merits, the Court indicated that the case could have been 
resolved by requiring the government to include greater 
protections for railroad workers in its implementing regulations. 
On the facts before it, the Court reasoned. enjoining the 
government to add a regulatory warrant requirement "would add 
little to the assurances of certainty and regularity already afforded 
by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and in many 
cases frustrating, the objectives of the Government's testing 
program."430 The Court's underlying premise, consistent with the 
Lugar formulation, was that the government could have been 
directed as a matter of the state action doctrine to properly dictate 
the terms of the private party's service-terms that it could 
control. 
Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky,431 the Court could have directed 
the state to amend its regulations bearing on private nursing 
homes to avoid violations of constitutional rights. In Blum, 
Medicaid recipients challenged private decisions to transfer or 
w 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
1211 ld. at 610-12. 
427 ld . at 614 . 
·1211 ld. 
·12!1 ld. at 614-16 (de8crlbin~ the quasi·compulsory fa.ctors of tilt' r"J.:lI h ll i .. ,d 
430 ld. at 624. 
"" 457 U.S. 991 (1982). 
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discharge them, arguing that they were entitled to notice ami H 
hearing as a matter of due process.<32 The Court found no state 
action because the decisions to transfer or discharge "ultimately 
turn[edJ on medical judgments made by private parties according 
to professional standards."433 An order enjoining the state to 
amend its regulations to provide notice and a hearing prior to a 
transfer or termination decision-an action over which the state 
has control under the Lugar rationale for the state action 
doctrine-would not have disturbed the private actors' ability to 
exercise their professional discretion.434 Hence, Blum coalesces 
with the idea that the state action doctrine could be applied to 
"find[ I public accountability in the circumstances...... On this 
theory, plaintiffs suing the government for injunctive relief could 
seek an order forcing it to alter the terms of its outsourcing 
relationships to ensure accountability for the exercise of its 
functions.·s• 
By way of example, suppose that DHS enters into a contract 
with Booz Allen to "assist Homeland Security in developing a bio-
defense and health-preparedness infrastructure to ensure the 
security of the nation."437 Suppose further that the contract 
specifically directs Booz Allen to develop training and security 
protocols for United States medical personnel in the event of a 
~3Z Id. at 995-96. 
. 33 l d. at 1008. 
~ :u See id. at 1008-09 (analogizing the medical professionals' discretion to thnt of a public 
defender); Gilman, supra note 314, at 612- 17 (arguing that requiring the statt! in Blum to 
change the regulations to provide Cor notice and a hearing would be more consistt'nt wi th 
the purposes of the state action doctrine than the Court's finding of no Rtatc actinn). 
~ 3! Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n. 531 U.s. 28A, :lO:l (2001). TIlt' 
Court in Brentwood Academy noted that "[e]ven facts that suffice to show puhlic HctlOn (or. 
standing alone. would require such a finding) may be outweighed in the nAme nf Nome valur 
at oddR with finding public accountability in the circumstancttl:l ," id., .. uch LUI Lht! public 
defender'~ need to retain an adversarial posture vis·a·vis the State, id. nt :)04 (ciling Polk 
Cty. v. Dodson. 454 U.S. 312. 323 n.3 (1981». 
~36 Whether plaintiffs wou ld have Article I II ~tandinK to HUP. for RUt~h an injuuction iN UII 
important quefl tion that is beyond the scopt! Df this Artiell!. Nor d~s thiN Artidl~ mh.Jrl':<t; 
tht> intersections with the law governing facial versus os·uppl iml l'Unstitu tiollnl chnlll'n ~(!H 
to statutes and regulations. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Chull('nges lu State and Ped('ral 
Statutes. 46 STAN. 1... RKV. 235, 239 (1994) (observing that the bAr for t>ur.t'e<!diI1K on a fHcinl 
chalJenge is higher than for as-applied challenges). 
m Homeland Security, Booz ALLEN, http://www.boozallen.com/consultnntskivilian-govern 
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bioterrorist attack involving an infectious disease pathogen such 
as the pneumonic plague. Booz Allen's protocols ultimately 
exclude a certain class of health care workers from first-line 
antibiotic treatment in the event of a mass exposure. Janet 
Schmendrick is a hospital attendant who would not be eligible for 
the first round of antibiotic treatments under Booz Allen's 
protocols. She sues DHS and Booz Allen for an injunction 
mandating revision of the protocols.43s Janet's substantive 
constitutional claim is that the existing protocols violate equal 
protection, as the vast majority of workers affected are women. '1'0 
be sure, Booz Allen exercises discretion in devising the protocols, 
much like the medical personnel in Blum. 4:19 Under the prevailing 
construction of state action, therefore, the suit against Booz Allen 
could be dismissed on the grounds that Booz is a private actor that 
is not operating under the compulsion of the state. On a 
constitutional accountability approach to state action, however, 
Janet could rely on Skinner and the first prong of the Lugar test to 
argue that, for purposes of her facial challenge,440 Booz is a state 
actor functioning pursuant to government directives, which DHS 
should amend to conform to the Equal Protection Clause. The 
state action doctrine's objective of protecting Booz Allen from 
liability for money damages is no longer at stake if the all-or-
nothing approach to state action is revised to limit the relief 
available to Janet.44 ' Nor is there a viable concern that the 
government will be held liable for conduct it cannot control. 
The Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer44' is particularly 
instructive for purposes of evaluating how a repackaging of state 
action remedies might apply to data insourcing. Suppose again that 
Janet Schmendrick separately sues the NSA along with a host of 
private companies for an injunction imposing mandatory protocols 
regarding how her personal data is collected, used, stored, and 
shared. Fearing that she is being constantly tracked, Janet raises a 
43H She might face standing and ripeness problems, hut they Rre heside the point. marle hl~re. 
I;m 8 1'(' supl'a illit es :t~7. ·1:J J - :i4 and nc('ompanymg tt~xt. 
1111 .~·('e supra notp.!o! 42o-:m nnd H('t:O mpanying text. 
'1\ '1'0 bH sure, whether it would he appropriate and advisable to recalihrate the state 
action doctrine to enable a continuum of possible relief requires further thought, including 
an ana lysis of what l~ v(! J of sta te involvement would trigger the full panol>ly of money 
damages. 
'" :l:l4 U.H. 1 (1948). 
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host of possible constitutional theories, such as equal protection 
(arbitrary surveillance), the First Amendment (chilled speech and 
association rights), the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable general 
warrant), and the Fifth Amendment (informational 
privacy).·43 Janet might use Shelley to argue that, for purposes of 
obtaining injunctive relief, the government's use of her data 
transformed its collection by the private sector into state action. In 
Shelley, the Court held that judicial enforcement of private 
covenants restricting the sale of property to Caucasians was state 
action even though the covenants were voluntarily entered into by 
private parties: "It is clear that but for the active intervention of the 
state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, 
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in 
question without restraint."'" The Court invalidated lower court 
judgments enforcing the covenants, finding that they violated equal 
protection.44 6 Thus, the relief granted was essentially injunctive-
non-enforcement of a lower court jUdgment. 
Janet might justify her request for injunctive relief on the 
theory that state action exists because the NSA's use of her data 
caused her constitutional deprivation. Although the government 
sourced the data from private parties who collected it from her 
voluntarily, these factors-private action devoid of government 
compulsion-existed in Shelley ... 6 In effect, such an analysis 
subsumes the second prong of the Lugar formation (i.e., is the 
private actor a state one) within the first (i.e., whether the 
deprivation was caused by the State). The second prong's purpose 
of protecting private parties from constitutional liability for money 
damages when they rely on rules of the State loses its 
resonance.447 Instead, the state action doctrine would highlight an 
objective that is implicit in the first prong of Lugar: ensuring that 
the government does not evade its constitutional obligations on the 
pretense that the public and private sectors are severable for 
·143 This Article takes no position on the viability or st rength of these theories beyond th(' 
}t'ourth Amendment discussion contained herein. 
·.401 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19. 
H " Id. at 20. 
446 See id. at 4-6 (describing the restrictive covenants adopted by private parties). 
01017 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (stating that the two principles 
"collapse into each other when the claim of constitutional deprivation is directed against a 
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purposes of the structural Constitution. To be sure, 
superimposing state action on a private party whose data is 
insourced into government coffers significantly stretches the state 
action from its current doctrinal posture.448 But its potential for 
imposing constitutional limits on big data surveillance activity 
that surely warrants such boundaries is formidable. 
C. THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE, DEPAR7'MENTOF 
TRANSPORTA7'ION V. ASS'N OF AMERICAN RAILROADS. AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The so-called private and non-delegation doctrines have long 
been considered moribund as a meaningful check on government 
decisions to hand off sovereign powers to private parties.449 Yet 
just recently, in Department of Transportation u. Ass'n of American 
Railroads,45o a faction of the Court signaled a willingness to 
employ the private delegation doctrine to hold the government 
accountable when it attempts to pass off powers to independent 
entities. 451 Although not express in the Constitution, the concept 
of government accountability emerges from Ass'n of American 
Railroads as a galvanizing principle that is both embodied in the 
Constitution's design and central to individual liberty. 
The case involved Amtrak's preferential access to national rail 
lines under the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act 
of 2008 (PRIIA).452 In 1970, Congress created Amtrak'53 as a 
"~K The analysis is admittedly at odds with Burdeou [I. McDowell, 256 U.s. 465 (1921). 
See supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text; see also Flagg Bros., Inc. Y. Brooks, 436 
U.S. 149. 151-54. 163-64 (1978) ("[E)xpre .. [ing] no view as to the extent. if any. to which a 
city or State might be free to delegate to private parties the performance of such functions 
and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
~ .111 Alexander Volokh argues that delegatIons are constitutional 80 long as the enacting 
legislation contains an mtelligible principle. See Alexander Volokh, The New Priuate· 
ReRulatwn Skepticism: Due Process, No,,~Delegation, and An.tilrusl Challenges, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & PuB. POLty 931, 979 (2014) (arguing that the scarcity of cases where the Court has 
struck down a statute on non-delegation grounds makes the doctrine useless for 
constraining government delegation to private parties) . 
... 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013). uacated, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2015). 
M,I Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2015) . 
.. n PasBenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, Div. B. 
122 Stat. 4848, 4907 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24101 note (2012», inualidated by ABo'n of Am. 
R Rs. v. U.S. Dep't ofTran,p .• 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013). uacated. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2015) . 
'" Ra il Passenger SerVIce Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 301. 84 Stat. 1327. 1330 
(repealed 1994); see also Ass'n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep't of Transp., 865 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C. 
G7(, GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
"private, for-profit corporation" to save the passenger train 
industry, which had suffered as a result of increased competition 
from air travel and improved highway systems.4'" Under the 
statute, private railroads could transfer their unprofitable 
passenger service to Amtrak but were required in exchange to 
lease their tracks back to Amtrak, which would have preferred 
access.4;; Amtrak and the railroads subsequently entered into 
operating agreements establishing rates that Amtrak would pay to 
use the private tracks and facilities, as well as other conditions:l5fi 
In 2008, Congress sought to standardize the operating 
agreements by empowering Amtrak and the FRA to jointly 
"develop new or improve existing metrics and minimum standards 
for measuring the performance and service quality of intercity 
passenger train operations, including ... on-time performance and 
minutes of delay."457 Under the statute, if Amtrak and the FRA 
cannot agree on metrics and standards, they can petition the 
Surface Transportation Board (STB)-an independent agency 
within the Department of Transportation-for binding 
arbitration.4." Moreover, "[t]o the extent practicable, Amtrak and 
its host rail carriers [must] incorporate the metrics and 
standards ... into their access and service agreements ... ·'o" If 
Amtrak fails to provide "on-time performance," the STB may start 
an investigation to determine fault.'61l If it finds that a freight 
carrier failed "to provide preference to Amtrak over freight 
transportation as required," it can impose damages:";' 
~1)]2). rella, 72 1 F.:id 666 (D.C. CIT. 2013), uarated, l:n H. Ct. 2355 (2015) (nntinl-:' tlmt tilt' 
National Rail rruui Passenger Corporation is hetter knuwn m. Amtrak). 
·IM Ass 'n of Am. R.Rs., R65 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Nat'} R.R. PasRenger Corp. v. Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Corp .• 470 U.S. 451, 454 (1985)); , ... 49 U.s,C. § 24:l01(OI) . 
• ,e<, 49 U.S.C. § 24:108(u), (c). 
·1511 A.~s'n of Am. R.Rs., 865 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
~57 49 U.S.C. § 24101 note; A.~"i'n of Am. R.Rs., 721 I·~.ad 666; Sf'C' Ml'lrk.o; & S/umlurcJs {or 
Inlercil;v Passenger Rail Serllicp Under Section 2tJ7 of the Passenger Rail JIII'C'~/"U'/ll alld 
Jmp I'(IfIC'melll Act of 2008, 75 }I'ed. Reg. 26,H39 (May 12, 2010) (f'xplaining that § !W7 of the 
PRllA charged the FRA and Amtrak with developing new und impmving ('xi J>t ing mch·j(,s). 
Stnmllirds were promulgated In 2010. Jd. (explaining that the FHA nnd Amtrak cl~yclop('d 
new fltandards that went into effect May I1t.h, 2UIU). 
'" 49 U.RC. § 24101 note. 
·\!',II Jd. 
.; (1) Jd. § 24:U18(O(1). The S'rB must do so if Amtrak IIr a raih"luc1 bringR n complaint. fd. 
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Upset with Amtrak's enhanced powers, the Association of 
American Railroads (AAR) initiated a lawsuit on behalf of its 
freight railroad members, seeking an order declaring 
unconstitutional the portion of the PRlIA giving Amtrak dual 
authority to promulgate standards governing the freight rail 
industry.462 Reversing the judgment of the district court, the D.C. 
Circuit found that "Amtrak is a private corporation with respect to 
Congress's power to delegate ... authority" and, as such, it cannot 
be given the "regulatory power prescribed in [the PRlIA]" under 
the private delegation doctrine.46' 
The Supreme Court reversed, deeming Amtrak a governmental 
entity for purposes of the Constitution and remanding the case for 
consideration, inter alia, of whether the PRlIA's provision for 
appointment of an arbitrator " 'is a plain violation of the 
nondelegation principle.' "464 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized that "[t]reating Amtrak as governmental" 
avoids what would otherwise amount to "an unbridled grant of 
authority to an unaccountable actor."465 Among other things, "[t]he 
political branches ... have imposed substantial transparency and 
accountability mechanisms [on Amtrak], and, for all practical 
purposes, set and supervise its annual budget."·66 Such" 'structural 
principles secured by the separation of powers,' .. he added, " 'protect 
the individual as well.' "461 
Justices Alito and Thomas each wrote separately that the 
PRlIA is unconstitutional under the private delegation doctrine. 
Importantly, they both underscored the separation of powers 
implications of privatized policymaking, which include, in Justice 
Alito's words, "a vital constitutional principle [that] must not be 
forgotten: Liberty requires accountability."468 
4112 Ass'n of Am . R.Rs., 721 F.3d at 670. 
Hi.1 Jd. at 677. 
Ifi\ D(!p't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 1335 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015). The Court also 
instructed the D.C. Circuit to consider whether "Congress violated the Due Process Clause 
by "givlingJ a federally chartered, nominally prlvate. for·profit corporation regulatory 
aul hOl'ity over its own indu ~try.''' Id. !<'or an explanation of the due process claim, see 
supra nole a03 and accompanying text. 
1M Ass'n of Am. R.Rs .• UJ35 S. Ct. at 1233. 
U~; Jd. 
·Ul7 ld. (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011». 
161\ Jd. Ilt 12a4 (Alito, .J., (·oncurring). 
678 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
In making the case for why outsourcing powers to private 
parties is unconstitutional, Justice Alito characterized 
governmental power as uniquely belonging to government actors 
who "are set apart from ordinary citizens. Because they exercise 
greater power, they are subject to special restraints," such as 
swearing an oath of office.'" Government actors, in turn, must be 
accountable to the people. Otherwise, "[w]hen citizens cannot 
readily identify the source of legislation or regulation that affect 
their lives, Government officials can wield power without owning 
up to the consequences," such as by "passing off a Government 
operation as an independent private concern."470 Because "a 
private person" can be appointed an arbitrator under the PRIIA, 
Justice Alito concluded, "this law is unconstitutional."·7J 
As support, Justice Alito cited the post-New Deal decisions in 
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, which have long been 
dismissed by scholars as lifeless relics of the past. The non-
delegation doctrine, he explained, "exists to protect liberty."472 
"[B]y careful design," the structural Constitution "prescribes a 
process for making law, [with] many accountability 
checkpoints."473 "It would dash the whole scheme," he quipped, "if 
Congress could give its power away to an entity that is not 
constrained by those checkpoints."474 Justice Alito maintained 
leeway for preserving executive branch rulemaking even if private 
sector lawmaking is unconstitutional. Whereas "the other 
branches of Government have vested powers of their own that can 
be used in ways that resemble lawmaking," he explained, "(w]hen 
it comes to private entities ... there is not even a fig leaf of 
constitutional justification."475 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas adopted a more rigidly 
formalist approach to Article I that would "require that the 
Federal Government create generally applicable rules of private 
4 110 Id. at 1235. 
nu Id. a t 1234-35. 
0171 Id. a t 1237-38. 
·1741 Jd. at 1237 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1: Wayman v. Southard. ]0 Whent. 1. 42-43 
(1 825); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Uniwd Statcl!, 295 U.s. 49;' (1 9:15); Punmna 
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conduct only through the constitutionally prescribed legislative 
process."476 "Because a private entity is neither Congress, nor the 
President or one of his agents, nor the Supreme Court or an 
inferior court established by Congress," he added, "the Vesting 
Clauses would categorically preclude it from exercising the 
legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the Federal 
Government."·77 But Justice Thomas ventured further than 
Justice Alito to argue that Congress cannot allocate power to "an 
ineligible entity, whether governmental or private."47. This view is 
radical to the extent it would render unconstitutional vast swaths 
of the federal administrative bureaucracy, leaving many segments 
of the economy unregulated. 
Like Justice Alito, Justice Thomas fastened his analysis on the 
concept of government accountability,479 adding with irony that 
"[wle never even glance at the Constitution to see what it says 
about how this authority must be exercised and by whom"-a 
searing insight regarding the way in which the privatization 
movement (and, indeed, the growth of the administrative state) 
has vastly outpaced the courts-and thus the law.480 On this 
point, Justice Thomas decried the Court as having "sanctioned the 
growth of an administrative system that concentrates the power to 
make laws ... in the hands of a vast and unaccountable 
administrative apparatus that finds no comfortable home in our 
constitutional structure."' ·' 
Ass'n of American Railroads leaves at least two significant 
constitutional issues for possible future consideration by the 
Supreme Court. First, as the concurring opinions by Justices Alito 
and Thomas indicate, the proposition that private delegations are 
per se unconstitutional, is not yet well settled. The federal 
government has repeatedly outsourced regulatory functions to 
·1111 [d. at 1242 (Thomas, J., concurring), 
.1"/7 [d. at 1240. 
<178 [d. 
~79 &e id. ut 1234 ("Confronted with 1\ stat\lte that authorizes a putativ~ly private mJl r~1C' 1 
participant to work hand·in-haud with an executive age ncy to craft rules that have lhl' fhn't-
and effect of Jaw. our primary question . .. is whether that market participnnl, iN HllhJt'I:1 I;, 
an adequate me8sur~ of control by the Federal Government." Id. at 12-1U ('I'hHIII Il"' . • 1 , 
concurring» . 
... [d. at 1240. 
'~I Id. at 1254. 
(i80 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
private parties without meaningful constitutional checks, a 
practice that reinvigoration of the private delegation doctrine 
could call into question:'·" 
Second, the case legitimates as doctrinally relevant the question 
of whether the structural Constitution forbids delegations to 
private parties that render the government democratically 
unaccountable. If adopted, a doctrine of constitutional 
accountability could operate to confine the manner in which 
outsourcing arrangements are structured-at least to the extent 
that legislative power is involved. Such an approach would 
advantageously adhere to the nondelegation doctrine's origins, 
which derive from notions of popular sovereignty. John Locke"'" 
explained that "the legislative cannot transfer the power of 
making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power 
from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others."48' 
Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly argued-in a concurring opinion 
that condemned the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
as an impermissible delegation of broad agency authority to 
establish exposure limits for carcinogens-that "the nondelegation 
doctrine ... ensures to the extent consistent with orderly 
governmental administration that important choices of social 
policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most 
responsive to the popular Will."4K5 Requiring that private 
~K2 See Sarah Shlk l.umdnn. Sunshine For Sale: Enuironmental Contruc:lors Wid tll(! 
Freedom of Information Act. 15 Vl'. J. ENV'I'L. L. I, ]6 (2014) ("As early n~ 1989, it waH 
uncovered during &nat.e hl"anngs that EPA contr8ct.or~ were drafting budget riocuments. 
overseeing field invel!l tigators, drafting re8pOnSeG to pubhc comments dur:ng the rulemaking' 
process and Writing regulation preamblelJ, and organizlOg and conducting public hearings." 
(quoting Steven J. Kl'iman. AC'hil'uing eon/rading Goals and Recognizing Pllbhr C(Jnrr.rll.'~: 
A ContraclillR Management Perspective. in GOVF.RNMRNT 8Y CoNTRACT: OU1'HOURCING ANIl 
At.mRlcAN DEM(Jt:HAGV. supra note 18, at 153. 177». 
·Ilel l'(lck(! waR u pulitlcn] phiJcllmphcr whose ideas hl'uvily innucm:cd Uw I'-'rumen,. Sec 
LlmNARD Wn.LIAMH J~&VY, ORIGINAl. INTENT ANI) Tnt: F1tAMF..H..t;,' CON~"'IT{ rrJO!'il 276 (19RB) 
(d,~scrihmg Lork,"!l vit·w or prullOrty 8M ('nCfllD}Jassing the "right to rights," including "the> 
purMuit of hRppin~H'1. 
~~, JOliN L()('KJ.;, 'fm: HI-:f:'ONJ) '1'RJ.;A'rl,s}o; O}o' GOVJmNM":N'r HI ('I'hmnnH P. Pl!llniull (~d., 'rJll~ 
(~ib,~rnJ Arts PreM, Inr.. 19 i12) ( 1690). 
·IM Indus. Union Ucp't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Gas(l), 44R U.s. 607, 685 
(1980) (RchntJuist , J., concurring). Rather than strike down the legJslatiun on 
nondeJegntion grounds, the majority construed the statutory language narrowly to confine 
agency discretion. Jd. at 639- 40. ('{ Loving y. Un ited States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) 
(observing thot "itlhc clear n.s~il(Dment of power to a hranch ... allows the citiwn to know 
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delegations be structured to retain accountability to the people 
would serve the doctrine's purposes without unraveling the 
administrative and contractual bureaucracies that are essential to 
a functioning modern government. 
Justice Thomas offered a two-part test for analyzing legislative 
delegations: "The first step [would] be to classify the power that [a 
statut'll purports to authorize" an entity other than Congress to 
exercise.··h If that power includes the ability to give content to or 
e!ecide the applicability of rules governing private conduct, the 
fimt >ltep is satisfied." 7 ''The second step [would] be to determine 
whnt.hur the Constitution's requirements for the exercise of that 
power havn been satisfied."'HH For Justice Alito, this line might be 
drawn at government actors who take an oath of office, whereas 
Justice Thomas would find unconstitutional any legislation that 
authorized the exercise of such power in a manner other than 
bicameralism and presentment under Article I of the 
Constitution:'"9 
Common to both approaches under step two is a principle of 
constitutional accountability, i.e., that the power of government 
can only be exercised by actors who are accountable to the people 
by virtue of a transparent process that the President can control. 
Framed this way, constitutional accountability begins to take 
e!octrinal shape. Suppose, once again, that DHS contractually 
engages Booz Allen to develop bioterrorist protocols. This time, 
the contract specifies that Booz Allen must draft rules that are 
later incorporated into official agency guidelines, satisfying step 
decision!'> (~sKential to governance" and stating that the nondeJegation doctrine "developed to 
prevent Contr:ress from forsaking its duties"); Arizona v, California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) 
(Harlan, .l., dissenting in part) ("The principle that authority granted by the legislature 
mmolt he limitt'd hy Adequate standards, , . Insures that the fundamental policy decisions in 
(ml' sodl'ty will he made not by an appointed official but by the body immediately 
rmJlJOn8iblIJ to the people."); Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 26, at 254-55 (''Once the 
peoph! hud delegated the lawmakmg power to the legislatul'C. it could pass no further lest it 
(~ hllt(! thr pt'Opie's oversight."); CASS R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Ai,. Act UnoonslitutioMI?,98 
MICH, I ~, Rfo:V. :ID3, 335-36 (1999) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine promotes "the 
ki nrt of 1lI:I'tmnlnhilif.y t.hat romes (l'om requiring specific decisions from a deliberative body 
l't~n('d inJ: thu view!'! of l'elll'esentutlv('s from various s tates of the union'). 
'w, Dep',. of Transp. v. A.R'n of Am. R.Rs .• 1335 S. Ct. 1225. 1253 (2015) (Thorn •••• J.. 
eoncurrjn~). 
-.;H7 ~"'ec tel. 
ISH See ld. 
411!1 Set'id nt 12114. 
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one of Justice Thomas's standard. A public accountability 
approach to private delegation would forbid this delegation 
because it allows the government to evade responsibility for its 
legislative functions under step two. The process is opaque and 
not within the clear command of the President. A court employing 
an accountability rationale might remand the case with 
instructions to the government to amend the contract to include 
terms that require transparent, comprehensive DHS review of the 
proposed rules with the objective of fostering good government and 
enabling public scrutiny of the rulemaking process.490 Optimally, 
a functionalist approach to private delegation-grounded in 
ensuring that the government remains accountable under the 
Constitution without evading its protections via non-governmental 
agents-might transfer to other doctrinal contexts in which futile 
public-versus-private distinctions currently dominate. 
D. CONFINING DATA INSOURCING AFTER RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
For the fIrst time in history, privately developed technology is 
driving government surveillance"'! By insourcing data, the 
government bootstraps the private sector's extra-constitutional 
status for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and thereby evades 
public accountability for surveillance derived from that data. This 
is because, as with the state action doctrine, the Fourth 
Amendment's third party doctrine bifurcates the public and 
private spheres for purposes of triggering constitutional 
protections, frustrating the Fourth Amendment objective of 
maintaining a separation between the government and individual 
zones of privacy.492 Much like the concept of constitutional 
·1110 Unlike a state action claim, moreover, such a lawsuit would not require that the 
plaintiff allege an underlying violation of individual constitutional rights. 
<191 See Michaels. supra note 12, at 902 C'[T]he private sector('s] comparative advantage 
over the government in acquiring vast amounts of potentially useful data is a function both 
of industry's unparalleled access to the American public's intimate affairs-access given by 
all those who rely on businesses to facilitate their personal, social, and economic 
transactions-and of regulatory asymmetries insufar os private organizations can at times 
obtain and share information more easi1y and under fewer legal restrictions than the 
government can when it collects similar information on its own."). 
·192 See supra Part IV.c. Numerous scholars have thus argued for the third party 
doctrine's retirement, offering various justifications within the confines of existing law. 
E.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection {or Shared Privacy 
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accountability has infiltrated the Court's dialogue around private 
delegation, however, the prerogative of maintaining an 
accountable government appears in recent Fourth Amendment 
cases as a constitutional value that may overshadow the historical 
vagaries of existing doctrine in an era of ubiquitous big data 
surveillance. 
In United States u. Jones.9a and Riley u. California,494 the 
Supreme Court wrestled with the disconnect between the 
permeating police surveillance made possible by new technologies 
and outdated doctrinal barriers to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, 
without overtly disturbing them. In both cases, the Court applied 
the Fourth Amendment to constrain law enforcement's ability to 
capitalize on the unprecedented surveillance capacity of today's 
technology on the theory, articulated in Jones, that the Court 
"must 'assur(e] preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.' "495 For its part, the unanimous Riley Court held that 
the police may not search digital information on a cell phone 
incident to arrest.496 Commentators have heralded Riley as a case 
that "brings the Fourth Amendment into the digital age"497 and 
climination of the third party doctrine on the theory that data is protected under Ka tZs 
reasonable expectation of privacy test); Elspeth A. Brotherton, Big Brother Gels a Makeover: 
Behauioral Targeting and the Third.Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 592-96 (2012) 
(discussing the problems with the third·party doctrine and arguing for the imposition of a 
"competing-interests test"); Erik E. Hawkins, No Warrants Shall Issue But Upon Probable 
Cause: The Impacl of the Slored Commrmicalions Act on Priuacy Expe('tations, 4 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 257, 270-73 (2014) (discussing the need for an exception to the third· 
party doctrine in the in formation age); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Curren.t) Fourth 
Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Informa tion, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1025 (2007) (advocating for the elimination of the strict third-party 
doctrine and only applying it on a case-by-case basis). C{. Orin S. Kerr. The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 56 1. 600 (2009) C"The third party doctrine serves 
two importa nt roles: blocking s ubstitution effects tbat upset the technological neutrality of 
Fourth Amendment law and furthering clarity of Fourth Amendment rules ."). 
'" 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
'" 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
m~ Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (quoting Kyllo v. United StatljB, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001». 
~ !HI Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (holding thal "a warrant is generRlly required before such D 
search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest"). 
·m Mark Rotenberg & AJan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v. California, a Unanimorts 
Supreme Court Sets Out fourth Amendment for Digital Age, SCOTUSHI.OO (June 26, 20 14, 
6:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.comJ2014/06lsymposium·in-riIey-v·california·a-unanimous-su 
preme-court-sets-out-fourth-amendment-for-digital·agel. 
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sets the stage for substantially reconfiguring the third party 
doctrine.49" 
Like the D.C. Circuit's decision in Ass'n of American Railroads, 
Riley is noteworthy for a different reason: the Court's overt 
rejection of a "mechanical application" of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, which it conceded "might well support the warrantless 
searches at issue."499 Instead, it took a functionalist approach to 
restricting excessive government power, which focused on the 
values underlying the Fourth Amendment.50o Writing for the 
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts first emphasized that the 
"element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not 
physical records" means greater surveillance power in the hands of 
government. 50 I This is because ready government access to cell 
phone data is quantitatively and qualitatively different than 
physical searches of the past.502 A cell phone search, he wrote, 
would typically expose to the government far more 
than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone 
not only contains in digital form many sensitive 
records previously found in the home; it also contains a 
broad array of private information never found in a 
home in any form-unless the phone is.503 
408 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 249 1 (observing that a cell phone is unlike a storage cont.nin(!'r 
as it "is used to access data located elsewhere," such as "on remote RPrvprs rnthpr t.han on 
the device itself'), 
4911 Id. at 2484. In particular, the Court applied the search incident to afrest doctrine. 
which requires assessment of ... 'on the one hand, the degree to which fa wan'antlesa senrehl 
intrudes upon an mdiV1dual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which It. is needed [01' 
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.''' [d. (quoting Wyoming v. Huughton, 
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999». 
r.oo [d. at 2484-91; see Daniel J. Solove. Digital Dossiers and th(' /Ji:;sfpntioll uf ['iJl/rlll 
Amendment Prioocy. 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2002) (proposing an "an:hilecture (]f 
power" to balance government power with that of the people); see aL<;o KC'rr, .<;lIpm note :180, 
at 802-04 & n.7 (citing numerous scholars for "the view that the Fourth Ampmimpnt. Hhcmld 
be interpreted broadly in response to technological change"). 
t,(u Rile,v, 134 S. Ct.. at 2490. 
r.n2 ld. at 2489-91. 
foll:l Id. at 2491. In this way, a search of a cell phone harkens hack to thp Tf'viled writ uf 
assistance, "which were in essence open·ended search warrants, allowing officprs to sparc::h 
any premises they chose," and were used by British authorities for decades until th(')' 
expired in 1760 with the death of George II. James Otis, Against the Wnls of Assi:;/rwc'(" 
(1761), in 1 DOGUMl<;NTS Ojo' AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY: FROM THK 
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Second, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the government 
must be accountable for long-term, comprehensive monitoring-by 
whatever means achieved. To be sure, the third-party doctrine per 
se was not before the Court because the existence of a search was 
not in question.5O' Nonetheless, "[t)he United States concede[dl 
that the search incident to arrest exception may not be stretched 
to cover a search of files accessed remotely-that is, a search of 
files stored in the cloud."6<J6 The Chief Justice likened the 
government's access to the cloud via a cell phone to the search of a 
house by virtue of "finding a key in a suspect's pocket."ou6 Surely, 
he indicated, the latter would be intolerable under the Fourth 
Amendment;607 the former is thus unthinkable, as well. In Riley, 
cell phones' capacity to access data stored remotely-presumably 
on private third-party servers-was thus held up as a reason for 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 
There is a crucial distinction between the "cloud" for data 
Htorage and an individual's private residence, however: the cloud 
does not exist within the confines of a home. 'rbe government has 
described a category of cloud infrastructures as "provisioned for 
open use by the general public ... owned, managed and operated 
by a business, academic, or government organization, or some 
combination of them; and "exist[ing) on the premises of the cloud 
provider."oos Under Smith v. Maryland,5og a colorable argument 
can be made that a consumer's decision to store personal data on a 
third-party cloud server operates as a waiver of Fourth 
Amendment protections.5lO Yet the public-private distinction-so 
~'OUNIllNG TO 1896. at 38 (Melvin J. Urof.ky & Paul Finkelman •• dB" :ld ed. 2008). S .. 
gellerull:v NJo~I .... ~ON B. LASSON, TH!o; HISTORY ANn DEVEJ..(WMENT 010' THIo; FOURTH AMENIJMRNT 
'InTH,.; UNITlmSrATF.S CoN~'TITlf1'J()N 51-78 (discussing writs of assistance). 
I'Ifl I Riley, 134 S. Ct.-Ill 2480 (stating the issue to assume the l:ell phones have ht.-eu6earched). 
i'>CJ .~ Jd. at 2491. 
f)E1(i Id. 
.m [d. 
follM N A'l"I, IN~"I'. fit· H'rANflAkl}S ANI} T,.;( :II" U.S. 1),.;j"'I' 'II-' C(}MMldlf't-:, Hpl.cia) Puhl'n liOO· 
1,1!i; 1'1071'Jo:H MI-:I.L & 1'IMcrrHY CIL\NCIo:, '1'm~ NIRT OJ<;Jo'INI'I'ION 01" CLOUIl COMPUT INC: : 
R I-X!OMM";NIJATIONS OFTH}O~ NA'I'IONAI. INSTITUTfo; OF STANDARDS ANn 1",;CHNOI.ol iY 3 (20 11), 
rzvai lable ut http://csrc.nist.gov/pubJicationslnistpubslHOO·145JHP8011·145.pdf. 
~.w .1<12 U.s. 7aS (1979): Iwe ohm .. mpra nows :362-Sa Ilnd lll'cnmpnnyinK h!xt. 
li lU Ser .c.,~mith, 442 U.S. at 741-42 (finding no legit imo\,(: expectation of privacy in thf" 
llumhp.l':oI dialed on II JX'rson's phone). 
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central to Fourth Amendment doctrine to date-was missing from 
the Riley opinion. 
Lastly, Chief Justice Roberts underscored the overriding 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to justify the somewhat 
extraordinary outcome in the case. He characterized the 
Founders' objective as a "response to the reviled 'general warrants' 
and 'writs of assistance'" which were "driving forces behind the 
Revolution itself."5ll Rejecting technical doctrinal distinctions in 
favor of this broader principle, the Chief Justice insisted that 
"[t]he fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such 
information in his hand does not make the information any less 
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought."·12 He 
went so far as to mock the government's argument that it could 
develop "protocols" to address cell phone access to cloud data, 
retorting that it was "IP]robably a good idea, but the Founders did 
not fight a revolution to gain the right to government agency 
protocols ... •13 
Chief Justice Roberts's reliance on first principles is 
reminiscent of Justice Brandeis's famous dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States, 51' in which the majority upheld warrantless 
wiretapping of telephone conversations."ls Foreshadowing modern 
surveillance technology, Justice Brandeis expressed concern that 
"[w]ays may someday be developed by which the government, 
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them 
in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the 
most intimate occurrences of the home," including "unexpressed 
beliefs, thoughts and emotions."OI6 He posed the question 
rhetorically, "Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection 
against such invasions of individual security?"517 The answer to 
such questions, he suggested, must lie "in giving effect to the 
principle underlying the Fourth Amendment" and "refus[ing] to 
MI Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
512 Jd. at 2495. 
613 ld. at 249l. 
6 14 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J. t dissenting); see Rotenberg & Butler, supra note 
497 (discussing Justice Brandeis's veiled influence on the Riley opinion). 
51' Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466-69. 
&16 Id. at 474. 
li17 Id. 
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place an unduly literal construction upon it."s1B Specifically, the 
Framers "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations" and thus 
"conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men."519 "To protect that right," he added, "every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment."s20 
Big data mining enables the kind of unjustifiable intrusions on 
privacy that Justice Brandeis envisioned. Before the age of big 
data, technological limitations prevented intrusive surveillance 
unless the government secured a warrant to search a home, an 
order to wiretap, or both.s21 Chief Justice Roberts explained: "In 
Riley's case, ... it is implausible that he would have strolled 
around with video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all 
crammed into his pockets" in the "pre· digital" era."22 The tracking 
capacity of new technology creates dangers that exceed the 
Founders' worst fears. 5~3 Yet the four corners of the third party 
and public view doctrines render it technically beyond the Fourth 
Amendment's strictures. Recognizing this irony, the Riley Court 
echoed Justice Brandeis's admonition that underlying 
constitutional principles must override narrower interpretations if 
citizens are to be protected from government overreaching."24 
In her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, Justice 
Sotomayor suggested that constitutional accountability is one such 
~III Id. al 476. 
11111 Id. at 478. Justice Brandeis distinguished Burdeau II. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), 
on the grounds that 
[llhere only a single lot of papers was involved. They had been obtained by 
a private detective while acting on behalf of a private party. without the 
knowledge of any federal official. long before anyone had thought of 
instituting 8 federal prosecution. Here the evidence ... was obtained at the 
government's expense, by its officers, while acting on its behalf. 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 481-82. 
~2U Olmslead, 277 U.S. at 478-79. 
&21 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (noting that in the pre-computer 
age. surveillance was di fficult and costly). 
'" Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). 
ft2., See. Ld. at 2495 (noting that technological advances do not make per~onal information 
unworthy of the protection for which the Founders fought). 
6~' ld. at 2493. 
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principle.525 While modern surveillance affords the government 
unprecedented access to personal information, she argued, it is 
accompanied by an unprecedented lack of accountability.SZ!; Jones 
involved installation of a global positioning system (GPS) on an 
automobile for tracking purposes.627 Concurring in the majority's 
finding that law enforcement's use of the GPS constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that today's 
technology "is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance 
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously," thereby 
"evad[ing] the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community 
hostility.' "528 She underscored the Constitution's role in ensuring 
that the government's capacity for surveillance is curtailed: 
"Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government's 
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of 
identity is susceptible to abuse."529 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor 
warned, "[t]he Government can store [these] records and efficiently 
mine them for information years into the future."53o The 
consequence of "making available at a relatively low cost Buch a 
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person 
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to 
track," Justice Sotomayor observed, is that modern surveillance 
technology "may 'alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.' "531 
As in the state action context, a constitutional accountability 
principle could be applied in Fourth Amendment cases to confine 
how the government structures the processes by which it insources 
and uses third-party data. Requiring a warrant every time the 
government utilizes third-party data is not feas ible. But the 
r.26 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 966 (Sotomayor, J. t concurring) «('om:;idering th(· }<'llllrth 
Amendment's goa l "to curb arbitrary exercise of police power"). 
[,26 See id. (noting that "the Government's unrestrained power tu HAsemhlp ... I)rivah! 
nspects of identity is susceptible to abusp"), 
521 Id. at 947-49 (majorlty opinion). 
"28 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 5,10 U.H. ·119, 426 (~()()4» , 
l'>Z!J ld. 
1'>.10 Id. at 955-56 (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 6 17 1<~. 3d 1120, 1 . ~4 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from thE> denial of rE'hcnring pn hane)). 
r.:l l Id. at 956 «llInt.ing Un ited States v. CUPv8s·Pprez, 640 I·'.ad 272, ~HI'1 (7th ('ir. :U)1 1) 
(Flaum, J., concurring». 
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structural Constitution might be imposed to force the government 
to enact and follow protocols that protect individual privacy and 
ensure sufficient public oversight when it conducts big data 
searches without a warrant.632 
Suppose, for example, that by mining publicly-available data 
and matching it with information contained in government 
databases (such as satellite and closed circuit video data), the NSA 
learns that Janet Schmendrick has interacted with an individual 
who is suspected of having ties to a member of the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As a consequence, the NSA begins watching 
Janet's every move. The NSA's ability to track Janet using 
information she willingly posted on the Internet or provided to 
commercial third parties, as well as any images obtained as a 
result of her movement in public spaces, might not trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections under current doctrine. Yet, assuming 
arguendo that Janet could satisfy constitutional standing, a public 
accountability approach to the Fourth Amendment might give rise 
to an injunction requiring lesser privacy protection measures as a 
matter of constitutional necessity. Under the Riley Court's 
functionalist approach to technology and the Fourth Amendment, 
the effect of the government's big data usage--omnipresent 
surveillance reminiscent of a general warrant-would itself justify 
application of constitutional limits, regardless of the private status 
of the entities that sourced the data in the first place. 
To be sure, this Article does not make specific recommendations 
other than to posit that a plaintiff suing the NSA over its data 
collection efforts might seek a range of injunctive relief on a public 
accountability theory that appropriately balances law enforcement 
and national security interests with individual privacy protections. 
Such protections might include imposition of consent protocols: 
transparlmcy requirements; limits on wide-scale collection, 
retention, use and sharing of data; methods for ensuring the 
accuracy, relevance, and completeness of data used for 
governmental purposes; and the establishment of security 
safeguards against the risk of loss or unauthorized US(1. 
6.12 'I'hese could cotnp. in the form of I~gi818tive amennnwnts to existing data·in80urcing 
related Rtaluh·s. fl('f.> Ii"pm Part III.B, ur through infhrmal or eVl'l1 llf)u·leglsintiw l"Ulemaking. 
liOI) GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:607 
destruction, modification, or disclosure of data.633 In any event, a 
public accountability gloss on the Fourth Amendment would afford 
a more nuanced-and potentially more comprehensive-approach 
to the challenges of modern surveillance methods than do 
legislative options, which leave constitutional privacy interests 
vulnerable. Applying a constitutional accountability principle to 
reconcile modern technology with existing Fourth Amendment 
doctrine would also chip a way at the unhelpful pretense that the 
public and the private spheres are functionally distinct for 
purposes of constitutional law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The private sector's development of massive data banks, 
biometric technology, and unprecedented online monitoring 
diminishes the need for the government to extract information 
from individuals on its own. The result is an end-run around the 
constitutional limits on the government's surveillance abilities. 
This Article drew parallels between the government's use of 
private data to perform surveillance on the one hand, and its use 
of private parties to perform its constitutional functions through 
outsourcing on the other. The net effect of both phenomena is a 
marginalization of the Constitution's role in protecting 
fundamental guarantees. Private entities hold the reins on 
surveillance technology for the first time in history, and they are 
driving society towards the Orwellian state that research shows 
many Americans fear. 
This reconfiguration of the Const itution's impact on protecting 
privacy from governmental intrusion is not a result of careful 
theoretical analysis by the Supreme Court, the President or 
Congress regarding the government's constitutional obligations 
when it acts in partnership with the private sector. It is a product 
of outdated constitutional case law in the form of the Fourth 
/1:1."1 See C HRISTOPHER SU1BOGlN, PRIVACY A't' RINK: THF. NJ~W GOVlmNM f.:NT RURVF.JJ.I.ANCF. 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 74-76 (2007) (proposing modifications of Title III to make 
the provisions applicable to visual Jliurveillnnce); THE W HITE HOUSE. CONSUMER DATA 
PJuVA~'Y IN A N ETWORKED WORW: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRO'I'EC'l'INO PRJVACY ANn 
PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAl. DIGITAL ECONOMY 1-10 (201 2). auailable at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/sitesldefaultlfiles/privacyo finn1.pdf (proposing a consumer privacy bill 
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Amendment's third-party doctrine, the state action doctrine, and 
the private delegation doctrine. The constitutional blind spot 
created by the government's reliance on the private sector for its 
own functions can, however, be addressed through a reframing of 
existing doctrine in ways that show fidelity to the preservation of 
government accountability under the structural Constitution. 
